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MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE COLOMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITY

August, 2018

This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared independently by the Evaluation and Analysis for Learning Project (EVAL) of Management Systems International, a TetraTech Company.

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August 2018

Contracted under AID-514-C-13-00003

Colombia Evaluation and Analysis for Learning (EVAL) Project

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Photo Caption: Training with women in the indigenous guard in Ituango, Antioquia

Credit: Human Rights Activity

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The evaluation team thanks the study participants, including government officials, civil society representatives, and community members who shared their insights and time to participate in this study. They also thank Chemonics and the entire HRA team for their collaboration and support throughout the planning and implementation of this evaluation. Special acknowledgement goes to the field research team, including Dario Alvarado, Alejandro Cruz, and Diana Leal for assisting the core evaluation team members in conducting interviews and group discussions; Natalia Restrepo for conducting interviews in Bogota and qualitative analysis; Cristina Querubín and Laura Castro for leading the logistics and transcribing support teams and providing quality oversight of transcripts, and Pablo Gutierrez and Luisa Fernanda Torres for coding support during the qualitative analysis. The evaluation team also benefited from technical reviews from Roger Rasnake, Ana Maria Rivera, and Daniel Nowicki at Management Systems International. Finally, the evaluation team thanks USAID staff, Omar Lopez, Leonardo Reales, and Sol Gaitán, for their support during this study.

ABSTRACT

This mid-term performance evaluation of the USAID/Colombia Human Rights Activity employs a qualitative methodology to assess HRA's advancements towards its intended outcomes, relevance in the changing human rights context, and promotion of sustainability of its activities. The evaluation team conducted 136 key informant interviews and 15 group discussions to answer six evaluation questions. The evaluation found that HRA remains relevant through its regional presence and technical and contextual expertise. While HRA has incorporated activities that adequately respond to the institutional challenges that governmental entities face, there are particular strategies that can be strengthened, including issues on illegal mining, targeting Afro-Colombians, and protecting human rights leaders and defenders. HRA has contributed to and improved understanding of human rights standards among the most relevant municipal government officials and vulnerable beneficiary groups. The additional effects on beneficiaries include leadership, empowerment, and self-esteem at the individual level, which spill over into strengthening civil society and their community and family spheres. HRA's institutional strengthening strategy is oriented toward sustainability through its emphasis on supporting activities and processes linked to public policy. However, two challenges under HRA's control undermine the sustainability of its activities: 1) intensive technical assistance runs the risk of creating dependency from government officials on its regional advisors, and 2) short-term grants limit CSOs from fully implementing their projects. Finally, HRA has limited capacity and a constrained sphere of influence to achieve the objectives of its response component under the status quo. In the absence of high-level discussions between USAID and AGO officials, HRA has been strategic in approaching the AGO. However, this has resulted in a piecemeal strategy rather than a high-level comprehensive strategy that aligns with the ambitious objective of this component.

ACRONYMS

ADS	Automated Directives System
AGO	Attorney General's Office
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
COMPOS	Municipal Social Policy Committee (<i>Consejo Municipal de Política Social</i>)
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CPDH	Presidential Advisor for Human Rights (<i>Consejería Presidencial de Derechos Humanos</i>)
DEC	Development Experience Clearinghouse
ELN	National Liberation Army (<i>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</i>)
EVAL	Evaluation and Analysis for Learning Project
EQ	Evaluation Question
EWS	Early Warning System
FARC-EP	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo</i>)
FENALPER	National Federation of <i>Personeros</i> (<i>Federación Nacional de Personeros</i>)
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GD	Group Discussion
GOC	Government of Colombia
HRA	Human Rights Activity
IGO	Inspector General's Office
IR	Intermediate Result
JAC	Community Action Board (<i>Junta de Acción Comunal</i>)
JEP	Special Jurisdiction for Peace (<i>Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz</i>)
KII	Key Informant Interviews
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transexual, Intersex
MEV	Elimination of Violence against Women Roundtable (<i>Mesa de Erradicación de Violencia contra la Mujer</i>)
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOI	Ministry of the Interior
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NPU	National Protection Unit
PDET	Territorial-Focused Development Program (<i>Programa de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial</i>)
PPGNR	Prevention, Protection, and Guarantees of Non-Repetition
SOW	Statement of Work
UNOHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the mid-term performance evaluation of the Human Rights Activity (HRA) in Colombia. The evaluation was commissioned by the USAID Colombia Mission and was designed and implemented by the Evaluation and Analysis for Learning contract.

This performance evaluation aims to assess HRA's implementation progress near the midpoint in the life of the Activity and advancements towards its intended outcomes, its relevance in the changing human rights context, and its promotion of sustainability of its activities. The evaluation is expected to contribute to Mission and implementing partner program management and learning as HRA proceeds through the remaining time in its implementation period.

Background

In November 2016, the GOC and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP) signed a finalized peace accord to end its 52-year conflict. The Accord's implementation has been challenging, resulting in a recent upsurge in violence against local human rights advocates. With the demobilization of FARC-EP combatants, the government's ability to provide security for at-risk populations, while ensuring access to justice and addressing impunity of human rights violations, is being sorely tested. Many of the inroads made with support from previous human rights programs are still fragile and need ongoing assistance to ensure their sustainability.

Activity Description

Over the past 16 years, USAID/Colombia has developed the largest U.S. stand-alone human rights program in the world. HRA, implemented by Chemonics, is the fourth phase of USAID's human rights program in Colombia. It is a \$14.1 million Activity with a period of performance from April 2016 to April 2019, with two options years to continue through April 2021. HRA aims to consolidate prior gains from previous human rights programs, as well as to more effectively confront the human rights concerns of vulnerable populations.

HRA's overall strategy is to support the GOC and civil society in promoting a culture of human rights, preventing abuse and violations of human rights, and responding effectively to human rights violations once they have occurred. The Activity is focused primarily on regional human rights efforts in 40 municipalities across seven departments, while maintaining some national actions, particularly with respect to policy reforms and the implementation of post-accord measures. Activities include a differentiated approach ensuring that initiatives targeting vulnerable groups are tailored to their cultural characteristics and needs, geographic realities, and conflict circumstances.

Evaluation Questions

The evaluation answers the following evaluation questions (EQs):

1. Do the overarching and specific strategies of the Activity remain relevant in the changing human rights context from a municipal, departmental and national perspective? Has HRA adapted adequate and relevant strategies to address this changing human rights context?
2. To what extent do Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards

- and view compliance with those standards as the norm?
3. Are HRA's strategies and approaches promoting sustainability of the initiatives supported by the Activity at the GOC and civil society levels?
 4. What effect has HRA had on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity, especially on human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, women, local journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected municipalities covered by HRA?
 5. Are HRA's strategies effective and adequate for the objective of increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations? Is HRA effectively coordinating with other programs or international organizations working on impunity, such as UNOHCHR?
 6. What have been the achievements, bottlenecks and lessons learned during the implementation of the three components of HRA and its cross-cutting themes?

Evaluation Methodology

This performance evaluation employed a qualitative approach, consisting of 136 key informant interviews, 15 group discussions, a desk review of project documents, and a context analysis by human rights experts which also used third-party data from national and regional institutions. This research included eight weeks in-country, with two weeks of desk review and planning and six weeks of primary data collection in 13 municipalities and department capitals across the seven departments where HRA operates. The different stakeholders included in this evaluation are national, departmental, and municipal government officials, CSO grantees, and beneficiary groups (i.e. social leaders, youth, women, LGBTI, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian groups).¹ The team used planned/actual comparisons and pattern/content analysis to analyze these data and develop findings and conclusions for each EQ. While the evaluation triangulates evidence across different data sources and stakeholder categories to strengthen the validity and reliability of the findings, some limitations include the inability to demonstrate attribution, lack of baseline information, potential respondent bias, and non-random selection of the beneficiaries in the group discussions.

Findings and Conclusions

EQ1: Do the overarching and specific strategies of the Activity remain relevant in the changing human rights context from a municipal, departmental and national perspective? Has HRA adapted adequate and relevant strategies to address this changing human rights context?

The evaluation team found that the changing human rights context presents the GOC with several institutional challenges relating to implementing the Accord as well as territorial challenges relating to the demobilization of the FARC-EP and a reconfiguration of armed groups participating in illegal economies, which in turn exposes vulnerable populations to different risks.

The Accord alters the institutional structure of the national entities and imposes new obligations on local governments. The challenges that stem from these changes result in an increased demand from government officials for 1) human and financial resources, 2) engagement between government entities and across levels of government, and 3) knowledge and understanding by national and local government officials of what the GOC and FARC-EP agreed to in the Accord.

¹ While all of these stakeholders are HRA beneficiaries, throughout the report "beneficiaries" refers only to the population groups that participated directly in the CSO grant projects as well as social leaders.

All active armed groups have some relationship with illegal economies, including drug trafficking, illegal mining, and illegal logging, but not all aspects of the illegal economies are present in all municipalities in which HRA works. The armed groups' actions have affected a variety of vulnerable groups including human rights defenders and leaders, children and youth, women, Afro-Colombians and indigenous groups, the LGBTI population, and demobilized FARC-EP members. The risks to these vulnerable populations are not new. Yet, the reconfiguration of armed actors has worsened the situation for human rights defenders and leaders as well as indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities who are closely tied to the territory.

Key Conclusions:

- HRA stays relevant and adjusts activities in a changing human rights context through its regional presence and expert knowledge of the geographical areas in which it works.
- In this changing human rights context, HRA has incorporated activities that adequately respond to the institutional challenges that governmental entities face.
- While HRA assesses risks that stem from the presence of illegal economies, their strategy explicitly includes human rights issues related to illegal mining. However, it does not address illegal mining in a direct and comprehensive manner.
- The restrictions imposed by the USG on working with demobilized members of the FARC-EP prevents HRA from adequately addressing this, increasingly critical, segment of the population at risk of human rights violations. Moreover, this restriction can create legitimacy issues in the institutions that HRA intends to support. One example that illustrates this risk is the case where a *dupla* financed by HRA was not able to help a victim of sexual violence because she was a demobilized member of FARC-EP. This has important implications for HRA's relevance and "do no harm" principle.
- HRA focuses on the population groups most affected by human rights violations, with the notable exception of demobilized members of the FARC-EP, and has contributed to strengthening CSOs representing these groups.
- HRA's differentiated approach for the Afro-Colombian group is not reflected by most of the CSOs targeting this group and their beneficiaries, who describe their activities through a gender and youth lens, and mostly focus on the mere inclusion and participation of Afro-Colombians in these activities, which does not constitute a differentiated approach for this group.
- HRA's strategy for human rights defenders and leaders is clear at the national level, through its work with the IGO and NPU; however, the strategy is not comprehensive at addressing the severity of the situation due to increasing homicides at the regional and local levels.

EQ2: To what extent do Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards and view compliance with those standards as the norm?

HRA has contributed to improving the understanding of human rights standards for departmental and municipal government officials. Learning has focused on: 1) new obligations and public policies resulting from the Accord; 2) new competencies regarding human rights prevention and protection mechanisms, such as risk diagnostic, conflict resolution, and responding to GBV cases; and 3) better understanding of the functions of national entities such as the Ministry of Interior and National Protection Unit. The application of this knowledge is done with close support from HRA regional advisors and is evident in the formulation of public policy instruments and in the creation and activation of institutional mechanisms. It is uncertain whether the application of this knowledge will continue independently. However, government officials demonstrate limited knowledge, within the framework of their functions, on gender issues, particularly on how to assist the LGBTI population.

More than half of CSO grantees report already having internal capacity on human rights standards so their understanding of human right standards did not change due to HRA. The HRA strategy towards CSOs focuses more on strengthening capacity rather than on conceptual issues, as the latter support is only provided following requests from CSOs. While six local grantees report receiving thematic support from HRA, a few grantees state they did not receive training or technical support from HRA but think they would have benefitted from it. Social leaders who participate in the PPGNR sub-committees demonstrate a clear understanding about the relevant government entities regarding human rights as well as their responsibilities. While they confirm HRA has supported them in participating in these mechanisms, this knowledge cannot be directly attributed to HRA as it is very likely they already knew this information due to their role as leaders.

HRA has contributed to improving the understanding of human rights standards for vulnerable beneficiary groups. All the beneficiary groups have increased their knowledge about human rights and value this knowledge. There is also recognition of the enforceability of their rights. However, they express that there is a gap between the enforceability of their rights and the lack of response from the State and distrust of police. Not all beneficiaries can identify the entities responsible for guaranteeing, protecting, and respecting human rights.

Key Conclusions:

- Government officials' focus on developing and updating public policies on human rights comes from the obligation to comply with the MOI's orders, rather than from the need they see in their communities.
- HRA has contributed to improved understanding of human rights standards among the most relevant municipal officials, including *personeros*, victims' liaisons, family commissaries, and women's secretariats.
- Grassroots CSOs value and recognize HRA's technical support on conceptual issues related to human rights and gender. However HRA provides this support reactively, after receiving requests from CSOs. Some HRA grantees who could have benefitted from this support did not receive it.
- Beneficiaries frequently mention economic, social, and cultural rights when talking about human rights and their needs. This is an important outcome particularly in regions such as Cordoba, where even five years ago these rights were not part of the discourse and only violence and international humanitarian law were discussed.
- Widespread dissemination of the various response *rutas* is important to continue strengthening beneficiaries' – especially women's – knowledge about the enforceability of their rights and who to turn to for help and support.
- Not all beneficiaries can identify the entities responsible for guaranteeing, protecting, and respecting human rights. Experiential methodologies, such as the *Diócesis de Tumaco's* field trip to meet the public officials that are part of the *rutas*, may be an effective way to ingrain this knowledge.

EQ3: Are HRA's strategies and approaches promoting sustainability of the initiatives supported by the Activity at the GOC and civil society levels?

From a policy perspective, HRA aims to provide institutional strengthening assistance that is linked to national level human rights policy. HRA supports the creation or activation of Human Rights Committees and of multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms, such as the Peace Councils, which also enables formalization of human rights related policies. Most Governor's offices report that HRA is enabling sustainability by connecting its activities with the goals of the departmental development plans. Municipal and departmental government officials highly value HRA's technical assistance for the design

and implementation of public policies related to prevention of and protection from human rights abuses. However, they are concerned that it will be difficult to comply with their obligations and continue these efforts when HRA ends.

HRA focuses on strengthening community participation in public policy mechanisms, such as the PPGNR sub-committees, to increase their ownership of human rights issues and to hold government entities accountable, especially due to the high turnover of government officials. Most CSOs feel ownership of their projects, as these are based on their own strategies and were designed by them. While some design adjustments by HRA may be necessary to strengthen these projects, a few CSOs report adjusting their projects to meet HRA's needs, which reduced their sense of ownership.

HRA increases government capacity through trainings, technical assistance, the creation and activation of PPGNR sub-committees, and in developing or updating prevention and protection plans. Moreover, municipal government officials and CSOs agree that support on the documentation and systematization of good practices and methods contributes to sustaining the capacity in the face of turnovers, helps transfer knowledge between new and departing officials, and helps to replicate successful processes. These approaches reduce reliance on individual officials. Nonetheless, local authorities also note that the constant turnover in officials is an obstacle to generating and sustaining local capacities.

HRA's technical assistance is highly valued by government officials, particularly the systematic and direct support they provide on processes and plans to implement and fulfill the requirements from the MOI. In many cases, HRA's technical assistance is indispensable to local government officials who lack bandwidth capacity and technical knowledge to perform these functions independently. As such, there is an over reliance on HRA advisors to perform technical and operational functions, as they are available at any time of the day, either in person or by telephone. HRA regional advisors recognize their highly involved support, although some municipalities require this constant support due to the initial state of their institutional capacity.

Municipal and departmental government officials concur that the lack of budgetary resources for local administration puts the sustainability of HRA's work at risk. In addition, securing sufficient financial resources depends largely on the political will of the mayor or governor. The continuity of activities from most CSOs, particularly those operating at the local level, is highly dependent on financial resources from external donors, such as HRA. Moreover, almost all CSOs express concern over the grants' short timeframe. Almost forty percent of HRA grants have a period of performance of nine months or less, and grants to local or regional CSOs, which interact directly with the beneficiary population groups, are not longer than 12 months. However, HRA's short three-year period of performance with uncertain approval of its two option years, along with an over-prescription of the quantity and types of grants it is contractually obligated to fund, make it difficult for HRA to address this issue.

Key Conclusions:

- The sustainability of HRA's activities with local governments depends on a number of factors that are beyond its control, including the budgetary resource allocation, turnover in government staff and consultants, and political will. HRA aims to influence these factors by strengthening policy development processes and mechanisms, such as PPGNR sub-committee, instilling institutional capacity, and increasing civil society participation to minimize the reliance on individual officials.
- HRA's institutional strengthening strategy is oriented toward sustainability through its emphasis on supporting activities and processes linked to public policy and by responding to the risks and needs of the most vulnerable groups.

- While technical assistance is greatly valued by government officials, there is an over reliance on HRA regional advisors to perform technical and operational functions. While HRA aims to instill institutional capacity, a continued highly involved technical assistance to municipal governments could undermine the sustainability of HRA's activities.
- MOUs between USAID and departmental governments enhance interdepartmental coordination, enable departmental governments to identify and take ownership of the initiatives that USAID proposes, and streamline USAID activities in regions where there are multiple and sometime overlapping programs.
- HRA's activities bring together the local government and civil society. This can generate sustainability as long as local governments identify firsthand the community needs, community members are informed of government obligations, and trust is promoted between communities and their governments.
- HRA grants to CSOs typically have a period of performance of 9 to 12 months. The short period of performance limits the grantee's ability to have the desired impact, creates expectations from beneficiaries of continued support that cannot be fulfilled, and undermines the sustainability of the grant activities. Unfortunately, as HRA is currently set-up, it does not have much flexibility to extend the grants' duration.

EQ4: What effect has HRA had on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity, especially on human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, women, local journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected municipalities covered by HRA?

HRA has contributed to the increased participation in institutional mechanisms as well as engagement with institutional entities for social leaders and nascent groups. However, it is still not clear if beneficiaries from nascent groups can sustain this independently. The support from HRA and its grantees gives them legitimacy and beneficiaries recognize that they would have not have the same access to or reciprocity from government entities without this support.

Empowerment is the most prevalent effect across the beneficiary groups, except for the social leaders groups, as this group already stood out on this front. Beneficiaries take ownership of the knowledge gained, which spills over into their immediate nucleus (i.e. families, schools, neighbors) rather than into participation in institutional mechanisms (i.e. local councils, community action boards, etc.). All women beneficiaries express a recognition of their own value (agency) and an increased internal locus of control, that is, they feel they have greater control over the things that happen to them. They express a gained attitude of empowerment with respect to their own abilities and value as a person, not only as a mother and wife.

All of the beneficiaries, except for the social leaders, express that participating in the HRA grantee projects raised their self-esteem since it made them recognize their abilities and resiliency despite the abuse they have survived or the abandonment they had felt as a community. Social leaders did not report experiencing this, maybe because as leaders their self-esteem is already high. Most women and young beneficiaries express that the HRA grantee projects helped them lose their shyness to be able to speak publicly and with more confidence, to participate in meetings, and to express their opinions.

Most young beneficiaries express a change in how they treat others, especially with regards to the respect and tolerance of others. They state that before they participated in the project they were rude to teachers, friends, and siblings, sometimes racist and homophobic, but after learning about human rights they recognize that respect goes both ways.

Young beneficiaries and women report that they have taught what they have learned to their families and this has improved how siblings treat each other, how parents treat them (youth), and the support women feel from their husbands. Nonetheless, all beneficiaries recognize there is a sexist culture that discredits women, especially in political participation, and confines them to the roles of mother and wife. During the GDs, beneficiaries offered solutions of inclusion and strategies to demand their rights when presented with a vignette that discriminated against women's participation.

Key Conclusions:

- HRA grants aimed at empowering young people show positive contributions in forming leaders and role models. Given that youth are increasingly vulnerable to force recruitment, and illegal use and utilization for activities related to the illicit economy, grants targeted at youth play an important role, not only in the promotion, but also in the prevention of human rights violations.
- Vulnerable population groups, in particular LGBTI groups who are starting to organize formally, highly value the support and accompaniment of HRA and its grantees to strengthen their nascent groups. This also shows that grassroots CSOs may need and value more than just financial support.
- The grantee projects are generating respect and recognition from beneficiaries of different population groups, resulting in new allies, as well as facilitating dialogues between groups that do not normally sit down together (i.e. leaders, police, and government officials).
- Grassroots CSOs seem to contribute greater positive effects on beneficiaries because they provide close, consistent, and localized support.
- Empowerment goes hand in hand with increased risks that beneficiaries feel by becoming more visible in their communities or more exposed after filing complaints. This risk is exacerbated by the lack of effective response from the State. Moreover, CSOs cannot guarantee protection and beneficiaries may be left exposed to violations.
- Beneficiaries perceive a lack of knowledge and capacity from the State for an effective response to their claims. There is also a lack of trust in the authorities, especially in the police.
- The LGBTI population continues to face prejudice due to the lack of knowledge and sensitivity on the part of government officials that are an assault to their dignity and integrity.

EQ5: Are HRA's strategies effective and adequate for the objective of increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations? Is HRA effectively coordinating with other programs or international organizations working on impunity, such as UNOHCHR?

Representatives of the AGO, USAID, and UNOHCHR concur that the implementation of a prioritization approach, which has been supported by HRA, has allowed progress in the response to human rights violations by enabling assessments on the structures and patterns of these violations. In addition, AGO officials agree that HRA's support has contributed to a wider adoption of the prioritization strategy, unified its strategy regarding the response to human rights violations, and obtained an institutional vision that transcends beyond the individual officials linked to the entity.

The implementation of the prioritization strategy at the regional level is important for both HRA and USAID's Justice for a Sustainable Peace (JSP) Activity. However, the roles and responsibilities of each program for this strategy remains uncertain and may create obstacles in implementation if not addressed strategically within USAID. The overlap in strategy between HRA and JSP present an opportunity for USAID to design a clear implementation strategy with the two programs that makes the best use of their resources and capacity.

HRA's engagement with the AGO has been through individual offices with "champions" to advance in their strategy and work plan. The AGO officials reflect that this approach enables HRA to have a strategic focus, since they do not provide assistance on just any subject. AGO representatives recognize HRA's limited resources and capacity. They acknowledge that HRA adjusts to the needs of the AGO, takes into account its proposals, and focuses on specific supporting tasks to different Units within the AGO. However, UNOHCHR representatives believe that HRA's support could be leveraged with a more comprehensive strategy. Nonetheless, there are two underlying factors, which limit HRA's ability to pursue a more comprehensive strategy.

First, the AGO is a complex entity with a rigid hierarchical organizational structure that requires top-down decision-making. HRA representatives explain that changes to the organizational structure and personnel within the AGO, after the arrival of the new Attorney General in August 2016, have hampered the continuation of the projects that are being carried out, as well as the implementation of new phases of their strategy. However, the AGO officials interviewed recognize HRA's consistent ongoing relationship with the AGO that is focused on developing, implementing, and following-up on policies which allow the Activity to adapt to these changes.

Second, there is a lack of clarity in USAID's comprehensive strategy toward the AGO. The current lack of specificity has an impact on the planning and implementation of the work that the different programs, specifically HRA and JSP, carry out with the AGO, as well as on the different levels of coordination that should exist between these programs and external stakeholders that also work with the AGO. Moreover, no high-level dialogues between USAID and the AGO have taken place.

Representatives of USAID, HRA, and JSP, as well as external stakeholders (UNOHCHR and AGO), have different interpretations of what "effective coordination" entails. There is a lack of clarity from USAID as to what type of relationship its two programs should have with UNOHCHR, as well as the type of coordination that should exist between these stakeholders. There is also a gap in the perceived benefits or value-add that would result from greater external coordination.

Key Conclusions:

- HRA has limited financial and human resources capacity and a constrained sphere of influence to achieve the objectives of Component 3 under the status quo. The perceived lack of clarity in USAID's comprehensive strategy toward the AGO coupled with the fact that the AGO is a complex entity with a rigid hierarchical organizational structure that requires top-down decision-making, makes the adoption and implementation of HRA projects dependent on individual officials, which can restrict HRA in meeting all of its deliverables.
- In the absence of high-level discussions between USAID and AGO officials, HRA has been strategic in approaching the AGO through individual offices with "champions" to maximize its small budget, limited capacity, and sphere of influence. However, this has resulted in a piecemeal strategy rather than a high-level comprehensive strategy that aligns with the ambitious objective of IR 3.
- While increasing engagement with other stakeholders, such as UNOHCHR, could enhance HRA's work, it is not the barrier to achieving an increase in investigations and responses to human rights violations. Without strategic coordination within USAID and without high-level engagement between USAID and the AGO, HRA remains constrained in how it can provide support.

EQ6: What have been the achievements, bottlenecks and lessons learned during the implementation of the three components of HRA and its cross-cutting themes?

Component I: Promotion

Key Achievements:

- Contribute to increasing visibility and awareness of the human rights situation in areas where it previously was not possible to address these issues.
- Departmental and municipal officials demonstrate an improved understanding about human rights, especially with respect to the regulatory framework.
- In Meta and Tolima, designed models and proposals for Human Rights and Peace Schools as a strategy to strengthen the culture of peace and respect for human rights.
- Diploma course facilitate engagement and interaction between stakeholders that do not tend to dialogue with each other, due to the historical conflict. These courses also serve to strengthen ties and relations between civil society and local authorities.
- Contributed to empowering vulnerable communities, specifically LGBTI, youth, women, and indigenous beneficiaries through its grant support of local CSOs.
- HRA has been successful in empowering women and LGBTI grassroots CSOs by increasing their knowledge and strengthening their leadership and organizational capacity. The support provided by HRA was not only financial (through grants) but also through mentoring support.

Bottlenecks and Challenges:

- While local government officials apply newly acquired knowledge to the design of public policies, their capacity to interact in an informed manner with vulnerable communities, particularly women and LGBTI members, continues to be limited.
- The multi-actor dialogues (police, local authorities, and community members) were not implemented as planned due to low interest from the mayor's office and low participation from police officers.
- Although the *duplas* are mentioned repeatedly by HRA staff in Bogota and by the National Ombudsman's Office, only one interviewee at the department and municipality level speak about their activities or results.
- The challenge for the differentiated *rutas* for GBV against women and LGBTI communities lies in their effective implementation by the local institutions.
- There is a large dispersion of activities within the promotion component as HRA simultaneously supports a variety of initiatives, education entities, and institutions that are not all tied to the Ministry of Education. Without close communication and coordination there is a risk that HRA would be supporting activities that do not coincide with the standards set in national public policies.
- The activities for the promotion of human rights are mostly limited to urban areas due to logistics and operational issues for HRA staff and current CSO grantees.

Lessons Learned:

- HRA's training activities, where a variety of actors participate, serve a dual purpose of promotion of human rights and bringing the community into closer contact with local government institutions and with other actors they have historically been distant from.
- The four Human Rights Student Olympics held in only a couple of municipalities in Antioquia create incentives for youth to learn more about human rights issues.
- The experiential methods used by organizations such as *Diócesis de Tumaco* have demonstrated stronger results in terms of gained knowledge and feelings of ownership in young beneficiaries. HRA should promote the replication of these experiential methods with other grantees.

- The grantees with the greatest contributions on the population are the grassroots CSOs, as they respond clearly to the situation in the territory and have been able to empower the communities in which they work. The current human rights context requires that these organizations are known to the communities and have members who live in the area.

Component 2: Prevention

Key Achievements:

- HRA's strong regional staff with technical and contextual expertise, have positioned the Activity as a credible expert and strategic partner to department and municipal government officials, CSOs, and the MOI, especially on matters of public policy for the prevention and protection of human rights.
- HRA's technical assistance has resulted in significant progress in formulating and updating the prevention and protection plans as well as in the creation or activation of PPGNR sub-committees in most of the municipalities it supports.
- HRA has strengthened LGBTI organizations in the identification of risk and in their capacity to demand respect for their rights. This has contributed to their empowerment and increased engagement with local authorities, resulting in the creation of institutional mechanisms, such as the LGBTI roundtable in Tumaco.
- HRA coordinated with the National Police to organize the first meeting of police human rights coordinators from across the country. Additionally, HRA supported the design of a protection *ruta* for human rights defenders, which was incorporated into the Police Conduct Guide for Vulnerable Populations (this guide was designed by HRA's predecessor program).

Bottlenecks and Challenges:

- HRA regional advisors report that administrative work takes up too much of their time that could be used implementing HRA activities.
- The limited local budgets, lack of political will of some mayors, and high turnover of public officials create bottlenecks for the implementation of prevention and protection policies.
- One of the most visible challenges for HRA, in terms of sustainability, is the over reliance on HRA regional advisors from a large proportion of government officials.
- There is a large variation on CSOs' expertise with self-protection methodologies. Some of them did not have a clear understanding of the concept (for example, *LIMPAL*) or of how to initially design the plans and mechanisms (for example, *Consejo Comunitario de Rio Gualajo*). Given HRA's expertise in these topics, and upcoming Grants RFA oriented at self-protection projects, it is important for HRA to provide technical assistance to CSOs from the time projects are designed.
- HRA supported the formalization of the Observatory of Human Rights in the Mayor's Office, who has transitioned its operations to the *Diócesis de Tumaco*. However, municipal officials express concern that permanent funding of stronger technical staff is needed for the Observatory to meet its objectives and for the *Diócesis* to sustain it.
- Although HRA supported the preparation of a study on the impacts of illegal mining and other illegal economies on human rights with the Ombudsman's Office, the utilization of this study is uncertain.
- Results 2.6 under this component consists of strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations to "advocate and monitor" development and implementation of human rights protections. However, the evaluation found that actions under this result focus only on the advocacy part; no actions were identified that are specifically aimed at monitoring.

Lessons Learned:

- The initial stage of technical assistance at the department and municipal level required systematic and constant support, as well as a direct presence in the territory. However, developing an exit strategy for the technical assistance activities is fundamental to establishing sustainable processes.
- Several CSOs value HRA's presence as an effective strategy to approach government institutions, as they feel HRA gives them greater receptivity and credibility.
- Designing and implementing self-protection methodologies is not a generalizable or standardized process. HRA can leverage its expertise to train CSOs and provide technical support to identify and analyze risks and to design plans of prevention, mitigation and response to human rights violations.
- Local CSOs create bridges between their beneficiaries and government institutions. HRA should continue working strategically with these local CSOs as a strategy to reach vulnerable populations, to make their needs visible, and to give them access to government entities.
- Extending HRA for two more years until April 2021 would give the Activity the opportunity to participate in the design process of new municipal and departmental development plans, which can enable HRA to influence the allocation of resources, the design of strategies, and the setting of objectives towards human rights.

Component 3: Response

Key Achievements:

- HRA's support has enabled the AGO to implement a prioritization approach in investigations, which implies advancing investigations from a context analysis lens rather than following the perpetrator who committed a specific violation. This support has resulted in several achievements that are important for the AGO's mission and that enable it to fulfill its functions more effectively.
- The documentation of cases of human rights violations, particularly of GBV cases, has an important role in the strategic litigation in courts. In addition, it contributes to the rehabilitation and recovery of the women affected, so they can overcome the emotional impact of the violence faced.
- HRA, through its CSO grantee, *Corporación Humanas*, has developed case guides on GBV for regional prosecutors, which include research, documentation, and judicial tools that are disseminated within dialogue mechanisms with these officials.

Bottleneck and Challenges:

- There is a perceived lack of clarity, among HRA, JSP, and UNOHCHR, on the comprehensive strategy USAID wants to advance with the AGO, along with an absence of high-level discussions between USAID and the AGO. This results in a lack of buy-in and involvement from the key decision-makers in the entity. AGO's rigid hierarchical organizational structure makes the need for high-level dialogue and agreement between USAID and the AGO even more critical.
- In the absence of these high-level discussions between USAID and top AGO officials, HRA has been restricted to, but strategic, in approaching the AGO through individual offices with "champions" to maximize its small budget, limited capacity, and sphere of influence. However, this has resulted in a piecemeal strategy rather than a high-level comprehensive strategy that aligns with the ambitious objective of IR 3.
- HRA's implementation is also being affected by USAID assigning overlapping areas of action under this component to its two programs, HRA and JSP. This is generating a different understanding, between the two programs, of who and how the prioritization strategy will be implemented at the regional and local level.
- The documented cases related to GBV do not necessarily serve as inputs for the prosecution of the perpetrators of the violations, due to the continued distrust in the judicial system by the women involved and the ongoing presence of armed actors that deter formal complaints.

- The new institutional framework established for the post-conflict period and the new obligations for those entities that the Accord creates, such as the Truth Commission and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, represent challenges for an effective response to human rights violations.

Lessons Learned:

- A clearly defined comprehensive strategy from USAID may facilitate a more effective adoption, implementation, and monitoring of a program such as HRA. Harmonizing this strategy across its different programs requires taking into consideration the resources, capacity, and sphere of influence of each program.
- Refining a strategy that focuses on working with a centralized and hierarchical government entity, such as the AGO, can be facilitated by engaging high-level officials in dialogue to obtain buy-in and commitment for specific projects.
- Coherence between the grants linked to the AGO and the work carried out in the AGO at the national level is needed to prevent confusion among officials at the regional and municipal level.

Recommendations

Recommendations for HRA's relevance and adequate adaptation to the changing human rights context

- 1.1 Economic, social, and cultural rights are priorities for the communities where HRA is working, so USAID should consider how to integrate these rights into its human rights programming.
- 1.2 Given USG restriction on working directly with demobilized FARC-EP members, HRA should focus their support on public policy formulation and implementation with national and local government institutions rather than supporting human resources in institutions that have direct contact with this population group. This would avoid creating legitimacy issues in the institutions that HRA intends to support.
- 1.3 HRA should more clearly develop its differential approach for the Afro-Colombian population to close the gap between what CSO grantees and their beneficiaries report and what is developed conceptually for these activities.
- 1.4 USAID should assess how it can expand HRA's strategy on human rights issues associated with illegal mining to include relevant issues on working conditions of small-scale workers miners.
- 1.5 Given the changing human rights context and increasing risks to human rights leaders and defenders in the regions where the Activity operates, HRA should expand its strategy to work with this population group as a cross-cutting task.

Recommendations for improving the understanding of human rights standards

- 2.1 HRA should continue supporting the *personeros* through its grantee, FENALPER.
- 2.2 Given that organizing and facilitating dialogues between the police and vulnerable populations in at least seven departments is an expected result (Result 1.1.2), and activities implemented so far have fallen short, HRA should reassess its approach with the police to achieve this result.
- 2.3 HRA should enhance its LGBTI thematic focus in its training activities for government officials, including the police force.
- 2.4 HRA should conduct a strategic and formal review of their grantees' needs with respect to thematic support. This is not only relevant for grassroots organizations.

- 2.5 HRA should promote the replication of experiential methods that have been effective tools for beneficiaries to learn about human rights, such as field trips to meet relevant government entities. One potential way of doing this would be to establish a Community of Practice for its grantees, where CSOs come together to share and learn from each other's experiences and challenges.

Recommendations for promoting sustainability

- 3.1 HRA's short three-year period of performance, along with two separate option years, limit HRA's ability to promote the sustainability of its activities. The evaluation team recommends extending HRA's period of performance for two years from now, until April 2021.
- 3.2 USAID should continue to promote and leverage the signing of MOUs with departmental governments.
- 3.3 As HRA continues to support local development plans, it should work with local governments to define actions that are financially possible.
- 3.4 HRA should start developing exit strategies for their technical assistance activities to government officials that focus on strengthening institutional capacity, through the further documentation of processes and best practices, and minimizing over reliance on HRA advisors. The handover of functions and action plans should be tailored based on the municipality's current and projected capacity with consideration to not overburden officials.
- 3.5 HRA should continue promoting the creation of mechanisms and processes where government officials and community members can engage in dialogue and increase their confidence in each other.
- 3.6 HRA should strategically support and engage the JACs, as another stakeholder to minimize reliance on individual officials and to increase local ownership and participation in public policy in rural areas.
- 3.7 HRA should prioritize grants to local CSOs with a strong local presence to increase local capacity and ownership, and to more closely reach local populations.
- 3.8 USAID and HRA should reassess the structure of the Grants Fund to better meet the diverse needs of the different organizations they fund and to provide support through a sustainability lens. Two potential enhancements could include:
- *Funding stages for grassroots organizations:* A dynamic model to strengthen local CSOs and support the scaling up of grassroots organizations while enabling HRA to manage risk sensibly.
 - *Sliding scale funding to graduate CSOs:* Longer timeframe grants with two or three rounds, where financial and technical support are on sliding scales, depending on the needs of the CSO.

Recommendations for maximizing effects on beneficiaries

- 4.1 HRA should strategically continue to fund youth-targeted projects with longer timeframes and evaluate the grantees previously funded for a second round.
- 4.2 HRA should strategically expand its holistic support – financial, technical, and organizational – to grassroots organization and continue to leverage the expertise of more established CSOs for mentoring.
- 4.3 Given the new or increased risks faced by beneficiaries, HRA should make strategic revisions to its risk and context analysis to develop specific methodologies for contingency plans and more formal “do no harm” plans.

Recommendations for advancing the objective of increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations

- 5.1 USAID should define and design a comprehensive strategy regarding its relationship with the AGO. It should include clearly defined objectives, focused on implementable projects that can that aim to advance these objectives. The relationship between USAID and the AGO must be strategic and not a sum of activities through the different USAID programs.
- 5.2 Following recommendation 5.1, USAID should pursue high-level meetings with AGO officials with the purpose of getting buy-in from the entity, finalizing this strategy, and defining the adoption and implementation of the different projects linked to it.
- 5.3 Rather than simply focusing on coordination between HRA and other organizations, such as UNOHCHR, USAID should shift toward a collaboration, learning, and adaptation (CLA) framework to leverage or maximize its efforts across these stakeholders.
- 5.4 HRA, with participation from USAID, should coordinate with the Justice for Sustainable Peace Program on taking the prioritization strategy to the local level.
- 5.5 Under the status quo, and in the absence of high-level engagement between USAID and the AGO, HRA and USAID should assess whether it might be efficient to invest more efforts in supporting CSOs who engage with the AGO (such as *Corporación Humanas*, *Caribe Afirmativo*, and *CODHES*).

INTRODUCTION

This report presents the mid-term performance evaluation for the Human Rights Activity (HRA, also referred to as “the Activity”) in Colombia. The evaluation was commissioned by the USAID Colombia Mission and was designed and implemented by the Evaluation and Analysis for Learning (EVAL) contract. Annex A provides USAID’s Statement of Work for the evaluation.

The first section of the report describes the purpose of the evaluation, presents the evaluation questions, and provides background information and an overview of HRA. The second section explains the evaluation methodology, data collection and analysis methods, and limitations. The third section presents the findings and conclusions of the evaluation. The last section presents the evaluation team’s recommendations.

EVALUATION PURPOSE

The purpose of this performance evaluation is to assess HRA’s implementation progress near the midpoint in the life of the Activity, to determine 1) whether HRA is on-track in implementing its deliverables to achieve its intended outcomes, 2) if the activities and outcomes are still relevant based on the current local context, and 3) if HRA’s institutional strengthening interventions are sustainable. In accomplishing this purpose, the evaluation team assessed if the support provided by HRA has contributed to changes in key Government of Colombia (GOC) institutions that support the promotion of human rights, and the prevention of and response to human rights violations.

The primary audience of this evaluation is USAID/Colombia and HRA. The evaluation is expected to contribute to Mission and implementing partner program management and learning as HRA proceeds through the second half of its remaining implementation period. Since HRA works closely with the local, regional, and national partners, Colombian officials in the justice sector, legislators, and other government administrators are also expected to benefit from the evaluation findings and conclusions.

This evaluation provides USAID with lessons learned and recommendations to improve HRA’s implementation to achieve expected results. It also indicates which selected strategies or activities across the three HRA components should be further emphasized, modified, or eliminated, and why. Finally, it provides information to help USAID make decisions for improving the sustainability of HRA initiatives at the GOC and civil society levels, and offers input to help USAID make human rights programming decisions.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Per USAID’s SOW, with slight revisions made and approved by USAID on 7 February 2018, this performance evaluation answers the following evaluation questions (EQs):

1. Do the overarching and specific strategies of the Activity remain relevant in the changing human rights context from a municipal, departmental and national perspective? Has HRA adapted adequate and relevant strategies to address this changing human rights context?
2. To what extent do Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards and view compliance with those standards as the norm?
3. Are HRA’s strategies and approaches promoting sustainability of the initiatives supported by the

Activity at the GOC and civil society levels?

4. What effect has HRA had on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity, especially on human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, women, local journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected municipalities covered by HRA?
5. Are HRA's strategies effective and adequate for the objective of increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations? Is HRA effectively coordinating with other programs or international organizations working on impunity, such as UNOHCHR?
6. What have been the achievements, bottlenecks and lessons learned during the implementation of the three components of HRA and its cross-cutting themes?

ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

Background

In November 2016, the GOC and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP for the initials in Spanish, *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo*) signed a finalized peace accord to end its 52-year conflict. As expected, the peace accord’s implementation has been challenging. Nowhere have these difficulties been more evident than the recent upsurge in violence against local human rights advocates. The FARC-EP demobilization catalyzed violence at the local level, as armed groups and dissidents continue to fight over former FARC territory and the lucrative illegal economies and trade routes they contain.

With the demobilization of FARC-EP combatants, the government’s ability to provide security for social leaders, human rights defenders, journalists and ethnic communities, while ensuring access to justice for victims and addressing impunity of human rights violations, is being sorely tested. Many of the inroads made with support from previous human rights programs are still fragile and need ongoing assistance to ensure their sustainability. Substantial challenges remain with respect to institutional structures, implementation of laws and policies at the national and local levels, adaptation capacity, and overall understanding of and support for human rights among Colombians at large. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are playing a more relevant role in this context, serving as a bridge and trust-builders between an absent state and communities abandoned for decades.

As for the threats and homicides of human rights defenders and social leaders, recent scrutiny over related figures by some Colombian government entities, including the Inspector General’s Office (IGO) and the National Ombudsman’s Office, has generated a fierce debate over whether these cases constitute a trend. More importantly, each regional dynamic is different and the profiles of homicide cases have broadened the traditional definition of human rights defenders and social leaders to be inclusive of community leaders (i.e., community action board presidents, *campesino* leaders, land restitution leaders, victims, etc.). Most government/state entities have been hesitant to label these killings as systematic, and instead assess the majority to be isolated cases. On a larger scale, the silencing of those denouncing illegal presence and activities stands to jeopardize any progress made under the nascent and fragile post-accord implementation phase. This complex situation directly impacts HRA’s activities in its targeted regions.

Activity Overview

Over the past 16 years, USAID/Colombia has developed the largest U.S. stand-alone human rights program in the world. HRA, implemented by Chemonics, is the fourth phase of USAID’s human rights program in Colombia. It is a \$14.1 million Activity with a period of performance from April 2016 to

April 2019, with two options years to continue through April 2021. HRA aims to consolidate prior gains from previous human rights programs, as well as to more effectively confront the human rights concerns of vulnerable populations. HRA is focused primarily on regional human rights efforts in 40 municipalities across seven departments, while maintaining some national actions, particularly with respect to policy reforms and the implementation of post-accord measures.

HRA's overall objective is to support the GOC and civil society in promoting a culture of human rights, preventing abuse and violations of human rights, and responding effectively to human rights violations once they have occurred. The Activity's three core components have the following specific objectives:

- **Component 1 - Promotion of a culture of human rights:** Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and the general public in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards and view compliance with those standards as the norm.
- **Component 2 – Prevention of human rights violations:** Policies to prevent human rights violations are developed and implemented.
- **Component 3 – Adequate and effective response to human rights violations:** Investigation and prosecution of human rights violations are increased.


In addition, HRA is guided by six main principles which are built into all program tasks and activities:


- Regional/local emphasis: HRA's primary focus is to implement interventions and assist with the implementation of national policies at the local level. HRA emphasizes building on public participation, strong institutions, and tailored solutions at the local level with support from a decentralized team of regional human rights advisors, a community grants fund, and close partnerships with local leaders.
- Empower vulnerable groups: HRA focuses on strengthening policies and projects that prevent human rights violations against at-risk groups, which include human rights defenders, indigenous and Afro-Colombians, journalists, women, youth, members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and intersex (LGBTI) community, and victims of the conflict, with a focus on sexual and gender-based violence (GBV). The ultimate objective is to increase GOC authorities' awareness of specific risks faced by certain vulnerable populations and enable them to fulfill their obligations to provide for their protection.
- Flexibility and information-driven decisions: To respond to the dynamic context of the country, HRA incorporates continual contextual and thematic analyses to engrain flexibility in programming to respond to evolving local human rights issues. HRA design and strategies can and are expected to be altered to seize opportunities to achieve better outcomes with existing resources.
- Differentiated approach: Activities include a differentiated approach ensuring that initiatives targeting vulnerable groups are tailored to their cultural characteristics and needs, geographic realities and conflict circumstances.
- Promote sustainability: HRA applies a strategy in which local, regional and national partners build capacities sufficient to not only participate, but lead human rights initiatives. Sustainability is a key goal for HRA and, accordingly, is integrated into programming from the design phase.
- Other USAID, USG, and donor coordination and private/public partnerships: HRA plans and carries out program activities with a clear understanding of the scope and impacts of other donors or programs, not only to increase complementarities and avoid duplication or inconsistencies in effort, but to leverage opportunities to optimize impact through joint implementation or collaboration.

Development Hypotheses

The theory of change that underlies HRA is that if the Activity strengthens government institutions and civil society organizations to effectively serve as agents of change at the local level, then respect for human rights and peace will be improved, and policies will reflect special considerations for vulnerable populations. The results framework, shown in Figure 1 below, guides HRA’s approach to implementing USAID’s vision for the project, linked directly to USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for 2014-2018. The results framework incorporates crosscutting responses, including a differentiated approach on gender inequity and vulnerable populations.

Figure 1: HRA Results Framework





EVALUATION APPROACH

This performance evaluation employed a qualitative approach that relies on semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs) and group discussions (GDs), supplemented with a range of qualitative and quantitative reporting data from a comprehensive desk review of HRA results and available outcome measures as well as third-party data from national and regional institutions. The team triangulated findings across the primary and secondary data sources to explore the contribution of HRA activities on outcomes of interest related to their component objectives and guiding principles. This type of evaluation provides details about activity processes, general relationships between activity inputs and outputs, and relevance to the changing context, but cannot definitively attribute outcomes to the HRA activities. Annex B provides a more detailed description of the evaluation approach and includes the evaluation design matrix summarizing data sources, data collection methods, and limitations.

Sampling Methodology

Municipality Selection

The evaluation team visited a purposive sub-sample of the 40 HRA municipalities and all department capitals, except for Pasto (Nariño). A random sample of municipalities was not chosen since HRA's strategic approach is not to cover their 40 municipalities homogeneously. Instead, the municipality selection process was intentional in reaching both broad geographic coverage of the HRA implementation area and broad activity coverage. First, the evaluation team set the target number of municipalities to be visited to 13, based on the evaluation timeline and scope. Second, this target number of municipalities was divided proportionally across all seven departments to account for the larger number of municipalities and therefore HRA investments in certain departments, such as Antioquia. Third, within each department the evaluation team selected individual municipalities to balance important characteristics, including HRA activities, number of CSO grantees, population size and proportion of rural population, indigenous and Afro-Colombian population, homicide rates (2015 and 2016), forced displacement rates (2016 and 2017), demobilization zone status, and security conditions. Finally, the evaluation team consulted with HRA and USAID to finalize the list of municipalities. Table 1 and Table 2 below show the evaluation sample, consisting of 13 municipalities (one-third of the total HRA coverage area) and 6 department capitals. Annex C includes the municipality characteristics matrix used for the sample selection and a list of the HRA municipalities.

Table 1: Municipality Sample Summary

Department	Total HRA Municipalities	Evaluation Sample	
		Municipalities	Department Capital
Antioquia	12	4	Medellín
Córdoba	3	1	Montería
Tolima	6	2	Ibagué
Cauca *	6	2	Popayán
Nariño	3	1	---
Meta	6	2	Villavicencio
Caquetá *	4	1	Florencia
Total	40	13	6

* An additional municipality was visited in Caquetá and Cauca, but are not reflected in this table because only one interview was completed in each of them.

Table 2: List of Municipalities and Department Capitals in the Evaluation Sample

Department	Evaluation Sample	
	Municipalities	Department Capital
Antioquia	Ituango	Medellín
	Remedios	
	Segovia	
	Caucasia	
Córdoba	Tierralta	Montería
Tolima	Chaparral	Ibagué
	Cajamarca	
Cauca	Caloto	Popayán
	Santander de Quilichao	
	<i>Buenos Aires *</i>	
Nariño	Tumaco	---
Meta	Mesetas	Villavicencio
	Vistahermosa	
Caquetá	San Vicente de Caguán	Florencia
	<i>La Montañita *</i>	

* Only one interview was completed in each of these municipalities.

Data Collection Methods

The evaluation team conducted a desk review of HRA documents and an initial context analysis using third-party data from 22 January to 9 February. Annex D includes a list of the documents reviewed and the bibliography for the context analysis. Primary data collection (KIs and GDs) took place from 12 February to 16 March. The evaluation team visited 13 municipalities and six department capitals across the seven departments where HRA is currently operating and completed a total of 136 KIs and 15 GDs.

The different stakeholders included in this evaluation are national, departmental, and municipal government officials, CSO grantees, and beneficiary groups (i.e. social leaders, youth, women, LGBTI, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian groups).² The evaluation team obtained informed consent from all respondents before carrying out any interviews and GDs. All GDs and all, but six, interviews were audio recorded. The interviews with USAID and the AGO were not recorded since electronic equipment was not allowed onto the premises, and one municipal official in Meta refused to be audio recorded. For these six interviews, extensive notes were taken and incorporated into the data analysis.

Key Informant Interviews

The evaluation team conducted semi-structured interviews with a range of HRA stakeholders at the national, departmental, and municipal levels. In Bogota, KIIs included government entities, regional and national CSOs, international organizations, HRA staff and USAID representatives. At the department level, the evaluation team conducted between 4 and 8 interviews with different officials, such as the Secretary of Social Inclusion, advisor to the Departmental Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights Directorate, and regional Ombudsman’s Office, as well as any CSO grantees operating at the department level and HRA regional staff. At the municipal level, KIIs included various officials at the Mayor’s Office who had knowledge of and direct involvement in HRA activities, the Police, Family Commissaries, *Personerías*³, and local CSO representatives. The evaluation team conducted interviews with all of HRA’s GOC partners and all but two CSO grantees.⁴ While almost all KIIs were conducted face-to-face at the interviewee’s office or preferred location, four interviews were conducted via Skype due to scheduling conflicts. Table 3 shows the breakdown of KIIs by stakeholder category. Annex D includes the complete list of interviewees.

Table 3: Key Informant Interview Distribution

Stakeholder Category	Number of Interviews
National government officials	13
Departmental government officials	19
Municipal government officials	34
Civil society organizations (grantees)	29
Social leaders (beneficiaries)	15
USAID	3
UNOHCHR	2
UNDP	1
HRA (Bogota staff and regional advisors)	20
Total	136

The selection of KII respondents was done in consultation with HRA to identify the most relevant respondents within the government entities and CSOs. The list of government entities and CSOs was

² While all of these stakeholders are HRA beneficiaries, throughout the report “beneficiaries” refers only to the population groups that participated directly in the CSO grant projects as well as social leaders.

³ *Personerías* are municipal offices under the Public Ministry responsible for monitoring the management and conduct of public officials in the Mayor’s Offices and other decentralized entities; guarding the promotion and protection of human rights; monitoring due process, the conservation of the environment, the public patrimony and the efficient provision of public services, to guarantee citizens the defense of their rights and interests.

⁴ *Fundación Mi Sangre* was unavailable for an interview, after multiple scheduling attempts from the evaluation team. The grant to *Consejo de Redacción* was awarded in January 2018 so the evaluation team did not interview them because they had only recently begun implementation of their project.

compiled with HRA's support and supplemented by the evaluation team through the review of HRA's ongoing activities, work plans, and contract deliverables. HRA provided contact information for all of the selected respondents. While the evaluation team coordinated with the HRA regional advisors on logistics and scheduling, the evaluation team called all respondents directly to schedule the KIIs. The evaluation team reached a 96 percent response rate from the initial list of respondents.

The evaluation team developed KII guides linked to the EQs and stakeholder categories by creating an evaluation framework. This evaluation framework consisted of deriving research questions from each EQs. From those research questions, sub-questions and themes were defined. Then the stakeholder categories were linked to the sub-questions. This process resulted in KII guides that covered key themes to answer each EQ and ensured that multiple information sources were linked to each EQ. The KII guides were then prepared for each stakeholder category, covering the relevant themes from the evaluation framework. Annex E includes the interview guides.

Group Discussions

In addition to KIIs, the evaluation team conducted GDs to understand the process and results associated with beneficiaries' increased knowledge of human rights standards (EQ2) as well as the effects on beneficiaries of the CSOs supported by the Activity (EQ4). The GDs allowed respondents to reflect upon and make sense of shared experiences and provided evaluation team with a clear picture of the beneficiary experience. The GDs were led by an evaluation team member and a second team member provided logistical support. The evaluation team prepared semi-structured GD guides that covered (i) key discussion topics identified through the evaluation framework process described above, and (ii) situational vignettes describing hypothetical situations to which participants reacted, thereby revealing their knowledge, perceptions, values, social norms, and impressions of the events.⁵

The evaluation team conducted at least two GDs per beneficiary category, including women, LGBTI persons, youth, indigenous and Afro-Colombians, and social leaders (members of the human rights committees, prevention subcommittees, and municipal social policy committees), as shown in Table 4 below. The GDs were dispersed across the departments; however, more than one GD was conducted in some municipalities that had a larger number of CSO grantees, such as Tumaco. In total, the evaluation team conducted 15 GDs, which included 109 beneficiaries.

Table 4: Group Discussions by Beneficiary Group

Beneficiary Category	# GDs	Participants	M / F
Youth *	3	23	10 / 13
Women *	4	30	0 / 30
GBV victims (women)	1	4	0 / 4
Social leaders	3	19	9 / 10
LGBTI persons	2	13	9 / 4
Indigenous persons	2	20	5 / 15
Total	15	109	33 / 76

* One of these GDs were completely composed of Afro-Colombian persons, that is, Afro-Colombian women and Afro-Colombian youth. Afro-Colombian persons were also present in other GDs (social leaders and LGBTI groups).

⁵ Hughes, R., & Huby, M. (2012). The construction and interpretation of vignettes in social research. *Social Work and Social Sciences Review*, 11(1), 36-51.

GD participant recruitment was done in collaboration with HRA and CSO grantees. While a random selection of beneficiaries was proposed in the Evaluation Design Report, in practice the evaluation team was not able to accomplish this. The grantee CSOs did not agree to provide anonymized lists of their beneficiaries. The stated reasons included: security concerns since their beneficiaries are vulnerable populations; internal organization regulations that prohibit them from sharing beneficiary data; and a preference for contacting their own beneficiaries directly. Instead of random selection, the evaluation team coordinated with the CSOs by indicating the profiles of the required persons, focusing on beneficiaries who had attended the project activities. For each GD, ten beneficiaries were invited to participate in order to obtain the attendance of at least eight beneficiaries.

Data Analysis Methods

During each week of fieldwork, evaluation team members reviewed their interview notes and filled out a regional report with the most important information and insights gained on each EQ from the KIIs and GDs conducted that week. All interview audio files were transcribed and after fieldwork was completed, the evaluation team conducted content analysis using Atlas.ti software. The evaluation framework, described above, served as the foundation for the set of codes to capture themes and broader trends. In addition, open coding captured emerging themes, especially those unanticipated, during an initial review of the data. The content analysis aggregated responses around themes and trends relevant to each EQ. The evaluation team also analyzed data within and across geographic strata and stakeholder category to develop a thorough understanding of responses, address contradictory findings, and highlight common themes and narratives. The evaluation team also paid close attention to similarities and differences in responses and experiences among beneficiary groups (women, youth, Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations, and LGBTI) to address how HRA's approach is tailored to the needs and priorities of these different vulnerable groups.

To answer the evaluation questions, the evaluation team analyzed all data collected from all of the sources, including HRA documents, third-party data and reports, and primary data transcripts (KIIs and GDs). The answers that each data source provided was compared to the others to determine whether they converge or diverge. This triangulation process was also conducted for the responses from the different stakeholders, taking into account their different geographic areas and varying needs and priorities that may affect their perceptions and experiences.

Following this data analysis process, the evaluation team conducted an internal findings, conclusions, and recommendations workshop to assess the evidence against each EQ, consolidate preliminary findings, and develop conclusions and recommendations. Following this workshop, the evaluation team held a debrief session with USAID/Colombia and presented the preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations as an opportunity to validate results and receive and incorporate feedback.

Evaluation Team Composition

The evaluation team consisted of a technical advisor, an evaluation specialist and team leader, human rights experts, qualitative researchers, and logistics assistants.

- Irene Velez – Team Leader and Evaluation Specialist
- Maria Angelica Alvarado – Local Human Rights and Institutional Strengthening Expert
- Natalia Estupiñán – Local Human Rights Expert
- Natalia Restrepo – Local Judicial Sector Expert
- Dario Alvarado, Alejandro Cruz, and Diana Leal – Local Qualitative Field Researchers
- Susan Minushkin – Technical Advisor

The evaluation team also received support from EVAL's subcontractor, the Centro Nacional de Consultoría, including fieldwork logistics, transcription, quality assurance, and administrative oversight. The team members signed conflict of interest disclosure statements, which are retained by MSI and available upon request.

Evaluation Limitations

The design and implementation of this evaluation faced several limitations and potential biases from respondents, which the evaluation team sought to mitigate to the best of its ability.

- **Inability to demonstrate attribution:** Since the evaluation does not include a comparison group, the findings do not support causal inference. While stakeholders report about their gained knowledge and understanding of human rights issues that stem directly from their participation in HRA interventions, it is not possible to rigorously determine causality for other identified effects, such as leadership and empowerment. These effects are presented as associations with HRA interventions.
- **Lack of baseline information:** HRA collected baseline information for their indicators as required. However, this does not encompass all of the data necessary to answer the evaluation questions, in particular with respect to EQ2 and EQ4. The KII and GD guides were constructed to estimate whether change may have occurred, when and how HRA may have contributed to that change. Nonetheless, these are self-reported changes that require deductive interpretation.
- **Assessing sustainability:** Since the sustainability of initiatives can only be verified ex-post, the method to assess sustainability uses factors that theoretically would contribute to the sustainability of the initiatives. The answer to EQ3 describes the *likelihood* of sustainability, based on evidence collected by the evaluation team and the literature regarding sustainability indicators for interventions of this nature.
- **Respondent bias:** Key informants constitute the primary source of information in answering all evaluation questions. However, interview data is subject to cognitive biases, including recall bias. The evaluation team conducted systematic triangulation of interview and document sources, and appropriate selection of a range of HRA stakeholders at the national, departmental, and municipal levels to strengthen the validity and reliability of the findings. This reduces the potential for bias across the research.
- **Selection bias in the Group Discussions:** Random selection of GD participants was not possible, so the sample of beneficiaries invited to participate by the CSOs could be different from the average beneficiaries. It is possible that those invited were the most committed, most willing to participate, or those with the most favorable opinions of the CSO. This potential selection bias must be taken into consideration when interpreting the GD findings (EQ2 and EQ4).

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Evaluation Question I

Do the overarching and specific strategies of the Activity remain relevant in the changing human rights context from a municipal, departmental and national perspective? Has HRA adapted adequate and relevant strategies to address this changing human rights context?

The evaluation team conducted a context analysis, included in Annex F, based on third-party data and the team's human rights expertise prior to the start of data collection. This analysis was corroborated and supplemented with the information gathered from the KIs and GDs. The evaluation team assessed relevance based on whether the Activity is in line with national, departmental, and municipal needs and priorities as they relate to human rights and whether it is flexible enough to respond to the changing dynamics. The evaluation team found that the changing human rights context presents the GOC with several institutional challenges relating to implementing the Accord as well as territorial challenges relating to the demobilization of the FARC-EP and a reconfiguration of armed groups participating in illegal economies, which in turn exposes vulnerable populations to different risks. HRA's overarching and specific strategies aim to support the GOC in addressing these challenges.

Findings

The GOC and the FARC-EP signed and ratified the Havana Peace Accord in November 2016. The Accord is one of the principal factors shaping the context of human rights in Colombia. Implementing the Accord creates challenges for GOC capacity at the national and local level. In addition, the Accord and the end of armed conflict between the GOC and the FARC-EP has led to a reconfiguration of armed groups in Colombia which is having negative repercussions on the human rights situation of certain populations.

Institutional challenges as a result of the signing and implementation of the Accord

The Accord alters the institutional structure of the national entities and imposes new obligations on local governments. The challenges that stem from these changes, as reported by government official interviewees, can be summarized into increased demand for 1) human and financial resources, 2) engagement between government entities and across levels of government, and 3) knowledge and understanding by national and local government officials of what the GOC and FARC-EP agreed to in the Accord.

At the national level, government institutions have had to modify their processes and adjust their structures to comply with their new obligations under the Accord. For example, the GOC Ombudsmen's Office has had to revise and adjust its Early Warning System (EWS) to monitor armed conflict that threatens grave violations of fundamental human rights so that the information it collects and provides complies with the terms of the Accord. At the local level, officials complain that they do not have the resources to comply with the new obligations that the Accord imposes on them and that there are many challenges related to the reincorporation of demobilized former combatants to civilian life. Regarding this point, while in some municipalities, such as in the north of Cauca, residents have been receptive to the reintegration of ex-combatants, reconciliation has been more difficult in other localities, such as those in Antioquia, because of the perception of some residents that the government is favoring the victimizers without providing similar support for the victims of the armed conflict.

“As a victim, help doesn’t come to me. I have no house. No one has given me back my lands. They haven’t given me what I deserve as a victim. But the government is paying the FARC. It is giving them housing and creating productive projects to give them jobs.” (Victims’ Roundtable representative, Remedios, Antioquia)

More than three-fourths of all government authorities interviewed affirm that HRA has responded in a timely manner to the challenges they identified in this changing institutional context, regarding the new responsibilities and capabilities required by the implementation of the Accord. At the national level, HRA has supported government entities through financing the hiring of consultants. For example, the Ombudsman Office has support from four EWS analysts, financed through HRA, who carry out human rights risk analysis and issue warnings as necessary in the regions where HRA operates. Moreover, HRA is providing technical assistance on design and implementation of human rights prevention and protection public policy. For example, HRA is supporting the IGO with the implementation of Colombia’s Directive 002, which seeks to improve the situation of human rights defenders and leaders, as well as the National Protection Unit (NPU) in the inclusion of a gender approach in the *rutas*⁶ of collective protection for organizations of women leaders and women human rights defenders.

Nonetheless, not all national government institutions believe HRA is responding to their needs in the post-Accord context. Specifically, according to the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Human Rights (CPDH for the initials in Spanish, *Consejería Presidencial para Los Derechos Humanos*), HRA is not supporting actions they deem priorities and that are included in the Accord. In response to this, HRA states that they cannot fund all of the priorities from each government entity, so they focus on those aligned to their own objectives and within their financial capacity. While the CPDH does value the support of HRA and reports achieving significant progress given the limited resources, they believe that HRA acts according to its own priorities and not those of their Office:

“Well, I believe that they have left out some topics, some topics were left out. It was difficult, each topic was discussed strongly. Obviously, they (HRA) have reasons, justifications for saying no for this or that and they have that right. But, in the end it isn’t the CPDH that says, ok these will be the priorities for your work and we look to you on how to do this. That is to say, the CPDH had to align its objectives and priorities to those of [HRA] and not the reverse.” (CPDH, Bogota)

At the local level, HRA has supported 30 municipalities to activate or reactivate their human rights and peace council, as specified in the Accord. This mechanism enables engagement and articulation between the different municipal government entities and CSOs to avoid duplication of efforts. Similarly, HRA has supported departmental and municipal government institutions in understanding the implications of the implementation of the Accord with respect to human rights. For example, HRA’s main strategy in its prevention component is aimed at providing technical assistance to government institutions towards the fulfillment of their responsibilities within the legislative framework. Since 2017, multiple laws, decrees, and resolutions have been issued to implement the Accord. HRA supports the new legislative framework by serving as a bridge between the national government and the departmental and local institutions to activate mechanisms like the human rights and peace councils and to implement public policy guidelines such as the *Cátedra de Derechos Humanos*.

⁶ The *rutas* lay out the responsibilities of each institution in terms of preventing and responding to violence as well as the compliance and follow-up processes by civil society and other authorities. HRA supports the construction, promotion, and implementation of different types of *rutas*, including prevention and response *rutas*, GBV-focused *rutas*, self-protection *rutas*, prevention *rutas* regarding forced recruitment, illegal use and utilization of children and youth, prevention *rutas* of anti-personnel mine accidents. Each region poses its own challenges regarding these issues so every *ruta* has differential focus measures.

Reconfiguration of armed groups motivated by illegal economies

In addition to the institutional challenges related to governmental obligations included in the Accord, the GOC faces new territorial challenges due to the demobilization of FARC-EP members, their exit from areas that they previously controlled, and the GOC's limited capacity to assert control over these formerly FARC-controlled areas. In the absence of government control, different armed groups that are motivated primarily by their involvement in illegal economies have been able to move into some of the formerly FARC-controlled areas. Organized Armed Groups (GAO for the initials in Spanish, *Grupos Armados Organizados*) and Organized Criminal Groups (GDO for the initials in Spanish, *Grupos Delincuenciales Organizados*) are present in all of the departments in which HRA works.⁷ Furthermore, the National Liberation Army (ELN for the initials in Spanish, *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*), a guerrilla group that was not party to the Accord, has strengthened its hold in the territories in which it has historically been active including the south and center of Cauca, Nariño, and Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, and is entering new zones where it has not historically been active as well as other zones that were previously controlled by the FARC.⁸ Finally, dissident factions of the FARC-EP, which according to the AGO includes 16 groups located in 48 municipalities with about 800 to 1,000 members, have demonstrated their ability to significantly affect the population where they are active. FARC-EP dissidents are active in the HRA areas of Nariño, Meta, Cauca, Caquetá, and Antioquia. While some of the FARC-EP dissidents have economic motives, such as participation in the illegal economy, changes in leadership and group strategies as well as the way the Accord is being implemented have brought to light the lack of incentives for ex-combatants to remain in the demobilization process. This is magnified by the slow reincorporation of demobilized combatants into civilian life.⁹

All of these armed groups have some relationship with the illegal economies, including drug trafficking, illegal mining, and illegal logging,¹⁰ but not all aspects of the illegal economies are present in all municipalities in which HRA works. For example, in Tumaco, where more coca is grown than any other municipality in the country (16 percent of total national production¹¹), armed groups are heavily involved in activities related to drug trafficking. This situation makes the implementation of crop substitution programs more difficult. In areas that the GOC has prioritized for crop substitution there has been nearly constant tension between forced eradication and voluntary substitution. This is due to the slow progress in creating conditions that enable families that cultivate coca to transition into legal crops and to the legal uncertainty faced by families that have traditionally cultivated coca.¹² Moreover, some families that have signed agreements with the GOC under the National Integrated Program for the Substitution of Illegal Crops have faced reprisals. In municipalities with coca cultivation, homicides have increased 11 percent between 2017 and 2018, whereas in municipalities where crop substitution has begun, the homicide rate has increased 33 percent during the same time period.¹³

⁷ According to Directives 015 and 016 of the Ministry of Defense, GAOs have centralized and organized structures, hierarchical command positions, and territorial control, while GDOs are smaller groups that tend to operate as subcontractors of larger organizations, but which still generate a high impact on the population. The GAOs present in the Activity's coverage area include the Clan del Golfo, Los Puntilleros, the Ejército Popular de Liberación, the Bloque Meta, and the Bloque Libertadores del Vichada. Among the GDOs present in these areas, are Los Rastrojos, La Cordillera, the Constru, and La Empresa.

⁸ Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2017). *Crimen organizado y saboteadores armados en tiempos de transición*.

⁹ Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2018). *¿En qué va la sustitución de cultivos ilícitos? Balance 2017 y lo que viene en 2018*.

¹⁰ Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2016). *Economías criminales en clave de posconflicto: Tendencias actuales y propuestas para hacerles frente*.

¹¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2017). *Colombia - Monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2016*.

¹² FIP (2018).

¹³ Ibid.

Separately, in municipalities such as Segovia and Remedios, the illegal economy is dominated primarily by illegal mining, although northwest Antioquia also has coca cultivation and drug transit routes as it is a strategic connection corridor with Urabá and Magdalena Medio. With respect to mining, national legislation has created social conflict between small-scale miners defending their right to work and the mining company, Gran Colombian Gold, which has the mining title in the area, according to residents that the evaluation team interviewed. These residents say there has been a lack of respect for the local small-scale mining traditions and that the legislation provides no work guarantees for local miners. In this sense, challenges related to mining go beyond civil and political rights and involve economic, social, and cultural rights.

Illegal logging is also becoming a problem in territories that were FARC-controlled, such as Caquetá and Tolima. Issues relating to illegal logging has created social tensions with implications for the human rights context. In these two departments, the FARC-EP regulated the market for timber, allowing community members to cut one hectare per year. Without the FARC-EP playing a regulatory role, there has been a considerable increase in logging and burning the land to graze cattle, creating new social conflict between community members as well as environmental concerns.

HRA consistently conducts analyses of the human rights situation in its project areas to be able to adjust to the changing regional context. For example, after the baseline analysis, which confirmed the increased presence of organized armed groups, HRA decided not to open its office in Arauca and to close its office in Norte de Santander. However, the regional teams conduct their ongoing analyses without a systematic or standardized approach. This means that they do not necessarily use the same sources of information or the same approach to gather and analyze the information. The analyses are carried out based on the information gathered by the specific regional program advisors who are aware of the factors that affect the human rights context. These analyses inform HRA on issues related to illegal economies that affect the dynamics of the armed actors and that have repercussions on the human rights context.

Of the three different illegal economies mentioned, HRA directly works on the issue of mining and supports government entities and organizations in the preparation of reports and documents. In particular, the report *“Illegal economies, armed actors and new risk scenarios in the post accord period”* was published and is under review by the Ombudsman’s Office. Regarding the illegal economies of drug trafficking and logging, HRA has no direct strategies. This does not mean, however, that HRA should take action in these areas.

Risks of human right violations for vulnerable populations

The presence of these armed groups result in clashes between them and the police. They are also responsible for threats, extortion, selective assassination, social behavior control, intimidation through public pamphlets, massive displacement and confinements, planting land mines to prevent coca substitution, sexual violence, and child and adolescent recruitment into illegal activities and armed groups. These risks to the population are not equally present across all regions where HRA operates. For example, there are reports of massive displacements and confinements in Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, while in Meta and Caquetá, residents note that they are now able to freely move around the territory without the mobility restrictions previously imposed by the FARC-EP.


In general, interviewees recognize that since 2017 there has been a deterioration of the human rights situation compared to the years just before, and immediately after, the signing of the Accord. One interviewee summarized this well:

“During 2015 and 2016, just before the signing of the Accord, we were here and people at that time

were impressed at how the situation had changed from that of earlier years. It was very peaceful in the municipalities and people started to go out at night again. We could see the infrastructure and parks that had been built in the municipality. Unfortunately, the situation is very different now. Well, not very different, but it has changed since October 2017 when the killing of community leaders began. Now, we have the uncertainty again, but with new actors and new problems.” (Escuelas de Paz, Bogota)

The armed groups’ actions have affected a variety of vulnerable groups including human rights defenders and leaders, children and youth, women, Afro-Colombians and indigenous groups, the LGBTI population, and demobilized FARC-EP members. The risks to these vulnerable populations are not new. Yet, the reconfiguration of armed actors has worsened the situation for human rights defenders and leaders, as well as increased the violence against groups whose identity has a strong connection to a specified territory, such as indigenous communities that are vulnerable to displacement, where their leaders are being threatened and assassinated because of issues associated to land restitution and illicit crop substitution. Figure 2 shows that 291 human rights defenders and leaders have been killed since the signing of the Accord through April 2018.

Figure 2: Homicides of Human Rights Defenders and Leaders, by Month



Source: Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (May 2018).

Children and youth also are vulnerable to forced recruitment and illegal use and utilization into activities related to the illicit economy such as tending to illegal crops, transporting illegal products, providing information, and collecting “taxes” and extortion payments. The Clan del Golfo is particularly noteworthy in its ongoing recruitment of children and youth in its activities, in spite of the capture of some of its most important members.¹⁴

In contrast to other groups, there has not been an increase in actions against women and members of the LGBTI community. Rather, they say there has been an increase in the visibility of the ongoing human rights violations these groups face as well as a recognition of the lack of an official response to these violations. According to interviewees, since the withdrawal of the FARC-EP from territories where it used to be the primary regulator of social conflict, there has been an increase in the number of GBV

¹⁴ FIP (2017).


reports by women to the authorities because victims were previously not allowed to report these violations:

”Well, what we are seeing is an increase in reports of gender-based violence, the question is why. Before, people were not allowed to go to government institutions to resolve conflicts or to report violations of their rights. So what happens once the Accord is signed? Well, it is no longer them [FARC] who resolve conflicts in the more remote parts of the municipality and people start to go to the local public administration or institutions in search of help or for conflict resolution. There is some disillusionment with the pace of response, because we are tied to procedures, terms and conditions when claims or requests are submitted, and people are used to an immediate response [from the FARC]. So, there was a shock at this, but it seems like people are adapting. So, you can see the increase in reports as positive because this means there is access. People can now come. Before, maybe they wanted to, but they couldn’t. As a woman said to me, “one used to be so anxious to come here and just enter the municipality government offices.” (Family Commissary, Ituango, Antioquia)

For the LGBTI population, while the issues they face are now more visible and tolerance in communities is improving, discrimination and stigmatization persist, particularly for the transgender population. Furthermore, when people from the LGBTI community have been killed, the authorities tend to classify the cases to issues of local drug trafficking without any type of investigation on whether it is a case of GBV. This lack of official and accurate figures makes it difficult to assess patterns on crimes targeting the LGBTI population.

HRA funds activities to support the populations mentioned above. In general, these activities are carried out through the Grants Fund and involve training and empowering these population groups. Figure 3 shows the distribution of HRA grants by demographic characteristics. While women, youth, and LGBTI groups are generally targeted separately, indigenous and Afro-Colombian beneficiaries can also be part of these groups (i.e. indigenous women, Afro-Colombian youth, etc). The figure below depicts the overlap of demographic characteristics in some grants. For example, of the five grants targeting youth, one is for Afro-Colombian youth and another one includes both Afro-Colombian and indigenous youth.

Figure 3: Number of HRA Grants, by Demographic Characteristics



For the most part, the grantee projects implement a differentiated approach when working with the different beneficiary groups. For example with youth, CSOs grantees such as *FUNDAMOR*, aim to improve their knowledge on human rights issues, through participatory strategies such as developing audiovisual initiatives to promote and socialize them with their peers as well as using music and arts as a medium for learning and empowerment. In the case of indigenous people, the *Organización Indígena de Antioquia (OIA)*, another HRA grantee, strengthens its members' knowledge regarding the way of operating the special indigenous jurisdiction and the role played by members of the indigenous guard.¹⁵ While only one HRA grant, *Consejo Comunitario Rio Gualajo*, specifically focuses on the Afro-Colombian community, six other grants focus on Afro-Colombian women, youth, and LGBTI groups. However, the evaluation team found a gap between the documented differential approach for these grants (except with *ASOM* and *Hermanas Laura*) and the interviews with the CSO grantee representatives and GDs with grantee beneficiaries. During those conversations, the topics discussed by them centered around and kept shifting towards gender and youth issues, not specifically related to the Afro-Colombian community, and referred mostly to the inclusion and participation of this vulnerable population group. Moreover, only *ASOM* includes Afro-Colombian ethnic rights in the context of the implementation of the Accord, through their participation in the design of the PDETs.

With respect to human rights defenders and leaders, at the national level, HRA is supporting the IGO with the implementation of Colombia's Directive 002. At the local level, HRA's strategy towards leaders is less targeted at protecting and responding to the high number of homicides and instead focuses on including leaders in their activities towards increasing political participation and strengthening organizational capacity for self-protection and demand for their rights.

HRA's gender strategy seeks to increase the knowledge and skills of public officials, the police, and civil society on issues related to GBV prevention and response. This is carried out through activities such as the human rights diploma courses for public officials and social leaders, as well as through grants to CSOs, such as *Caribe Afirmativo* and *Asociación Municipal de Mujeres Buenos Aires (ASOM)*, where the emphasis is on improving the knowledge of women and LGBTI beneficiaries on their rights, the *rutas*, and the entities responsible for responding and protecting those rights. In addition, HRA has supported mechanisms of inter-institutional dialogue to implement differentiated response *rutas* for women and LGBTI victims of GBV. HRA has supported the reactivation of the Elimination of Violence against Women roundtables (MEV for the initials in Spanish, *Mesas de Erradicación de Violencia contra la Mujer*) in 17 municipalities, and included this issue in the municipal social policy councils (COMPOS for the initials in Spanish, *Consejo Municipal de Política Social*). HRA also supports the Ombudsman's Office in the financing of *duplas*¹⁶ in the departments of Tolima and Caquetá to improve the quality and access to legal and psychosocial assistance provided to women and LGBTI victims of GBV. With the national police, activities have recently started to update the Police Gender Guide and to examine internal and external policies and practices addressing GBV issues and cases.

One of the population groups with greater risks in terms of human rights are the demobilized combatants of the FARC-EP. In fact, Colombia's Article 13 of Decree 895 establishes a presumption of "extraordinary risk" for these people. According to the latest UN Verification Mission Report, 44 demobilized combatants have been killed since the signing of the Accord.¹⁷ Additionally, the Accord calls for the creation of the *Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics* in order to: (i) prevent threats to life, integrity, freedom and security of human rights defenders, leaders of organizations and

¹⁵ Indigenous guards are elected by their communities and mandated to protect indigenous lives and territory without the use of arms.

¹⁶ *Duplas* provide legal and psychosocial assistance to women and LGBTI GBV victims.

¹⁷ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia*. 2 April 2018.

social movements, and members of the FARC-EP in the process of reincorporating into civilian life; (ii) provide guarantees for mobilization and social protest; and (iii) protect all political parties, including the political movement or party that emerges from the transition of the FARC-EP into legal political activity. Despite the above, HRA does not work with the demobilized population due to United States Government (USG) restrictions on working with ex-members of the FARC-EP, even when they are participating in legal social or political activity. The evaluation team found, for example, that an HRA-financed *dupla* of the Ombudsman's Office, whose role is to guide victims of sexual violence in the processing of their cases, did not assist a victim of sexual assault because she was a demobilized member of the FARC-EP.

The risks posed to the different populations groups are not necessarily met with a response from governmental institutions. In municipalities such as Segovia, the community states that neither human rights violations nor threats of violations are investigated by the authorities. The lack of response to human rights violations brings with it a lack of community confidence in the authorities. The actions of armed groups have created fear in the populations in departments like Antioquia and Córdoba, and even created the perception that there are agreements between the armed groups and the authorities.

Armed groups are present in both rural and urban areas. Nonetheless, rural areas continue to be more vulnerable to violations of human rights given that the government's attention and institutions, as well as international assistance, are centered predominantly in urban areas.

Finally, in all of the regions where HRA is active, demands for economic, social, and cultural rights are increasingly present in the discourse. When asked about rights, community members also speak about the right to water, the right to a job, improving working conditions, and poverty alleviation.

Conclusions

- HRA stays relevant and adjusts activities in a changing human rights context through its regional presence and expert knowledge of the geographical areas in which it works. This permanent presence, with highly capable regional advisors in each department, keeps HRA informed of the principal factors affecting the human rights context for different vulnerable groups. HRA adequately uses the regional advisors' local knowledge and network in their risk analyses and to fine-tune their activities in each area. Nonetheless, these analyses are not undertaken in a standardized way.
- In this changing human rights context, HRA has incorporated activities that adequately respond to the institutional challenges that governmental entities face. The financial and technical support provided to the Ombudsmen's Office, IGO, and NPU enable these national entities to respond to the situation of human rights defenders and leaders. In addition, HRA is very knowledgeable about the institutional rules, regulations, and procedures related to the post-conflict context and the Accord and is accompanying and supporting departmental and municipal governments to implement the Accord.
- While HRA assesses risks that stem from the presence of illegal economies, their strategy explicitly includes human rights issues related to illegal mining. However, it does not address illegal mining in a direct and comprehensive manner. HRA's activities are focused at the macro level, such as an analysis of the human rights situation related to mining and the publication of reports related to illegal mining, and do not address relevant local issues such as working conditions of small-scale miners.
- The restrictions imposed by the USG on working with demobilized members of the FARC-EP prevents HRA from adequately addressing this, increasingly critical, segment of the population at

risk of human rights violations. This has important implications for HRA's relevance and "do no harm" principle. HRA is limited in participating in and influencing institutional and community mechanisms where there is a presence of demobilized FARC-EP members. Moreover, it is not able to recognize this group as a population at risk of human rights violations. Finally, this restriction can create legitimacy issues in the institutions that HRA intends to support, as was seen in the case between the *duplas* and the demobilized FARC-EP woman who was a victim of sexual assault but could not be assisted.

- The three HRA components continue to be relevant in the changing human rights context:
 - Component 1 is relevant because in order to achieve effective protection and guarantee of human rights, it is essential that government institutions, civil society organizations and communities recognize the importance of issues related to human rights and how to apply human rights concepts to their work. In this sense, promoting human rights is not only important for local government officials to comply with their responsibilities in the implementation of the Accord, but it gains even more relevance in areas, such as Cauca, where just a few years ago, before the Accord, it was not possible to even broach the topic of human rights. In other areas where there has been more attention paid to human rights, as in the north of Cauca, HRA has developed activities to increase awareness and knowledge of human rights issues among strategic stakeholders.
 - Component 2, focusing on the prevention of human rights violations, emphasizes strengthening national institutions charged with preventing human rights abuses as well as supporting the creation or reactivation of the required local institutional bodies, such as the prevention, protection, and guarantee of non-repetition (PPGNR) sub-committees, for the development of their respective documents, in particular the local prevention and protection plans. Because the most advanced plans were finalized at the end of 2017, it is still too soon to make any conclusions regarding their implementation.
 - Component 3 focuses on responding to human rights violations. It is important to note that since the Activity was designed and started before the signing of the Accord, HRA's strategy is limited exclusively to traditional justice mechanisms and does not include the transitional justice mechanisms in the Accord. While responses to human rights violations are a matter handled through the justice system and thus the AGO is the adequate government institution that HRA should be supporting, transitional justice also opens opportunities to respond to human rights violations. New entities such as the Special Peace Jurisdiction and the Truth Commission represent opportunities to respond to human rights violations through a reparative justice approach rather than a punitive focus as with the formal justice sector institutions such as the AGO.
- HRA focuses on the population groups most affected by human rights violations, with the notable exception of demobilized members of the FARC-EP, and has contributed to strengthening CSOs representing these groups. Specifically, under Component 1, HRA's activities have adequately emphasized promoting the human rights of indigenous groups, women, youth, and the LBGTI population. In addition, HRA's gender strategy has contributed to positive effects on the beneficiaries who participate in grantee CSO projects with a gender focus. Both women and LGBTI beneficiaries demonstrate an improved understanding of their rights which has empowered them to organize for the demand of their rights.
- HRA's differentiated approach for the Afro-Colombian group is not reflected by most of the CSO grantees targeting this group and their beneficiaries, who describe their activities through a gender and youth lens, and mostly focus on the mere inclusion and participation of Afro-

Colombians in activities, which does not constitute a differentiated approach for this population group.

- HRA's strategy for human rights defenders and leaders is clear at the national level, through its work with the IGO and NPU; however, the strategy is not comprehensive at addressing the severity of the situation due to increasing homicides at the regional and local levels.

Evaluation Question 2

To what extent do Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards and view compliance with those standards as the norm?

To answer this question, the evaluation team assessed not only the extent to which interviewees had improved their **understanding** of human rights standards but also the extent to which they had **applied** the learning in their work or projects. As part of the contribution analysis, the evaluation team also took into consideration the interviewees' **reactions** to the trainings and the value derived from them. Assessing learning through these three levels (reaction, understanding, and application) provides a holistic understanding of HRA's contribution to and advancement of Intermediate Result (IR) 1.

Findings

Government Officials

Of the 19 departmental government officials interviewed, five officials (26 percent) report benefitting directly from HRA trainings and demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards, and eleven officials (58 percent) report not participating directly in the HRA activities but witnessing an improved understanding of human standards among direct reports within their offices and/or other municipal level officials that participated in these activities. The remaining three officials (16 percent) were from offices where these training activities were not relevant, such as the Departmental Office of International Cooperation.

At the municipal level, 14 officials (41 percent) report benefitting directly from HRA trainings and demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards, and 11 officials (32 percent) report not participating directly in the HRA activities but witnessing an improved understanding of human standards among other officials that participated in these activities. Nine officials (26 percent) did not attend any trainings or did not demonstrate improved understanding of human rights standards when asked about what they learned or how it had been applied to their work functions.

The evaluation team found that initial knowledge levels on human rights standards varied greatly among government officials, from a few officials stating they had no prior work experience or knowledge of human rights issues even though it was now relevant to their role, to a few officials having held more specialized positions on human rights issues over time, and everything in between. Nonetheless, even those with more prior knowledge of human rights report that they benefitted from the trainings and technical assistance provided by HRA.

In general, departmental and municipal officials value the capacity building support provided by HRA. Several municipal officials agree that HRA trainings are effective because they are not lecture-based theoretical workshops; instead, their methodology is focused on implementation and applying the knowledge into their work as well as accompaniment through the process rather than support on

individual tasks. Almost all government officials state that the HRA trainings align to their capacity building needs and priorities.

Increased knowledge of new obligations and public policies resulting from the Accord

Almost 90 percent of government officials report that HRA trainings have primarily contributed to their improved understanding and awareness of public policies related to human rights, especially with respect to the new legislative framework following the signing of the Accord, which resulted in new obligations for local government entities. For example, in Chaparral, a municipal government official states that:

“Even though I studied these issues in University, all of the information was jumbled up in my head. HRA’s assistance has given me a better understanding of our operational responsibilities as a municipality and has enabled the municipality to fulfill its Development Plans objectives. It has made the municipality more organized on these matters. I have leaned on HRA a lot, and thanks to HRA I have learned about the municipality’s obligations.” (Personería, Chaparral, Tolima)

Government officials, in particular those within the municipal government’s secretariat, praise HRA for instructing them on the process to develop and update their prevention and protection plans and to create or re-activate institutional mechanisms, such as the PPGNR sub-committees. Officials within the departmental government’s secretary of interior value HRA’s assistance in merging the Human Rights Committees and the Peace Councils as an efficient strategy. These officials recognize that HRA’s participatory and proactive technical assistance has given them a greater understanding of the regulatory framework related to human rights standards and compliance with them.

“HRA has been an immense support to us because really when I started working as the government secretary I had absolutely no experience on human rights issues. None. It has been an immense support because their way of working is very participatory and very proactive [...] so with their support we now have an updated municipal human rights, international humanitarian law, and peace council that fulfills the national orders received by the Mayor.” (Government Secretary, Mesetas, Meta)

The evaluation team noted, however, that all application of what is learned is implemented with close support of HRA and not independently by the government officials.

The improved understanding of human rights standards reported by public officials is corroborated by social leaders. In particular, some social leaders confirm that they have witnessed better understanding and capacity from public officials who participated in the diploma courses supported by HRA.

“HRA’s diploma courses trains public officials, so you have the Personeria, Family Commissaries, the Family Welfare Institute learning how to respond to and assist victims and their responsibilities in these matters. These are the institutions that we lean on for assistance to victims. So now with the knowledge we have gained and the knowledge that the public official has gained it is easier to know the responsibilities of the different offices.” (Social Leader from the Victims’ Roundtable, Tierralta, Cordoba)

New competencies regarding human rights prevention and protection mechanisms

In addition, 38 percent of municipal officials report that the trainings have given them new competencies regarding human rights prevention and protection mechanisms. For example, in Mesetas and Tierralta, the government’s secretariats report that HRA has taught them how to identify cases of human rights violations that they were not aware of before, and that as public officials they are also violating people’s rights by not providing them protection and guarantee measures.

Three-fourths of the *personeros* interviewed highlight that the HRA-supported trainings by the National Federation of *Personeros* (FENALPER for the initials in Spanish, *Federación Nacional de Personeros*) provided them with practical tools for conflict resolution and responding to cases of GBV. The *personera* in Chaparral states that she notices this improved knowledge when she meets with *personeros* from other municipalities that have not received this training. Officials in the Family Commissaries and the women's secretariat express that their gained knowledge on GBV has been applied in the construction and implementation of the response *rutas* and has improved the assistance they provide to citizens. However, this reportedly improved assistance is not yet perceived by civil society or community members. On the contrary, in some departments, like in Cauca, civil society members state that the response *rutas* are not well disseminated across the different government institutions and that comprehensive understanding is required not only by high-level officials but by all the personnel within these entities, including hospitals, where victims arrive to be treated.

The police in Chaparral reports that the trainings provided by *Fundación Ideas para la Paz* (FIP) gave them a better understanding of human rights standards and communication strategies that they found useful for conflict resolution and facilitating dialogue between different actors, such as police, community members, and municipal government. Unfortunately, police participation in the FIP activities was extremely low, with less than 10 police officers participating in three municipalities, and the dialogue activities were not implemented as planned, so the effect of this outcome is very limited.

A less frequently stated outcome at the department level is that the trainings increase the government's ability to define the needs of different population groups and enable them to better serve communities. However, a departmental government official in Caquetá, as well as several civil society leaders and beneficiaries in Tolima and Antioquia, state that authorities continue to lack understanding of the specific needs and risks faced by the LGBTI population, so they are not fulfilling their obligations to provide protection to this group, in particular.

Informed officials can better engage with and respond to the communities

The increased knowledge and new competencies of government officials is also improving their interactions with the communities. For example, in San Vicente del Caguán, the Councilor feels empowered with the knowledge gained because he can share that knowledge with the community when he does outreach or when they approach him within institutional mechanisms. In Ibagué, the secretary of social inclusion states that as both the public servant and the community gain knowledge about their rights, a common language is built that enables more effective interactions between communities, the municipal government, and the police force regarding human rights standards and compliance of these standards.

Civil Society Representatives

The evaluation team interviewed two types of civil society representatives. The first corresponds to representatives of CSOs that are HRA grantees, and the second corresponds to civil society leaders that were not grantees but were directly involved in HRA activities.

More than half (56 percent) of regional HRA grantees report already having internal capacity on human rights standards so their understanding of human right standards did not change due to HRA. Nonetheless, six local grantees (such as ASOM, *Rio Gualajo*, *Círculo de Estudios Culturales y Políticos*) report receiving valuable technical support from HRA.

“HRA has been one of the entities that has supported human rights issues the most. Their technical team is great, their staff has many years of experience and in-depth knowledge about gender issues and

the justice sector. They really provide technical support, they don't simply give you the financial resources, they know how to engage and strengthen grassroots CSOs. During our grant, I really liked that we had someone helping us with our monitoring, someone else helping with communications, and we received technical support from different perspectives. So for a small organization like us, it felt like we had an extended team.” (Grantee Círculo de Estudios Culturales y Políticos, Bogota)

A few grantees (such as *Red Caquetá* and *Fundamor*) however, stated they had not received training or technical support from HRA, but felt that they would have benefitted from it.

“It would have been good to receive training from HRA on human rights issues. This is a new topic for us to work on, so deepening our knowledge on these topics would be helpful.” (Grantee *Red Caquetá*, Florencia, Caquetá)

During the GDs, social leaders easily and correctly identify human rights violations presented in the vignettes. When defining human rights, they also express that these rights come with duties and they see human rights as a commitment they make towards society.

“I know my rights, but I also have duties. I also have duties towards society, the State, my family, and those around me. This isn't about just demanding rights, I also have to contribute. I see human rights as the commitment I have towards society”. (Social leader GD, Chaparral, Tolima)

The social leaders who participate in the PPGNR sub-committees demonstrate a clear understanding about the relevant government entities regarding human rights as well as their responsibilities. While they confirm HRA has supported them in participating in these mechanisms, this knowledge cannot be directly attributed to HRA as it is very likely they already knew this information due to their role as leaders.

Civil society leaders such as members of the women's or victims' roundtables express that HRA's trainings, where they learned about and constructed the response *rutas*, have given them the knowledge to know who to turn to and how to file claims. This knowledge has empowered them to start demanding respect for their rights.

“We have learned to come together, we have learned about the rutas – who we need to turn to, how to go through the process and file claims, and what different entities are responsible for. So after a few workshops you can see people are motivated, they have more clarity about these topics, because before we didn't know them, but now we do.” (Victims' Roundtable representative, Remedios, Antioquia)

Some social leaders also express that their increased knowledge contributes to their role as human rights defenders, particularly in the Human Rights Committees, where it is their role to bring informed observations to the government officials and demand action. This change is also perceived by government officials who report that social leaders have demanded specific actions and response from the government.

“What one notices is a gained interest of many public officials and many social leaders about the need to work on prevention of human rights violations. This is a very big gain. Social leaders are demanding actions, pushing forward these actions themselves. For example, here they are telling us to set up a Human Rights Observatory, these are specific matters that are now being brought to the table.” (Government Secretariat, Caucasia, Antioquia)

Beneficiaries

Increased knowledge on human rights

All of the beneficiaries groups easily identify human rights violations presented in the vignettes during the GDs, including the right to participation, right to equality and non-discrimination, right to liberty and security of person, right to equal protection of the law, right to fair trial and due process, and women and LGBTI rights, among others. Moreover, they identify and recognize why human rights violations are a problem and voice solutions without being prompted for one. Nonetheless, some beneficiaries across the groups incorrectly identify the specific human right pertaining to a situation or could not explicitly name the human right even though they could say it was a human rights violation.

During the GDs, the beneficiaries describe human rights as “laws, norms, and fundamental rules” and “legalized values” that “every human being is entitled to, simply for being human, regardless of race, skin color, age, employment or gender”. When speaking about the importance of human rights, all beneficiary groups mention rights that go beyond political and civil rights, especially the right to water, territory, autonomy, health, education, and work. Moreover, the LGBTI groups also talk about human rights as a matter of integrity and dignity, specifically with respect to institutional recognition and increased visibility, as this affects their access to public services and to the justice system. Some beneficiaries from the indigenous and Afro-Colombian women’s groups also emphasize that human rights violations are not individual since they carry an emotional burden which consequently affects the collective sphere (families and communities). The women’s groups also talk about recognizing different forms of violations that go beyond physical violence, such as verbal and emotional abuse; and they talk about their economic and property rights.

Beneficiaries across the groups express that what they learned goes beyond identifying human rights. They also learned that they have the right to demand respect for and protection of their rights, and that this right to demand respect and protection is a right in and of itself. They are aware of their right to justice and to protection measures. Nonetheless, they also state there is a gap between their demands and the State’s response, which is exacerbated by their distrust in the police.

“The tools are there, the government entities are there, but many times they do not operate well. The truth is that at times we find there is a sort of apathy [from these entities], many times you don’t see that response that you should receive from those entities” (Women GD, Buenos Aires, Cauca)

Beneficiaries attribute the lack of State response to apathy, lack of capacity, and lack of attendance of public officials in multi-stakeholder mechanisms such as municipal roundtables and councils. In several GDs, beneficiaries state that many times public positions are filled for political reasons rather than based on competency, and thus, these officials are not equipped with the knowledge or desire to respond to the community. The sentiment about a lack of State response was also expressed by most social leaders.

“The concern that we have as community leaders is that we start telling people we are going to help defend our rights, but the entities responsible for responding and protecting our rights do not do anything.” (Social Leader, Segovia, Antioquia)

The youth groups express that the hands-on dynamic exercises during the workshops, where lessons about human rights were incorporated into photography and painting lessons, helped them to better understand and grasp concepts. This knowledge was reflected in their comprehensive responses and thoughtful conversations throughout the GDs.

“What I liked was that we didn’t sit down and have someone talk to us about human rights. Instead, these lessons were part of our arts workshops. For example, one time the teacher divided us into groups and gave each group only one pot of paint. At first some people started arguing over sharing the paint, so the teacher guided us through resolving this conflict and talked to us about human rights and how it applies to us and our community.” (Youth GD, Chaparral, Tolima)

Initial changes in perceptions and attitudes about human rights

Some beneficiaries, especially youth and women, state that while they had a general idea of human rights prior to their participation with the HRA grantee, they did not have a clear understanding of what human rights entail or that these rights should be recognized and can protect them from abuses. Beneficiaries from indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations value their newly gained knowledge about human rights, laws and norms because they recognize that these have historically served their communities in resistance and liberation from oppression. However, during the GDs some youth still express prejudice against the LGBTI community, despite stating they are people with the same rights as anyone else and should be respected.

“I am the type of person who...I mean I don’t approve of homosexuals, but I do respect them, I have to respect them because they are people like everyone else...but I’d rather they keep their distance from me.” (Youth GD, Tumaco, Nariño)

Increased knowledge about entities responsible for guaranteeing, protecting, and respecting human rights

Beneficiaries across the different groups express that they feel supported by HRA grantees and HRA itself when they have to seek help, make claims or access justice and public services. However, there is variation amongst beneficiaries regarding how prepared they feel to be able to do this on their own. Some beneficiaries recognize that they are only starting to learn about human rights but know they can turn to the HRA grantee for support. Despite not feeling completely ready or capable of approaching government entities on their own, they now feel trained to ask, seek help, and not stay silent.

“We have the support of the [HRA grantee], and they say don’t worry, this is the process and if it is not being executed then we go to the Prosecutor, and if not then to the Ombudsmen’s Office. So if there wasn’t an organization mentoring us then abuses and violations would continue to happen. Also, as women having that accompaniment to file formal claims is important for our safety.” (Women’s GD, Vistahermosa, Meta)

There is also variation amongst beneficiaries regarding the identification of the specific entities responsible for defending and guaranteeing human rights, especially between the women, youth, and indigenous/Afro-Colombian groups. While knowledge about the *rutas* has helped beneficiaries to know the entities involved in the human rights process, many beneficiaries cannot correctly identify these entities and instead refer to government entities in general. This finding is not surprising, since most of the municipalities where HRA is working did not have well developed *rutas* prior to the program. HRA has been supporting the formation of subcommittees where the *rutas* are constructed, and is only now starting the process of socializing and implementing the *rutas*. Thus, this finding comes at an opportune time for the program.

The youth group from Tumaco, however, stands out positively in this case. Participants are very knowledgeable about the entities involved in the *rutas* and their roles and responsibilities. During their workshops, the HRA grantee, *Diócesis de Tumaco*, took them on a field trip to visit and meet the public officials from the different entities, including the Family Commissaries, *Personería*, Ombudsman’s Office, and Mayor’s Office, amongst others. The young beneficiaries expressed that they valued this exercise and that it helped them know where they can seek help and what each entity is responsible for. This exercise even led one of the beneficiaries to explain to her mother about the different entities and to convince her to appeal to one of them for a personal matter.

“I learned [about the relevant entities] with the Diócesis. I learned that the Personería and Ombudsmen’s Office existed, and it was with the Diócesis that we did a field trip to visit each one so

that was when I started distinguishing them and knowing their different roles. So then at home I told my mom let's go over there and I told her what I had learned, and thank god, thanks to that knowledge my mom was able to file a claim and now we live a bit more at peace.” (Youth GD, Tumaco, Nariño)

In contrast to other groups, the beneficiaries from indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups tend to mention their own communities as the first instance for complaint and response rather than an institutional entity. This is due to both cultural and historical reasons; culturally these communities are more focused on communitarian action and historically they have felt abandoned by the government.

The demand for the enforcement of rights is also related to the knowledge of the prevention and response *rutas*. In some municipalities, the *rutas* do not yet exist and some beneficiary groups confirm they are participating in the construction and socialization of these *rutas*. These beneficiaries confirm that HRA has improved engagement between civil society and the municipal government and has led a participatory process. Other beneficiaries state that knowing the *rutas* is what has helped them know how to demand their rights. The different beneficiary groups, although not everyone within each group, also demonstrate knowledge about various laws and regulations that protect their rights, such as “habeas corpus”, “Ley 70”, “the Constitutional Court ruling on the name change and gender in the identity card”, and legal action through the “*tutela*”.

The improved understanding of human rights standards demonstrated by beneficiaries during the GDs is confirmed by many municipal officials, especially those in functions that interact directly with the community, such as the *personeros*, victims’ liaisons, and family commissaries.

“The presence of HRA in the region, in my professional opinion as part of this entity, is that it has generated a lot of progress in the municipality and it has empowered the communities because now people know their rights, they know the different relevant entities that exist in their locality and in the municipality and they know where they can take their petitions. We are seeing that people are not just showing up anywhere; now they know where they can go for a response. We are also seeing people form associations and groups that we didn’t see before.” (Personería, Chaparral, Tolima)

Conclusions

- Departmental and municipal officials demonstrate an improved understanding about human rights, especially with respect to the regulatory framework. The application of this knowledge is done with close support from HRA regional advisors and is tied to fulfilling the departmental and municipal governments’ obligations. It is uncertain whether the application of this knowledge will continue independently.
- Government officials’ focus on developing and updating public policies on human rights comes from the obligation to comply with the MOI’s orders, rather than from the need they see in their communities.
- HRA has contributed to improved understanding of human rights standards among the most relevant municipal officials, including *personeros*, victims’ liaisons, family commissaries, and women’s secretariats.
- Grassroots CSOs value and recognize HRA’s technical support on conceptual issues related to human rights and gender. However, HRA proves this support reactively, after receiving requests from CSOs. Some HRA grantees who could have benefitted from this support did not receive it.
- All of the beneficiary groups, as well as social leaders, demonstrate increased understanding about human rights standards, and they value this improved knowledge. Beneficiaries frequently mention economic, social, and cultural rights when talking about human rights and their needs.

This is an important outcome particularly in regions such as Cordoba, where even five years ago these rights were not part of the discourse and only violence and international humanitarian law were discussed.

- Widespread dissemination of the various response *rutas* is important to continue strengthening beneficiaries' – especially women's – knowledge about the enforceability of their rights and who to turn to for help and support.
- Not all beneficiaries can identify the entities responsible for guaranteeing, protecting, and respecting human rights. Experiential methodologies, such as the *Diócesis de Tumaco's* field trip to meet the public officials that are part of the *rutas*, may be an effective way to ingrain this knowledge.

Evaluation Question 3

Are HRA's strategies and approaches promoting sustainability of the initiatives supported by the Activity at the GOC and civil society levels?

To assess the promotion of sustainability at the GOC and civil society levels, the evaluation team focused on five domains (i.e. relevant factors and conditions) that are likely to influence the continuation of initiatives supported by the Activity: 1) policy, 2) participation and ownership, 3) management and organization, 4) technical training, and 5) financial.¹⁸ It is worth noting, the sustainability of initiatives can only be verified ex-post, so this performance evaluation can only assess factors that theoretically would contribute to the sustainability of the initiatives. While some of these domains, such as policy and financial resources, are beyond the direct control of the Activity, HRA provides close support on the other three domains in a manner that is highly valued by GOC officials and civil society representatives but that runs of risk of creating dependency. HRA is in an opportune time to reassess and strengthen its sustainability strategies during the remaining time of its performance period.

Findings

Policy

Municipal and departmental government officials say that they highly value HRA's technical assistance for the design and implementation of public policies related to prevention of and protection from human rights abuses. These officials particularly note the assistance that HRA provides to help form the PPGNR sub-committees, and to develop and revise their prevention and protection plans. They also say that when HRA ends, complying with their obligations and continuing the efforts related to prevention and protection will be difficult because HRA organizes their activities, guides them to develop work plans for the PPGNR sub-committees, and updates them on national level requirements related to human rights.

Given the high turnover rates of local government officials, both CSOs and local officials state that one way to increase the sustainability of HRA's contributions is to formalize and institutionalize their strategies and practices through policy documents that require local government compliance, such as ordinances, resolutions, and administrative acts. Otherwise, in the words of a government official in Meta, "*When the international cooperation leaves, it seems like everything will come apart.*" HRA supports the creation or activation of Human Rights Committees and of multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms, such as the Peace Councils, which also enables formalization of human rights related policies. Another

¹⁸ AusAID (2000). Promoting Practical Sustainability. <https://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdndep/31950216.pdf>

example is HRA's support to formalize the Human Rights Observatory into the municipal government so that the municipal government takes ownership of and makes a commitment to the continuity of the Observatory once HRA ends. CSOs also want HRA support formalized into the local government. For example, *Fundación Arcoíris* in Tumaco recommends that the LGBTI roundtable be incorporated into local government through an administrative act.

Mayor's Offices told the evaluation team that HRA keeps them up to date on new human rights policies coming from the national government and, in many cases keeps them informed about local government requirements imposed by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). In general, local government authorities appreciate that HRA has helped them develop contact and networks with national institutions, such as the MOI, the NPU, and the President's Office, among others.

Most Governor's offices also report that HRA is enabling sustainability by connecting its activities with the goals of the departmental development plans. In Meta, the Governor's Office particularly noted the Human Rights School as an example of how HRA coordinated its strategies with the departmental development plan. Moreover, the Governor's Offices in Meta, Caquetá and Cauca highly value the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between USAID and their offices for coordinating different projects with what is in the development plans. The MOUs have contributed to organizing USAID assistance in these departments and to linking USAID's strategies with the government's processes. The advisor from the Office of International Cooperation in Cauca, sees benefit from the coordination roundtables created under the MOU with USAID, which enables the different secretariats within the departmental government to engage with all of the USAID implementing partners. She states that the MOU has resulted in more streamlined and strategic support as well as commitment from the secretariats towards these initiatives. The MOU in Meta has also resulted in more efficient coordination between HRA and other USAID programs, such as the Regional Governance Activity.

HRA regional advisors also express these same opinions regarding the sustainability of their activities from a policy perspective, emphasizing that they promote sustainability by ensuring that the institutional strengthening they are providing to local governments is linked to national level human rights policy.

Participation and Ownership

HRA focuses on strengthening civil society participation in public policy mechanisms, such as the PPGNR sub-committees, to increase their ownership of human rights issues and to hold government entities accountable, especially due to the high turnover of government officials. CSOs agree that providing human rights training contributes to community ownership and knowing when, how, and to whom they can demand that their rights be respected.

"Knowledge breaks barriers, at the least when someone knows what their rights are and what they are entitled to." (Grantee Fundación Arcoíris, Tumaco, Nariño)

In addition to the training provided, CSOs point out that HRA activities, such as the identification of risks and needs and the development of agendas and workplans related to human rights, spark community members' interest and empower them to participate in public policy mechanisms and engage in dialogue with local government authorities and institutions.

"There are mechanisms that people have to take advantage of, otherwise other people will be making decisions for them." (Grantee Corpomanigua, Florencia, Caquetá)

“Women, themselves, identify their needs...it gives women a voice and the opportunity for them to express themselves: what they feel, what they want, and what they need in their communities.”
(Grantee AMII, Ituango, Antioquia)

“The important thing is that people know, communities know...the activities are sustainable to the extent in which people empower themselves.” (Grantee Consejo Comunitario Rio Gualajo, Tumaco, Nariño)

Local government officials, social leaders, and CSOs report that working with youth through the Peace Schools, and strengthening their leadership and creative abilities to build peace, are fundamental to increasing citizen participation in public policy and including them in community oversight.

One-third of local CSOs and municipal government officials stressed the importance of strengthening the Community Action Board (JAC for the initials in Spanish, *Junta de Acción Comunal*) to create more space for community participation in public policy:

“[The JAC] is the institution at the rural level, they are the ones who need to take ownership of these issues.” (Secretary of Interior, Ibagué, Tolima)

Most CSOs and local authorities also agree that the *rutas* need to be disseminated in communities so that communities can take ownership of them and know how to demand their rights to the responsible authorities.

Most CSO grantees express a sense of ownership over the design and purpose of the projects they are implementing. While some design adjustments by HRA may be necessary to strengthen these projects, a few organizations, such as *Corpomanigua*, told the evaluation team that it had to adjust its initial project proposal to HRA’s preferences. This took significant time and effort and reduced their feelings of ownership over the work to be done. *Corpomanigua* told the evaluation team that they nearly withdrew their project because it took a lot of time to launch their revised activities. By the time work began some activities had lost their relevance.

HRA advisors affirm that strengthening community participation in public policy so that community members are directly involved in the processes with the government is a fundamental part of their sustainability strategy.

Management and Organization

Several local government officials told the evaluation team that HRA increases government capacity through trainings, technical assistance, the creation and activation of PPGNR sub-committees, and in developing or updating their prevention and protection plans. These approaches reduce reliance on individual officials. Nonetheless, local authorities also noted that the constant turnover in officials is an obstacle to generating and sustaining local capacities. They suggest that capacity building should focus on permanent government employees rather than short-term employees working under contracts.

Some municipal government officials told the evaluation team that they consider the systematization of good practices and methods, and the documentation and formalization of processes that HRA supports them with to be part of the capacity building efforts. They believe that this contributes to sustaining the capacity in the face of turnovers, helps transfer knowledge between new and departing officials, and helps to replicate successful processes. It also supports connecting government processes with communities.

“There wasn’t a single file left behind by the previous administration, so this has been a process of documentation from zero. So if I were to leave tomorrow, I can now hand over all of the files and documentation to the new person. I can show them, this is the document you need to update this year, this is the template you can use, this is the document with the contingency plans in case of emergencies, and this database has to be updated this way. So they don’t have to worry about starting from scratch or not knowing what to do, like the experience I had. HRA’s support has always been in the documentation of these processes, from start to finish.” (Victims’ Liaison, San Vicente del Caguán, Caquetá)

Some CSO grantees told the evaluation team that they learned to be more organized with their documentation and how to better plan activities through their work with HRA. They received support to strengthen their organizations administratively, financially, and with monitoring their actions and results.

“Having been able to develop a strategic plan with indicators has strengthened FENALPER. Since we first received HRA support, we have had 25 new international cooperation agreements. This is thanks to the support we have received from HRA.” (FENALPER, Bogota)

Other CSOs, such as *Corpomanigua* in Caquetá and *LIMPAL* in Meta, consider having an increased capacity from learning about new topics and competencies. *Corpomanigua* reports that learning about historical memory from HRA allowed them to develop and propose a new project to USAID, which was approved. *LIMPAL* reports increased capacity in developing proposals of higher quality and developing more robust programs.

“I think that HRA has helped strengthen our organization. We received trainings in various areas: administrative and financial issues, communications, developing our M&E framework, indicators, and monitoring systems, and technical assistance from their gender coordinator. The training on developing methodologies and reports, as well as the interaction with HRA has been very useful. As the person who designs and develops projects and programs, I feel better equipped and prepared to put together proposals of higher quality. We have received plenty of support from HRA and that has strengthened our organization.” (Grantee LIMPAL, Villavicencio, Meta)

HRA staff told the evaluation team that one way to sustain increased capacity and maintain processes is by empowering civil society through grants. This helps to mitigate the effects of public official turnover because even though the officials change, civil society and community leaders remain and can hold governments accountable.

Technical Training

All of the municipal government officials, and particularly those in the Mayor’s Offices, highly value HRA’s technical assistance. Fundamentally, they value the systematic and direct support they receive to implement and fulfill the requirements they receive from the MOI. They particularly note that HRA advisors are available to help them at any time of the day, either in person or by telephone.

“More than me, it is HRA that knows how to do this. They convene, prepare the topic, do everything... They even help us with the refreshments.” (Government Secretariat, Mesetas, Meta)

Local officials also said that HRA’s support and dedication has been fundamental in improving local public management. Municipal administrators say that thanks to HRA’s technical assistance and support, they now have PPGNR sub-committees as well as prevention and protection plans.

“So, sometimes there wasn’t the capacity and budget to respond as we should and HRA has become an ally in generating this capacity.” (Government Secretariat, Santander de Quilichao, Cauca)

In many cases, HRA's technical assistance is indispensable to government officials who lack bandwidth capacity and technical knowledge to perform these functions independently. As such, there is a high reliance on HRA advisors to perform technical and operational functions.

"[HRA could improve their support] by having more advisors because they... uyy... I need them but they are always so busy, so the time I have with them is not enough [...] sometimes things come up that need immediate attention but they already have a scheduled week and are bus..but at least they are very responseive over telephone, the next day the latest." (Office of Human Rights, Ibagué, Tolima)

Almost all HRA regional advisors expressed the same sentiments as the local officials. They told the evaluation team that they believe that sitting with local government officials and helping them comply with their obligations has created results, especially in municipalities that require constant support due to the initial state of their institutional capacity. An HRA advisor described what they do as *"operación siriri"* –very insistent and ready to answer any question whenever the question arises.

Financial Resources

Municipal and departmental government officials concur in saying that the lack of budgetary resources for local administration puts the sustainability of HRA's work at risk. This is because the logistical and operational requirements for increasing local government coverage to rural and urban areas are high. In addition, most municipal administration officials say that securing sufficient financial resources to assure the sustainability of HRA's support depends largely on the political will of the mayor. Not all mayors have the same commitment to human rights.

"If the next mayor places his bets on social issues and is passionate about these issues, then believe me the mayor will find the financial resources and maintain them. But, if it isn't a priority then unfortunately these are programs that are going to be left behind." (Family Commissary, Chaparral, Tolima)

"And, if you go and ask the municipal government, they don't have resources to transport the people (to the municipal center), nor the vehicles, nor places for them to stay or meals. And it's not just one person, it's ten that come. To maintain the participatory process, you need resources and I feel like the municipal administrations don't have these resources." (CIPRUNNA, Villavicencio, Meta)

"When you go to the mayor and say, well Mayor, we are going to have an activity with this or that community, and we are going to show them a film on the topic of human rights...there is no money, there is no money." (Victims' Liaison, Cáceres, Antioquia)

Although public policies on the prevention and protection of human rights are obligatory for local governments, the lack of financial and human resources impede the implementation of these policies. Government officials agree on the need to ensure that there is a specific budget line for human rights in local development plans.

For the MOI, HRA is a strategic ally for the design and implementation of human rights prevention and protection public policy at the local level. HRA is also a financial ally, which the MOI considers to be of critical value given the national government's budget limitations.

In general terms, officials from the Mayor's Office demonstrated interest in and recognize the importance of replicating HRA's successes in municipalities where HRA does not operate. However, they note that the lack of personnel and budgetary resources constitute an obstacle to doing this.

Most CSOs, and particularly those operating at the local level, say that replicating what has been done through HRA is a great challenge given the lack of financial resources. Assuring participatory processes requires a budget. CSO grantees told the evaluation team that the sustainability of their projects would be more certain if the financing that they receive was for a longer period of time.


“It would be good if the programs had a longer duration...the interventions are short-term and it makes it difficult for them to be sustainable.” (Grantee Escuelas de Paz, Bogota)

“As a smaller organization, it is very difficult to be able to have an impact on long-term issues when the projects that are financed are of such short duration.” (Grantee CREER, Bogota)

“One thing that can be improved is enabling the sustainability of our interventions. The grants have a fixed short period and then our project ends. It would be good to have the opportunity to propose a second phase or continuation of the work we are doing, to have a conversation about it during the implementation of the initial project. Right now the time is up and it all ends.” (Grantee Círculo de Estudios Culturales y Políticos, Bogota)

Figure 4 shows that almost forty percent of HRA grants have a period of performance of nine months or less, and grants to local or regional CSOs, which interact directly with the beneficiary population groups, are not longer than 12 months.

Figure 4: Distribution of Grant Duration



Local CSOs raise the concern that the grant’s short period of performance creates expectations from beneficiaries, especially youth and women, of continued support that cannot be fulfilled, and might actually expose them to risks if they are left without additional support when they are starting to become leaders or starting to overcome.

“I think it would be good to plan a second phase of the project with the groups that displayed greater interest and potential, because it’s important that we leverage the individual and collective leadership we are supporting. So a second phase of the grant would strengthen the peace promotion initiatives we have been launching. It is important to recognize that working with women at the base, women who

have been victims, is a long road, because she has to overcome emotional and psychological trauma, so you can't approach her about political participation right away, we can't ask them to jump into a stage that is so visible, it would be violent to put her in that stage and walk away. So a second phase would focus on deepening their knowledge and positioning and accompanying women in those stages to eventually increase their participation.” (Grantee Corpomanigua, Florencia, Caquetá)

“Continuity to this project is necessary. A year is not enough time, we are left short. We have identified the potential leaders in the groups...there are youth with big potential, they are energized and interested, but the year is now up. If we had more time we could also generate a strategy to then link and strengthen youth organizations that are starting to form.” (Grantee Fundamor, Santander de Quilichao, Cauca)

However, HRA's short three-year period of performance with uncertain approval of its two option years, along with an over-prescription of the quantity and types of grants it is contractually obligated to fund, make it difficult for HRA to address these concerns.

For larger national CSOs with greater financial capacity and experience with international assistance projects, sustainability is made possible by consistently securing resources from other financing sources that support their efforts in human rights. In this way, sustainability does not depend on continued HRA financing in the future. However, this consistent funding flow is not attainable for local CSOs, such as *Diócesis de Tumaco*, *Casa Teatro*, and *LIMPAL*, who will no longer continue these specific projects once the grant ends.

Some HRA regional advisors emphasize that financial resource allocation to ensure the sustainability of their initiatives can be dependent on the mayor's political will. For example, despite legal obligation granted through ordinances and municipal agreements, most of the Human Rights Committees do not have financial resources allocated to them. HRA advisors also say that most municipalities where they work have very limited budgets so sometimes even the timing of implementation can create budgetary conflicts for the municipal governments. For CSOs, HRA has also provided organizational support to eight CSOs (seven of those are grantees and one was done by request from USAID) on administration and accounting, monitoring and evaluation, communications, and budgeting and financial procurement, with the aim of strengthening their capacity to implement programs and procure funds from other donors. However, HRA has limited financial resources to provide this support more widely.

Conclusions

- The sustainability of HRA's activities with local governments depends on a number of factors that are beyond its control, including budgetary resource allocation, turnover in government staff and consultants, and political will. HRA aims to influence these factors by strengthening policy development processes and mechanisms, such as PPGNR sub-committees, instilling institutional capacity, and increasing civil society participation to minimize reliance on individual officials.
- HRA's institutional strengthening strategy is oriented toward sustainability through its emphasis on supporting activities and processes linked to public policy and by responding to the risks and needs of the most vulnerable groups.
- While technical assistance is highly valued by government officials, there is an over reliance on HRA regional advisors to perform technical and operational functions. While HRA aims to instill institutional capacity, a continued highly involved technical assistance to municipal governments could undermine the sustainability of HRA's activities.

- MOUs between USAID and departmental governments enhance interdepartmental coordination, enable departmental governments to identify and take ownership of the initiatives that USAID proposes, and streamlines USAID activities in regions where there are multiple and sometime overlapping programs.
- HRA's activities bring together the local government and civil society. This can generate sustainability as long as local governments identify firsthand the community needs, community members are informed of government obligations, and trust is promoted between communities and their governments.
- HRA grants to CSOs typically have a period of performance of 9 to 12 months. The short period of performance limits the grantee's ability to have the desired impact, creates expectations from beneficiaries of continued support that cannot be fulfilled, and undermines the sustainability of the grant activities. Unfortunately, as HRA is currently set-up, it does not have much flexibility to extend the grants' duration.
- Most CSOs feel ownership of their projects, as these are based on their own strategies and were designed by them. This potentially contributes to the sustainability of these initiatives, holding all other sustainability factors constant. While some design adjustments may be necessary to strengthen these projects, a few CSOs reported adjusting their projects to meet HRA's needs, which reduced their sense of ownership.

Evaluation Question 4

What effect has HRA had on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity, especially on human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, women, local journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected municipalities covered by HRA?

As described in the Evaluation Methods section, the evaluation team conducted 15 GDs with different beneficiary groups from the HRA grantees, to assess the effects that they report HRA has had on them. As shown in EQ2, HRA has contributed to improving beneficiaries' knowledge about human rights and changing perceptions and attitudes about them. The effects that stem from the capacity building activities and this increased knowledge are aligned to the theory of change, and include leadership, empowerment, and self-esteem at the individual level, which spill over into strengthening civil society and the community and family spheres. The evaluation team also identified some unintended risks on beneficiaries that HRA could address more strategically going forward. While the evaluation team only reports the effects associated with HRA activities, there may be some selection bias in the GD sample, as explained in the limitations section above. The rest of this section describes the different effects on beneficiaries associated with HRA.

Findings

Individual Leadership

Some young beneficiaries have become leaders in their schools and state that their peers recognize them as leaders and approach them when there is a case of injustice or abuse at school. They attribute this to their participation in the HRA grantee projects. A few young beneficiaries also identify themselves as peace promoters because they seek to form dialogue groups with their peers, recruit

more young people to participate in the HRA grantee projects, and have served as mediators during bullying situations in their schools.

“This year I was elected as class representative and my classmates are very happy because they say they needed someone to be their voice in front of teachers and school administration, and well they are very happy because I bring what I learned in this project”. (Youth GD, Santander de Quilichao, Cauca)

“In school, teachers used to kick you out of class if you were late, and I would think, what is going on here with my right to an education? I checked the school regulation handbook where it states that the teacher cannot keep me out of class for tardiness. Yes, there can be an academic sanction, so I could get a bad grade, but they can’t take away my right to an education. So I approached a teacher and I told her all this, and she supported me, so now we are preventing teachers from keeping us out of class. So now anytime something similar comes up, my classmates ask me, ok is this a violation of our rights, who do we turn to...so I have learned so much, before I would have stayed quiet and not stood up to teachers, without knowing they are violating my rights”. (Youth GD, Santander de Quilichao, Cauca)

A few young beneficiaries also report participating in their JAC or in the indigenous guard, but they already had these leadership positions before participating in the HRA grantee projects. Still, other young beneficiaries complain that their communities do not view them as leaders, stating that open spots in sub-committees or boards are generally given to adults, even though they now feel competent to participate in institutional mechanisms given the new knowledge they have acquired.

Indigenous community members explain their role within the indigenous guard and commitment to their communities as new leadership responsibilities.

“We learned that when we put on the vest, a symbol of authority, we take on the role of guard and with this comes a lot of responsibility. This means that we are committed as authority within our community. Once you take on this commitment you have to be aware of the activities happening in our territory, you have to safeguard the rights of others.” (Indigenous community GD, Segovia, Antioquia)

Some women report that they are now seen as mediators and resources in their communities. When a situation arises, they are present and seek solutions since now they know where to go, with whom to talk, and who can support and help them. Their leadership was evident in the examples they provided from their own lives but also when discussing the vignettes:

“If I were Sandra [hypothetical character] I would be more revolutionary. I would get my female neighbors, who also have the water access problem, and I would bring them with me to the JAC. I would motivate them so that a lot of us showed up to the meeting...we’ll see if they don’t let us participate then (laughs).” (Women GD, Buenos Aires, Cauca)

Some women say that neighbors recognize them as new leaders and have even encouraged them to run for public office, while other women report that some neighbors have insulted them for getting involved and helping to report domestic abuse and have been told not to step into couple’s problems.

“Recently, a neighbor insulted us. The husband was hitting his wife...horrible, horrible...we heard it from inside our house and ran outside when we heard her scream <Help!> so obviously we immediately called the police. As soon as the police arrive, the husband and the police start insulting us for being nosy, and that we shouldn’t step into couple’s problems. In other words, she gets killed and he goes unpunished, and one shouldn’t step into couple’s problems.” (Women GD, Buenos Aires, Cauca)

Empowerment

One of the most pronounced and widespread effects across the different beneficiary groups is a new sense of empowerment that has been gained, not only from having a better understanding of their

human rights, but also from having the formal support of HRA grantees and HRA itself. The potential selection bias of the GD sample should be taken into account when interpreting these findings. Nonetheless, many of these beneficiary groups have felt an institutional abandonment due to the armed conflict, and are now feeling empowered with the accompaniment of these grantee organizations and HRA. Common phrases during the GDs included “*they have opened our eyes*” and “*the bandages have been taken off*” to describe how the gained knowledge about human rights has empowered them to demand and claim respect for their rights, especially with their neighbors and in their communities.

“When you see a neighbor doing something they shouldn’t and you already have the knowledge and understanding of these issues, then you feel capable of approaching them and speaking up. That has been very enriching, to be able to speak up and express my opinions without fear” (Women GD, Ituango, Antioquia)

Although most beneficiaries say that with this knowledge they will no longer remain silent, not all of them would formally file a complaint, as there is still fear of reprisals, stigmatization due to lack of confidentiality, distrust of the police, and lack of response from the Prosecutor’s Office.

All women beneficiaries express a recognition of their own value (agency) and an increased internal locus of control, that is, they feel they have greater control over the things that happen to them. All of them express an attitude of empowerment with respect to their own abilities and value as a person, not only as a mother and wife, and they feel that they can achieve their goals and contribute to their communities. This sense of empowerment is also strengthened by the sense of support and camaraderie they feel within these groups. However, they recognize that they still rely on HRA grantee support to turn this empowerment into action:

“What I hope for us, women, is for there to no longer be the need to go accompanied by anyone. But for us to say I do not need company, I can do this on my own, I am capable. And she, herself, can file a complaint, she can have that sense of empowerment and leadership to say I am capable of losing this fear.” (Women GD, Vista Hermosa, Meta)

The beneficiaries, especially in the women and LGBTI groups, emphasize that the difference between the projects from the HRA grantees and other workshops they have attended is that they feel close support and accompaniment from the grantees; it is “*not a four-hour workshop where they simply take your signature and your picture*”. However, they also express that they do not want the support to end, that they are just now “*learning to walk*” and the project has finished. Almost all beneficiaries in every GD agreed that the HRA grantee projects are too short.

Self-Esteem and Public Speaking

All of the beneficiaries, except for the social leaders, express that participating in the HRA grantee projects raised their self-esteem since it made them recognize their abilities and resiliency despite the abuse they have survived or the abandonment they had felt as a community. Social leaders did not report that their self-esteem increased; this may be because as leaders their self-esteem is already high. The youth and women groups state that they learned to express themselves without fear of being made fun of or of what others will think.

Most women and young beneficiaries also express that the HRA grantee projects helped them lose their shyness to be able to speak publicly and with more confidence, to participate in meetings, and to express their opinions. The women of Ituango, in particular, also value learning about self-care and the exercise of historical memory to heal and let go of the guilt they felt from previous abuse.

The young beneficiaries also enjoyed having access to art, music, and photography since they report not having access to these tools in their schools. They enthusiastically express a thirst for learning, not just

about the arts but also about political science to be more informed about elections and political processes.

Civil Society Strengthening

The strengthening of the LGBTI community is evident through the mentoring support of *Caribe Afirmativo* to nascent CSOs like *Fundación Arcoíris* in Tumaco and the creation of offshoot grassroots organizations, such as *Caucasia Diversa* and *Tapir Dorado* in Antioquia, which were formed by beneficiaries of *Caribe Afirmativo*. HRA, along with *Caribe Afirmativo*, also supported the LGBTI group in Tumaco when a group leader and a community member were killed. They provided the local group with support during the complaint process as well as protection measures, launched public campaigns, and, thanks to HRA's leadership and timely presence of the Chief of Party, met with the Governor's Secretary and re-established the LGBTI inter-institutional roundtable. This dedicated support has strengthened and empowered them as an organized group.

Similarly, the social leaders in the GDs attribute to HRA the strengthening of their participation and incidence in institutional mechanisms, such as the Human Rights Committees, the PPGNR sub-committees, and the victims' roundtables. These beneficiaries express that they now have greater knowledge and competencies to present actions and actively engage in these matters. However, they also recognize that this participation only goes so far since response to human rights violations is the responsibility of the authorities.

Nonetheless, both social leaders and LGBTI beneficiaries state that if it were not for the accompaniment of the HRA grantee or HRA itself, they would not receive the same access or reception from the government entities. Thus, there is still a dependency and need for support from established organizations or from international cooperation programs like HRA.

"It is very different when Caribe Afirmativo or HRA arrive and they tell the Governor's Office, <come, listen to these people>...but when we go to their office on our own and knock and introduce ourselves as part of the LGBTI community...no, they don't even talk to you, you need to schedule an appointment and they give you a number that no one answers or send you to someone who won't talk to you. So this roundtable that was created through HRA's support is so valuable, we are starting to see engagement with the government, we aren't 100 percent there yet but we now have a foundation." (LGBTI GD, Caucasia, Antioquia)

Women beneficiaries also attribute their participation and engagement in institutional mechanisms to the HRA grantee projects. For example, in Cauca, the HRA grantee, ASOM, enabled them to participate in the Territorial-Focused Development Plans (PDET's for the initials in Spanish, *Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial*). The Afro-Colombian women express being proud of their group for demanding to participate in the PDET's and for the important contributions they made in this process since they recognize themselves as the nucleus of their communities. They also express that the ASOM project empowered them to not only to be members of the community council but also to run for the executive committee to be part of the decision-making body. They feel that with the new knowledge obtained they can contribute in these mechanisms. In Meta, women beneficiaries of HRA grantee, LIMPAL, now participate in the Human Rights Committee and the municipal women's roundtable to discuss issues of gender-based violence.

The construction, development, and socialization of the *rutas* has also served to further engage civil society with government entities. Women groups and social leaders, as well as the relevant entities, participate in this process. The beneficiaries recognize HRA and its grantees as the facilitators of this participatory process.

Community and Social Effects

The evaluation team found that the beneficiary groups have different interpretations of “self-protection”. Some women beneficiaries report that strengthening social networks with nearby communities is a tool for self-protection. However, other women talk about self-protection as an individual issue that consists of self-care and being cautious in their daily activities so as to not put themselves at risk. In the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, collective support is a tool for self-protection and guaranteeing rights. They explain that the self-protection strategies sometimes do not take into account the particularities of indigenous communities; they express a tension between individual and collective measures of self-protection. In the LGBTI community, they use a collective of local LGBTI groups, to offer each other protection and security, especially when formal complaints are filed.

Almost all beneficiaries across the different groups see the benefits received as an opportunity to strengthen their communities and to change attitudes. Indigenous beneficiaries talk about strengthening the social fabric, women beneficiaries talk about the collective support they have gained, and the LGBTI beneficiaries have allies that help to make them more visible in society.

“HRA and USAID have left a mark on us. Their vision has left us with tools so we can live and leave behind the fear that our communities live with. So I think that HRA has created dialogues between people in the community, has changed attitudes. So I think HRA and USAID have left an imprint in each of our communities.” (Indigenous GD, Cauca, Antioquia)

“I value the support that we give each other...we cry together, we support each other because we have become friends, we are like sisters after this. That support is invaluable, to get this support from people to help overcome the pain we have endured is something so great.” (Afro-Colombian women GD, Tumaco, Nariño)

“For example, I am not gay but I want to defend their rights. As a citizen you can take action, you can advocate as a citizen and intervene in different ways. [...] So through our radio show we talk about inclusion and we all have to take a stake in this. [...] One of our slogans is “You don’t have to be, to defend”. I don’t have to be Afro-Colombian to defend our fellow Afro-Colombians, I don’t have to be indigenous to defend the indigenous populations” (LGBTI GD, Cauca, Antioquia)

Most young beneficiaries express a change in how they treat others, especially with regards to the respect and tolerance of others. They state that before they participated in the project they were rude to teachers, friends, and siblings, sometimes racist and homophobic, but after learning about human rights they recognize that respect goes both ways:

“Human beings are all equal, no matter is we are different color, different whatever...on the inside we care the same. So in this project I have learned many things. If I am disrespecting someone, then how can I expect respect? I should act the way I want to be respected. To be respected, I must respect other. I can’t demand respect if I don’t do it, and this project has taught me that.” (Afro-Colombian youth GD, Tumaco, Nariño)

Some beneficiaries also report wanting to share what they learned with their neighbors and friends, or in the case of social leaders going to rural communities to talk to the JAC. However most beneficiaries talk about this as something they would like to do and not as something they have done. They would like to replicate what they have learned for their communities. They also want to encourage others to participate in the HRA grantee projects, as more people learn about human rights, the stronger the community will become.

Family Life and Gender Roles

Young beneficiaries and women report that they have taught what they have learned to their families and this has improved how siblings treat each other, how parents treat them (youth), and the support women feel from their husbands. Some women report having more support from their husbands to go after their goals and to continue learning and empowering themselves. Others report that their husbands are now starting to share household responsibilities, including cleaning and child rearing. Some women also report they have taught their sons that home duties should be shared between men and women, and have taught their daughters that they can have a place or position in the community and that their voice and opinion matters. Some youth and women beneficiaries report they have not felt this type of family support; however none have been forbidden or discouraged from attending the HRA grantee project activities.

All of the beneficiaries recognize there is a sexist culture that discredits women, especially in political participation, and confines them to the roles of mother and wife. During the GDs, beneficiaries offered solutions of inclusion and strategies to demand their rights when presented with a vignette that discriminated against women's participation. During the GDs with women beneficiaries, gender roles kept coming up in the conversation. Women beneficiaries declare that they want equality inside and outside their homes, they want partners not owners, and they want to continue learning and empowering themselves. Although some women beneficiaries perceive greater female participation in political stages and sense a change in gender roles and support from men, most women beneficiaries agree that machismo and structural resistance to gender role still exist and continue to be obstacles for their equality.

Risks to the Beneficiaries

Some social leaders, including LGBTI and indigenous beneficiaries, express that by building their capacity as human rights defenders they are exposed to more risks. The leader of the *Red de Mujeres de Ituango*, for example, feels she is at a crossroads. On the one hand, she wants women supported by the HRA grantee to continue learning and empowering themselves to fight for their rights. Yet on the other hand, she is aware that there are no guarantees of an institutional response, so this exposes women to risks of reprisals and as an organization she does not feel capable of protecting them. The LGBTI community also protests that the State response is very slow, that during the 90 days of waiting for a response “*they have already killed you*”, and that the State's protection measures of sending a police officer actually puts them at greater risk. They report that even approaching government entities must be done subtly and with sensitivity so as to not expose the organization members. The social leaders in Caquetá share that they mitigate security risks by maintaining open and transparent communications with the communities they work with, especially when it is a new community they are approaching and engaging.

Obstacles Faced by Beneficiaries

Throughout the GDs, beneficiaries mention different obstacles that prevent them from applying what they learned during the projects or that keep them exposed to human rights violations and abuse.

There is a lack of institutional support and protection for human rights defenders who continue to put themselves at risk to fight for human rights for all. Social leaders do not see concrete proposals to implement Directive 02, which outlines obligations to local authorities for the protection and guarantees for human rights defenders and leaders.

All of the beneficiaries of HRA grantees are waiting for a second phase and continuity in the project. They say that they have only now started learning and getting involved and want more support. There is a consensus that the projects are too short.

There continues to be machismo and structural resistance against the LGBTI community, not only in the communities but within the institutional framework. Women are victimized when they report sexual abuse. Public officials across entities do not have the knowledge or training necessary to address specific issues of the LGBTI community, from how to address people (by name) to how to guarantee access to health services.

Most beneficiaries across all the groups explain that the lack of formal complaints is due to a lack of trust in the authorities, especially in the police. During these conversations, beneficiaries describe their lack of trust stems from personal experiences with the police's rampant corruption, abuse of power, and mismanagement of information (lack of confidentiality) that exposes them, especially women and the LGBTI community, to stigmatization and possible reprisals.

The majority of beneficiaries across the groups also protest a lack of response from the State. They express that all the knowledge and empowerment they have gained, all the engagement and participation, all of the demands and claims come to nothing if there is no response from the State. There is a lack of agreement among the beneficiaries on whether there would be an effective response from the Prosecutor's Office if they filed a complaint. Some believe there would be, while others believe it stays on paper. However, they say this also depends on the nature of the complaint. The beneficiaries add that there is a lack of knowledge and capacity within the government entities which exacerbates the lack of State response to human rights violations.

Conclusions

- HRA grants aimed at empowering young people show positive contributions in forming leaders and role models. Given that youth are increasingly vulnerable to force recruitment, and illegal use and utilization for activities related to the illicit economy, grants targeted at youth play an important role, not only in the promotion, but also in the prevention of human rights violations.
- Vulnerable population groups, in particular LGBTI groups who are starting to organize formally, highly value the support and accompaniment of HRA and its grantees for the strengthening of their nascent groups. Moreover, the mentoring model between *Caribe Afirmativo* and these nascent LGBTI groups is proving successful and is highly valued by beneficiaries. This also shows that grassroots CSOs may need and value more than just financial support.
- HRA has contributed to the increased participation in institutional mechanisms as well as engagement with institutional entities for social leaders and nascent groups. However, it is still not clear if beneficiaries from nascent groups can sustain this independently. The support from HRA and its grantees gives them legitimacy and beneficiaries recognize that they would have not have the same access to or reciprocity from government entities without this support.
- Empowerment is the most prevalent effect across the beneficiary groups, except for the social leaders groups, as this group already stood out on this front. Beneficiaries take ownership of the knowledge gained, which spills over into their immediate nucleus (i.e. families, schools, neighbors) rather than into participation in institutional mechanisms.
- The grantee projects are generating respect and recognition from beneficiaries of different population groups, resulting in new allies, as well as facilitating dialogues between groups that do not normally sit down together (i.e. leaders, police, and government officials).

- Grassroots CSOs seem to contribute greater positive effects on beneficiaries because they provide close, consistent, and localized support.
- Empowerment goes hand in hand with increased risks that beneficiaries feel by becoming more visible in their communities or more exposed after filing complaints. This risk is exacerbated by the lack of effective response from the State. Moreover, CSOs cannot guarantee protection and beneficiaries may be left exposed to violations.
- Beneficiaries perceive a lack of knowledge and capacity from the State for an effective response to their claims. There is also a lack of trust in the authorities, especially in the police.
- The LGBTI population continues to face prejudice due to the lack of knowledge and sensitivity on the part of government officials that are an assault to their dignity and integrity.

Evaluation Question 5

Are HRA's strategies effective and adequate for the objective of increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations? Is HRA effectively coordinating with other programs or international organizations working on impunity, such as UNOHCHR?

HRA's strategy towards increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violation centers around supporting the AGO, strengthening civil society on case documentation and strategic litigation, and developing instruments and dialogues to assess the impact of mining on human rights. This section focuses on the support provided to the AGO; the latter two strategies are addressed fully in EQ6. In order to comprehensively answer this evaluation question, the evaluation team conducted interviews with key informants from HRA, GOC AGO, USAID, USAID's Justice for a Sustainable Peace Program (JSP), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR). Within the AGO, the evaluation team interviewed an official from the Delegate for Citizen Security,¹⁹ the Director of the Support Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis, and the Sub-Director of the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy.

Findings

Strategy Implementation

Support in the implementation of the AGO's prioritization plans

HRA's activities with the AGO consist of supporting the development and implementation of prioritization plans at the national and regional level. Specifically, HRA supports the Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis in the investigation of homicides and threats against human rights defenders. HRA hired four experts, who travel to prioritized regions such as Cauca, to provide support in the analysis of case files through standardization of context analysis, criminal profiles, and geographic reference systems. Moreover, HRA funds *Corporación Humanas*, *Caribe Afirmativo*, and *CODHES*, which work with the AGO to increase capacity in the response to cases related to GBV, LGBTI, and land restitution, respectively.

Representatives of the AGO, USAID, and UNOHCHR concur that the implementation of a prioritization approach, which has been supported by HRA, has allowed progress in the response to

¹⁹ The evaluation team scheduled the interview with the Director from the Delegate for Citizen Security, but at the time of the interview he delegated it out to one of his officials.

human rights violations by enabling assessments on the structures and patterns of these violations. Moreover, HRA's support on the AGO's prioritization plans has survived a change in the AGO administration at the national level.

While it is unclear if there has been an increase in investigations and prosecutions due to HRA's support, interviewees agree that an accomplishment has been the AGO's shift in focus towards contextual analyses rather than simply going after the perpetrator who committed the violation. The three AGO officials state that AGO's prioritization plan is one of the most relevant policies within the entity and that HRA's support has enabled the AGO to make a strategic shift towards its implementation, while taking into account the entity's limitations:

“HRA’s support has been critical in one of the AGO’s important policies, that of prioritization. I think it is one of the policies that has given the AGO a strategic shift because it allows us to think strategically about prioritizing, and accepting we cannot do everything, so then let’s make a rational and informed decision of what we can do and let’s think about what it means to prioritize [investigations] [...] and HRA is supporting these efforts.” (Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy, AGO, Bogota)

They also describe that the implementation of the prioritization plans is changing the narrative within the AGO, since in all of the management mechanisms there has been an appropriation of the language and the logic of the prioritization approach. The three AGO officials state that HRA's support has resulted in the adoption and utilization of technical instruments, documentation of cases, training for prosecutors, and the establishment of the implementation strategy as a mandatory directive for all Sectional Offices across the AGO. In addition, they acknowledge that the AGO has responded better in the prioritized crimes. For example, the official of the Delegate for Citizen Security explained that, thanks to the implementation of the prioritization policy, the following results were obtained: (i) 468 human rights violations cases launched, (ii) orders were given to the judicial police in 318 cases, (iii) 28 processes changed procedural stage, (iv) 14 indictment hearings and five accusation hearings were held, and (v) seven convictions were obtained.

Uncertain implementation of the regional prioritization strategy

HRA's implementation of the prioritization strategy at the regional level has been slow due to delays in working with the new Sub-Director of the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy. Moreover, there is overlap with the USAID JSP Activity's strategy²⁰ and a lack of clarity regarding how the prioritization strategy with the AGO will be taken down to the local level by these two programs. Table 5 below shows the work plan tasks, implementation progress, and identified bottlenecks for the two overlapping programs with respect to their support to the AGO at the regional level.

Table 5: Strategy Overlap between HRA and JSP

Strategy	HRA	JSP ²¹
Work Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work with the AGO in three regions to provide support for the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the AGO in the investigations and case processing of

²⁰ USAID's JSP Activity (April 2017 – February 2021) aims to strengthen the effectiveness and responsiveness of the Colombian justice system, increase citizen support for the rule of law in conflict-affects regions, and address the critical justice needs of victims of the armed conflict in 45 priority municipalities.

²¹ JSP information from this table compiled from a JSP Project Document shared by USAID on August 10, 2018.

Strategy	HRA	JSP ²¹
	<p>implementation of the prioritization plans for human rights defenders and social leaders (Task 3.1.2.1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop strategies for the prioritization and advancement of cases at regional level (Task 3.1.2.2) 	<p>homicides of human rights defenders and social leaders in the regions where JSP operates (Result 3.4.1)</p>
Implementation Progress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HRA hired four experts, under the Support Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis, who are traveling to prioritized regions such as Cauca, to provide support in analysis of case files through standardization of context analysis, criminal profiles, and geographic reference systems. • HRA funds <i>Corporación Humanas</i>, who supported AGO regional office in Norte de Santander on investigation of 17 sexual violence cases and developed case guides on GBV for regional prosecutors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JSP has a draft project proposal to support the Delegate for Citizen Security in the processes, determined through the AGO's prioritization system, of cases in the regions where it operates. <p>This project plans to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support the dissemination and application of internal protocols, directives, and analysis methodologies developed by the AGO, and promoted by UNOHCHR, for the investigations of homicides of human rights defenders and social leaders. • Technical support through hire of experts • Support and strengthen regional prosecutors and Sectional Offices
Bottlenecks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As of the drafting of this report (May 2018), HRA had a pending proposal with the Sub-Director of the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy. Delay in moving this forward has made it difficult to implement the prioritization strategy at the regional level. This is recognized by HRA and the AGO, and is reflected in the HRA deliverables tracker. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JSP started a year after HRA and had difficulty engaging initially with the AGO. Also faced uncertainty on how to utilize the work HRA has done at the national level with the AGO. • JSP approached UNOHCHR for access to the AGO and are only now drafting a proposed project for the AGO.

Besides the strategy overlap between the two USAID programs, conversations with their representatives reveal a lack of clarity about which program will support the implementation of the prioritization strategy at the regional level. On one hand, the JSP representative mentions that the work HRA has supported at the national level will be used by JSP to implement at the regional level, including the protocols on GBV, and states that there will not be an overlap between the two programs because HRA only works at the national level with the AGO. On the other hand, HRA is also pushing for the implementation of the regional prioritization strategy in their work with the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy, as it is also part of their work plan:

"The prioritization strategy has worked well, that is by thematic areas, at the national level. But the prioritization approach has still not reached the local prosecutor, it still needs to be adapted to the needs of the local prosecutor [...] so then the idea of the project with the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy is to take those developed tools, see how they can become something useful and appropriate, and disseminate them so that local prosecutors can prioritize, especially regarding these human rights issues."

The strategy overlap and lack of clarity about each program's implementation plans can result in a duplication of efforts and even confusion among regional officials, especially in the geographic areas where both programs operate. JSP and HRA agree that USAID should clearly define the programmatic coverage of each program during the design stage not during implementation. The overlap in strategy between HRA and JSP present an opportunity for USAID to design a clear implementation strategy with the two programs that makes the best use of their resources and capacity so that important steps can be taken towards the objective of HRA's Component 3.

Implementation support offered to individual Offices at the AGO

HRA's support has been focused on the Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis, which is under the Delegate for Citizen Security, rather than directly to the Delegate for Citizen Security. While HRA attempted to work with the Delegate for Citizen Security, they report that the Director has always been busy and pushed them towards working with the other Office. Because of this, HRA has also been trying to move forward on supporting the implementation of prioritization plans at the regional level through the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy. Thus, HRA's engagement with the AGO has been through individuals offices with "champions" to advance in their strategy and work plan.

The AGO officials reflect that this approach enables HRA to have a strategic focus, since they do not provide assistance on just any subject. AGO representatives recognize HRA's limited resources and capacity. They acknowledge that HRA adjusts to the needs of the AGO, takes into account its proposals, and focuses on specific supporting tasks to different Units within the AGO. The officer from the Support Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis explained that HRA, having limited resources, has greater clarity to know what can and cannot be done, making it easier to make decisions regarding the projects that can be jointly undertaken. The officials from the Delegate for Citizen Security and the and Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy also state that HRA's support has a strategic focus, since they do not provide assistance on just any subject; on the contrary it is concentrated on specific and previously defined topics.

"I think one thing that has been great about [HRA] is that we have a lot of continuity. It is great that we have worked with the program on the issue of prioritization and that now we will continue working on other facets of that [issue]. In other words, if we really develop...and I think that even gives institutional sustainability to the projects because it forces us to continuously think which direction we will take in the areas where we work together. So I definitely believe that we have a strategic relationship with HRA."
(Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy, AGO, Bogota)

UNOHCHR representatives, who have a longstanding relationship with the AGO, believe that HRA's support, which currently focuses on specific supporting tasks to different Units within the AGO, could be leveraged with a more comprehensive strategy, not only from HRA but from USAID as well. However, there are a couple of underlying factors, which limit HRA's ability to pursue a more comprehensive strategy, including the complex and hierarchical structure of the AGO and the lack of a high-level strategy between USAID and the AGO.

Factors Affecting HRA's Approach

Challenging organizational structure of the AGO

Representatives from the two USAID programs that work with the AGO (HRA and JSP), as well as representatives from UNOHCHR, concur that the AGO's hierarchical organizational structure makes it difficult to implement their strategies. For example, these three implementers working with the AGO state that it is a complex entity, with a rigid hierarchical structure, which makes it difficult to get buy-in for the implementation of projects at the regional level. A representative from UNOHCHR states that "the AGO is a very hierarchical institution, the director of the Sectional Offices will only work with you if their boss gives the order." Similarly, a representative from JSP confirms the following:

"The AGO is too big for us to reach consensus [...] they do not take you seriously because there is no unity, so then how did we do it...we did this with a previous strategy...the first thing was to talk to the deputy prosecutor, well we tried talking with the head, but the prosecutor did not grant us a meeting, so we reached out to the deputy prosecutor, and he gave us 15 minutes and we left happy because he sat with us, like five of us...but the deputy prosecutor was removed. So we did the same meeting 4 times with the same people and the tasks were established but they never started...and they have never started. So the difficulty with the AGO is that it is so complex, the Offices are divided and you cannot work with them." (JSP representative, Bogota).

HRA representatives explain that changes to the organizational structure and personnel within the AGO have hampered the continuation of the projects that are being carried out, as well as the implementation of new phases of their strategy. They report that meetings have stalled and it has been difficult to maintain open and consistent communication with new officials who are overburdened with new work. HRA believes this has created bottlenecks for the adoption and implementation of the specific projects within their response strategy.

"We have a pending project with the AGO to improve the implementation of prioritization plans, [...] it has been very difficult to carry it out since the arrival of [a new official] to the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy, because we spoke with her in September, there is a draft that she sent me about a month ago, but it is still too rudimentary to start implementing it." (HRA staff member, Bogota)

The bottlenecks created by the personnel changes within the AGO are also mentioned by the JSP program:

"The issue with the AGO is that we have not been able to work with them because the management from the Offices with whom we had meetings planned for this year have been changing, so we have not had any meetings so far." (JSP representative, Bogota)

Despite these challenges, the three AGO officials recognize HRA's adaptability to changes that have occurred within the entity, including the arrival of the new Attorney General in August 2016 and the organizational structure changes that came with it. For example, the officials from the Delegate for Citizen Security and the Support Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis state that HRA's consistent ongoing relationship with the AGO is focused on developing, implementing, and following-up on policies which allow the Activity to adapt to the different changes. They also state that HRA has always interacted with the relevant actors responsible for each issue, regardless of the changes that take place within the entity. In addition, the official from the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy states that the prioritization strategy will remain in the AGO despite personnel changes:

“I think that one of the things we have accomplished from our relationship with HRA is how to develop and put in place institutional initiatives rather than personal ones. I think that the prioritization strategy will stay in the AGO even if all of the USAID people change, even if all of the AGO people change and new teams come in, we will still be talking about this strategy.” (Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy, AGO, Bogota)

Undefined strategic relationship between USAID and AGO

USAID, as an agency, has not conducted any high-level dialogues with the AGO to define a strategic relationship that can then be laid out for its overlapping programs. Moreover, representatives from UNOHCHR and JSP perceive that USAID has not analyzed or thought strategically about the needs at the AGO in the design and implementation of its various programs. UNOHCHR remarks that USAID offers its projects to the AGO without taking into consideration the implications that stem from AGO’s complex structure and recent structural changes. Similarly, the JSP representative stated that USAID’s engagement with the AGO has been through individual mid-level officials without high-level dialogues to obtain buy-in:

“USAID does not talk to the deputy prosecutor or the prosecutor, and over there everything comes down from the top. It isn’t convenient for us that UNOHCHR talks to the head but USAID does not. You have to go meet face-to-face with the decision-maker. But that high-level dialogue does not take place and I think that is where you have to start. We have been able to work well with all of the other institutions within the national judicial sector, except for the AGO, because we have engaged with the top-level officials. If you engage with mid-level officials, they may be good, but it all stays in writing, everything is ready to be implemented but what is missing is the green light from the top. I think what is missing is that USAID needs to have high-level engagement with the AGO, with the deputy prosecutor, to define concrete projects and then they give the order and all of the Units start working, that is the way the AGO operates.” (JSP representative, Bogota)

HRA’s engagement approach toward the AGO has been restricted to individuals offices with “champions”, which is not the most effective way of supporting an entity with a hierarchical and rigid organizational structure to advance on an ambitious objective. However, given the lack of a comprehensive strategy between USAID and the AGO with directives to the relevant Delegates and clearly laid out projects, HRA, as an individual Activity, has a limited sphere of influence for the objective of increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations.

Coordination Aspects between Stakeholders

Lack of consensus on external coordination among stakeholders

USAID holds that, given the complexity of the AGO and the engagement of multiple stakeholders with this entity, better coordination between HRA and UNOHCHR might leverage HRA’s work so that they can more effectively undertake their projects and meet their pending deliverables. The evaluation team discussed the issue of coordination with the different stakeholders to gain insights on this perspective.

First, the evaluation team found that UNOHCHR and HRA have a clear understanding of their roles with the AGO, given each of their mandates and competencies. They also have a clear understanding of each other’s mandates, as well as the nature and objective of the support they each provide to the AGO. A representative of UNOHCHR summarized the difference between their strategy and USAID’s strategy:

“We have different mechanisms for public advocacy, we have the representatives, the annual report, the

Colombian government consults with us consistently; we are able to pressure the GOC. In the case of determining the figures regarding the homicides of human rights defenders, the government calls us, not the AGO. The AGO responds on the list of homicides based on what UNOHCHR reports. But that doesn't come out of thin air, that comes from a process of combining efforts with the AGO, we have a political relationship with them that allows us to provide technical assistance and work from within the entity. It isn't the same for the AGO to approach USAID as it is for them to approach the United Nations. ” (UNOHCHR representative, Bogota)

Likewise, the official of the Delegate for Citizen Security states that the work of both, HRA and UNOHCHR, are delimited and that, in a certain way, complement each other. For example, she stated that, on one hand, UNOHCHR is in charge of constantly monitoring the human rights situation in Colombia and issuing recommendations to the different GOC entities; on the other hand, USAID (through HRA) provides technical and logistic support, collaborates at the local level, and helps to launch investigations.

Second, representatives from USAID, HRA, JSP, and UNOHCHR have different interpretations of what “effective coordination” entails. There is no consensus on what “coordination” implies. USAID states that currently, programs coordinate for the division of activities rather than a strategic coordination based on a common objective. HRA explained that coordination entails that each program understands what work corresponds to them to avoid duplicating efforts when implementing different projects with the AGO.

“We have held a couple of meetings with JSP to discuss how to coordinate, and what came out of that was that when they have a meeting with the AGO, at least with the Support Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis, they would let us know so that we can be involved. That is probably the best way for us to coordinate.” (HRA staff member, Bogota)

The JSP representative discussed coordination with UNOHCHR and HRA to be about sharing information over certain methodologies. He then added that coordination with HRA has mostly happened at the regional level and that sharing office space has made it easier to share resources and coordinate activities to minimize overlap.

Third, there is a lack of clarity from USAID as to what type of relationship its two programs should have with UNOHCHR, as well as the type of coordination that should exist between these stakeholders. A USAID representative expressed concern that HRA has not been able to coordinate with UNOHCHR to achieve more progress with the AGO. However, he recognized that the nature of this greater coordination with UNOHCHR is difficult to specify in detail. He also considered that it would be an advantage for UNOHCHR to work in a more coordinated manner with HRA to benefit from the Activity's resources, given that UNOHCHR has a small team and could potentially leverage the technical, logistical, personnel and financial support that HRA could provide. However, UNOHCHR expressed that the relationship with USAID's programs is mostly focused on not duplicating efforts with regards to the support given to the AGO:

“Well, our relationship is practically based on a dialogue with [our representative of USAID] who is then the focal point with us ... with her, through the programs that USAID implements, we have been monitoring the situation of human rights defenders and they obviously ask us what we are doing with the AGO to try to avoid duplicating support or even so that through our experience they can improve the projects and concrete actions their programs are carrying out. For example last year we had a couple of meetings with HRA, who is providing support to the Delegate for Citizen Security.” (UNOHCHR representative, Bogota)

The evaluation found that while USAID may have directed its Activities to coordinate, there is a lack of clarity about what coordinating entails and for what purpose. Moreover, since a coordination plan was not put in place from the beginning of the Activities, each Activity recognizes each other's mandates and have focused efforts on simply sharing information while advancing on their own contractual obligations. Once again, a comprehensive strategy between USAID and the AGO would solidify specific ways these two Activities can coordinate to leverage their efforts and maximize resources. It can help set the ground for defined objectives and purpose for collaboration.

Different collaboration relationships with UNOHCHR marked by initial engagement

The evaluation team also found that HRA and JSP approached UNOHCHR differently due to their different initial needs, namely differences in independent access to the AGO, and this determined the type of relationship that exists between each USAID program and the United Nations office. The relationship between HRA and UNOHCHR has consisted of sporadic engagement to share information because HRA had initial access to the AGO on their own. One of the UNOHCHR representatives interviewed said that HRA did not engage them as an ally, it simply sought them out as a source of information when it already had projects underway and not when they were starting to design their projects. In contrast, the relationship between the JSP and UNOHCHR has been less sporadic because JSP engaged the UN office early on to get access to the AGO. In turn, UNOHCHR assisted them in making that connection and in identifying the needs of the AGO that were relevant and appropriate to what JSP could offer them. UNOHCHR added that this engagement set them up as allies in the work strategy that the AGO requested from JSP.

Weak internal coordination within USAID

Finally, it is important to note that all of the stakeholders interviewed agree that there is a coordination problem within USAID (among its different programs), as well as between USAID and other programs of the US Embassy. In addition, it is not clear that USAID presents its program portfolio to the AGO in a comprehensive manner, which has consequences on USAID's resource allocation and management strategy. Stakeholders external to USAID and HRA also agree on this point. The official of the Support Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis says that although there has been an attempt to build a strategic relationship between USAID and the AGO, it has been difficult because of what she sees as a lack of coordination inside USAID and the US Embassy regarding all of the programs they manage. She added that while it is understandable that there can be challenges in coordinating different programs, she recommends that there be greater communication and engagement between the different programs so they can operate in a complementary manner and not duplicate efforts.

“There needs to be more agreement within USAID and between their programs to approach the AGO with a more unified presentation. Here’s an example...currently there is a strategy to address threats that we have been working on with a specific unit in the AGO. And across the USAID programs there is no clarity of which program could do what, but they are all interested in working on it, so they approach the AGO independently. So now the AGO says yes, they have approached us...we’ve had meetings but we don’t know with whom or for what. So yes, more coordination within USAID and between their programs, engage with each other more and then approach the AGO with a more unified proposal.”
(UNOHCHR representative, Bogota)

The UNOHCHR representatives add that the coordination challenges within USAID have implications on HRA because they limit the support the Activity can give to the AGO to individual tasks rather than enabling a comprehensive strategy:

"Something that we are witnessing is that while the program [HRA] has lines of action there are other programs that are also interested in providing concrete support to the AGO and we can see that they are not sharing information between themselves, they are not talking and that is generating a perception in the AGO that there are many people who want to assist but in a disorganized manner. Also given the AGO's complex structure, obviously each Unit tries to grab on to something, but that is not appropriate from a strategic point of view [...] you have different Units involved without a common goal. Therefore, the international assistance needs to be thought through strategically and not on specific individual support." (UNOHCHR representative, Bogota)

Conclusions

- All of the key stakeholders interviewed perceive that supporting the implementation of a prioritization approach in the investigations has allowed progress in the response to human rights violations. In addition, AGO officials believe that HRA's support has contributed to a wider adoption of the prioritization strategy, unified its strategy regarding the response to human rights violations, and obtained an institutional vision that transcends beyond the individual officials linked to the entity.
- The implementation of the prioritization strategy at the local level is important for both HRA and JSP. However, the roles and responsibilities of each program for this strategy remains uncertain and may create obstacles in implementation if not addressed strategically with USAID.
- All of the key stakeholders interviewed perceive a lack of clarity in USAID's comprehensive strategy toward the AGO. The aforementioned, in addition to the fact that the AGO is a complex entity with a rigid hierarchical organizational structure that requires top-down decision-making, makes the adoption and implementation of HRA projects dependent on individual officials, which can restrict HRA in meeting all of its deliverables.
- In the absence of high-level discussions between USAID and AGO officials, HRA has been strategic in approaching the AGO through individual offices with "champions" to maximize its small budget, limited capacity, and sphere of influence. However, this has resulted in a piecemeal strategy rather than a high-level comprehensive strategy that aligns with the ambitious objective of IR 3.
- Representatives of USAID, HRA, and JSP, as well as external stakeholders (UNOHCHR and AGO), have different interpretations of what "effective coordination" entails, and what benefits or value-add would result from greater external coordination.
- Greater clarity about the relationship that USAID would like its different programs to have with each other and with external stakeholders such as UNOHCHR regarding the support it gives to the AGO would also be beneficial. The current lack of specificity has an impact on the planning and implementation of the work that the different programs, specifically HRA and JSP, carry out with the AGO, as well as on the different levels of coordination that should exist between its programs and external stakeholders that also work with the AGO.
- While increasing engagement with other stakeholders could enhance HRA's work, it is not the barrier to achieving an increase in investigations and responses to human rights violations. Without strategic coordination within USAID and without high-level engagement between USAID and the AGO, HRA remains constrained in how it can provide support.


Evaluation Question 6

What have been the achievements, bottlenecks and lessons learned during the implementation of the three components of HRA and its cross-cutting themes?

This section describes the key achievements, bottlenecks, and lessons learned on the implementation of HRA's three components and cross-cutting themes. Thus, it is not structured into findings and conclusions as the other evaluation questions. Given that Component 1 and Component 3 are discussed extensively in EQ2 and EQ5, respectively, and parts of Component 2 are discussed across the first four EQs, this section may repeat some of the conclusions from the other EQs; however, examples and findings from the other EQs are not repeated. The cross-cutting themes are included under each Component.

To report on HRA's overall implementation progress, the evaluation team reviewed HRA's deliverable tracker from December 2018 and adjusted it based on a desk review and findings from interviews with HRA staff and counterparts during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2018. Figure 5 shows that overall, HRA is on track with meeting its 86 deliverables. HRA has started or completed more than 80 percent of its deliverables. Only 16 deliverables have not been started, with slightly more than half of those (56 percent) corresponding to Component 3. HRA also reports the progress made on its indicators, which the evaluation did not review, but are included in Annex G.

Figure 5: HRA Deliverables Progress Tracker



Source: Data from the HRA deliverables tracker, as of December 2018 (FY2018Q3), adjusted with desk review of project documents and updated with findings from interviews with HRA staff and counterparts during FY2018Q4.

Note: This progress tracker varies from the deliverables trackers used by HRA. HRA includes in its tracker, as completed, those deliverables that are fully met or that already have an action/activity that once fulfilled will complete the deliverable in its entirety. This progress tracker only marks as "completed" those deliverables that are fully met. Deliverables with ongoing actions for the life of the Activity are marked as "in progress".

Component I: Promotion

Key Achievements

HRA's activities have contributed to increasing the visibility and awareness of the human rights situation in areas where it previously was not possible to address human rights issues, such as Córdoba, given that active armed groups and the stigmatization of human rights defenders had impeded efforts in the past. HRA has also contributed to bringing human rights to the forefront of various inter-institutional mechanisms through the creation or activation of Human Rights Committees and of multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms, such as the Peace Councils.

HRA has supported the Victim's Secretariat in Meta and the Government Secretariat in Tolima in designing models and proposals for Human Rights and Peace Schools as a strategy to strengthen the culture of peace and respect for human rights. Since the Schools are part of the non-formal education, they will not be incorporated into the official curriculums, known as *Proyecto Educativo Institucional (PEI)*.

Government officials and community leaders have participated in human rights diploma courses that have increased their legal and practical knowledge of human rights and has allowed them to learn more about their responsibilities to protect and defend against human rights abuses (See EQ2 for more details on this achievement). Moreover, the diploma course has facilitated engagement and interaction between stakeholders that do not tend to dialogue with each other, due to the historical conflict, such as community leaders and members of the army. Participants indicated that before the diploma course they had never had the opportunity to work with these other actors. Therefore, learning about the challenges and opportunities of others served to strengthen ties and relations between civil society and local authorities.

Personeros, in particular, report that they highly valued the training they received through HRA grantee, FENALPER. They told the evaluation team that not only did they deepen their knowledge, they also affirmed that they have been able to apply what they learned in their work, particularly on gender-related issues and conflict resolution tools. This is an important achievement given that the more common requests for support from these officials have to do with logistics and supplies.

HRA has contributed to empowering vulnerable communities, specifically LGBTI, youth, women, and indigenous beneficiaries through its grant support of local CSOs (See EQ4 for more details on this achievement). These beneficiary groups report that they now understand and recognize their rights and that learning about the *rutas* allows them to demand their rights.

HRA has been successful in empowering women and LGBTI grassroots CSOs by increasing their knowledge and strengthening their leadership and organizational capacity. The support provided by HRA was not only financial (through grants) but also through mentoring support. In particular, HRA has supported the creation of grassroots LGBTI organizations (*Caucasia Diversa* and *Tapir Dorado* in Antioquia), and strengthened nascent ones (*Fundación Arcoíris* in Tumaco), by leveraging the experience and capacity of the more established CSO, *Caribe Afirmativo*.

“Caucasia Diversa emerges as an organization in favor of the needs of the LGBTI population in Bajo Cauca (Antioquia), a region where the LGBTI population has suffered violence and displacement for many years. Since we started working with Caribe Afirmativo [HRA grantee], they have mentored us through leadership training and capacity building to defend LGBTI rights, rights we are entitled to. So out of the need to raise awareness to the government and to society that the LGBTI community needs support and protection, Caucasia Diversa is born, with support from Caribe Afirmativo, for the defense of human rights and of the LGBTI community, in particular.” (Caucasia Diversa, Caucasia, Antioquia)

HRA has also supported increasing the visibility and demands of women and LGBTI issues by facilitating the participation of these groups' leaders in institutional mechanisms where they can dialogue with government officials. For example, a representative from the LGBTI community now has a seat on the Human Rights Committee in Caucasia. Similarly, HRA has supported the reactivation of the MEV roundtables and the COMPOS in 17 municipalities.

Bottlenecks and Challenges

While government officials report having greater knowledge about human rights, the challenge emerges in the application of this knowledge. Local government officials apply newly acquired knowledge to the design of public policies, such as the prevention and protection plans, and to new competencies, such as risk analyses, with close support from HRA regional advisors. It is unclear if this knowledge will stick and application will continue once the Activity ends. Moreover, local government officials' capacity to interact in an informed manner with vulnerable communities continues to be limited. Specifically, communities continue to report that women and LGBTI issues do not receive an adequate response given officials' lack of knowledge and sensitivity to the needs of these groups:

“The level of local government officials’ knowledge about the LGBTI community is very low. For example, they invited me to participate in the Municipal Council, and I asked them in which category of LGBTI I would be considered a part of, no one answered. What I mean is that they don’t know if I am gay, if I am trans, the basic stuff.” (Caucasia Diversa, Caucasia, Antioquia)

The evaluation team found that there is a gap between national level perceptions and what is reported by interviewees in the municipalities regarding the multi-actor dialogues (police, local authorities, and community members) that HRA supports through one of its subcontracts, as well as with the *duplas* from the Ombudsman's Office. While at the national level, there is an affirmation that these dialogues have been successful in bringing together the different actors, in reality the dialogues and collaborative work phase did not take place in two of the three selected municipalities. Moreover, there was very low participation in the trainings, with less than 10 police officers participating in the three municipalities, because of misaligned incentives. While the police lieutenants recognize the importance of these activities, their performance is evaluated based on indicators such as number of apprehensions, not participation in community activities, so they do not have an incentive to pull their officers from duty to attend the trainings. Regarding the *duplas*, although they are mentioned repeatedly by HRA staff in Bogota and by the National Ombudsman's Office, the interviewees at the department and municipality level, except for the Departmental LGBTI Liaison in Caquetá, do not speak about their activities or results.

The challenge for the differentiated *rutas* for GBV against women and LGBTI communities lies in their effective implementation by the local institutions. This depends on the comprehensive understanding of the steps to be taken to implement the *rutas*, not only by the officials who participated in their construction, but also by the officials who respond to and assist women and the LGBTI community on a daily basis. While the *rutas* have only recently been constructed and the dissemination process for implementation is only beginning, this is critical for HRA to focus on during the second half of its performance period.

The Havana Peace Accord requires that the GOC develops and implements a National Rural Education Plan. The Ministry of Education (MOE) is leading the design of procedures, methodologies, and tools for education institutions to implement the plan systematically. Although HRA is supporting this initiative at the national level, it also is conducting parallel education activities at the departmental level, such as the Peace Schools, which are not part of formal education overseeing by the MOE. There is a large

dispersion of activities within the promotion component as HRA simultaneously supports a variety of initiatives, education entities and institutions (MOE – *Cátedra de Paz*, Peace Schools, diploma courses, and education activities through CSOs grantees), that are not all tied to the MOE. Without close communication and coordination there is a risk that HRA would be supporting activities that are not harmonized with the standards set in national public policies.

The activities for the promotion of human rights are mostly limited to urban areas due to logistics, security, and operational issues for HRA staff and current CSO grantees. However, vulnerable communities, especially indigenous groups, highlight the importance of bringing such activities closer to their territories.

Lessons Learned

HRA's training activities where a variety of actors participate, such as local government officials, community leaders, and civil society organizations, serve a dual purpose of promotion of human rights and bringing the community into closer contact with local government institutions. The HRA diploma course represents a neutral space where participants not only learn about human rights but also interact with individuals from groups that they have historically been distant from.

The four Human Rights Student Olympics held in only a couple of municipalities in Antioquia create incentives for youth to learn more about human rights issues. HRA should continue supporting these Student Olympics in the municipalities where they have been held and expand it to other municipalities as well.

The experiential methods used by organizations such as *Diócesis de Tumaco* have demonstrated stronger results in terms of gained knowledge and feelings of ownership in young beneficiaries. HRA should promote the replication of these experiential methods with other grantees.

Personeros are relevant government officials for HRA to support given their role to guarantee citizens the defense of their rights and their direct contact with the community. Continuing the strengthening of the *Personeros* through FENALPER is a good strategy, because they feel represented by this federation.

The grantees with the greatest contributions on the population are the grassroots CSOs, as they respond clearly to the situation in the territory and have been able to empower the communities in which they work. While many local organizations do need additional support from HRA or larger, national civil society organization, the closer the organization is to the beneficiary population and the greater understanding it has of the local human rights context, the greater impact that can be expected from the grant. The current human rights context requires that these organizations are known to the communities and have members who live in the area.

Threats

The presidential elections and the change in administration to take place in August 2018 represents a threat to the sustainability of the national level initiatives, such as the Rural Education Plan included in the Accord. To date, the MOE has only completed the design of one of the three components of the Plan, making the Plan's continuity and sustainability highly dependent on the incoming government's priorities.

Given the high turnover of government officials, due to rotations or being hired on short-term contracts, HRA runs the risk of knowledge drain from the institutions it supports. This generates a loop

of continuous training from the beginning. This can also affect the momentum of certain initiatives as new officials may not have the same knowledge or political will to support them.

The short-term duration of HRA grants limits the grantees' abilities to have the desired impact, creates expectations from beneficiaries of continued support that cannot be fulfilled, and undermines the sustainability of the grant activities. Moreover, as youth and LGBTI become empowered and more visible in their communities, ending these projects without continuity can leave them exposed when they need more support. This threatens HRA's "do no harm" principle.

Component 2: Prevention

Key Achievements

HRA is viewed as a credible expert and strategic partner by department and municipal government officials, CSOs, and the MOI, especially on matters of public policy for the prevention and protection of human rights. This is largely due to HRA regional staff's strong technical knowledge as well as local contextual knowledge since almost all of them are from the area or have been working in the area for many years.

HRA's technical assistance has resulted in significant progress in formulating and updating the prevention and protection plans as well as in the creation or activation of PPGNR sub-committees in most of the municipalities it supports.

HRA has strengthened LGBTI organizations in the identification of risk and in their capacity to demand respect for their rights. This has contributed to their empowerment and increased engagement with local authorities, resulting in the creation of institutional mechanisms, such as the LGBTI roundtable in Tumaco.

HRA coordinated with the National Police to organize the first meeting of police human rights coordinators. Seventy-seven officers and eight coronels and lieutenants from across the country gathered for a training on Police Conduct Guide for Vulnerable Populations (designed and implemented by HRA's predecessor program). Additionally, HRA supported the design of a protection *ruta* for human rights defenders to be implemented by the police. This *ruta* was officially introduced as part of mandatory police officer training and incorporated into the Police Conduct Guide for Vulnerable Populations.

Bottlenecks and Challenges

HRA's regional presence consists of only two regional advisors, who have to carry out the work plan across all three components and travel long distances to visit all of the municipalities in their departments. While all regional teams have an efficient division of labor between themselves, most HRA regional advisors state that administrative work (travel and event logistics, receipt legalization, among other) takes up too much of their time that could be used implementing HRA activities.

The limited local budgets, lack of political will of some mayors, and high turnover of public officials create bottlenecks for the implementation of prevention and protection policies. In addition, one of the most visible challenges for HRA, in terms of sustainability, is over reliance on the HRA regional advisors to perform technical and operational functions. In some municipalities, HRA advisors are highly involved in the convening of institutional mechanisms, complying with orders issued from the national government, and implementing the scope of what is established in the prevention and protection plans.

This constant and highly involved support can undermine the institutionalization and sustainability of HRA support if an exit strategy is not developed.

The analyses carried out to identify risks and the design of self-protection plans are valued positively by local CSOs, especially those from the LGBTI community. However, there is a large variation on CSOs' expertise with self-protection methodologies. Some CSOs did not have a clear understanding of the concept (for example, *LIMPAL*) or of how to design the plans and mechanisms (for example, *Consejo Comunitario de Rio Gualajo*). Given HRA's technical expertise in these topics, and upcoming grants RFA oriented at self-protection projects, it is important for HRA to provide technical assistance to CSOs on self-protection methodologies from the time projects are designed.

HRA supported the formalization of the Observatory of Human Rights in the Mayor's Office, who has transitioned its operations to the *Diócesis de Tumaco*. A couple of municipal officials in Tumaco, however, express concern that permanent funding of stronger technical staff is needed for the Observatory to meet its objectives and for the *Diócesis* to sustain it.

Although HRA supported the preparation of a study on the impacts of illegal mining and other illegal economies on human rights with the Ombudsman's Office, the utilization of this study is uncertain. It is necessary to assess who is aware of this study and if the findings and recommendations are taken into consideration and implemented by the different actors. Given that the report was launched in April of this year, it is still premature to make conclusions about the influence that research activities, such as this report, have in the effective prevention of human rights violations resulting from illegal economies.

Result 2.6 under this component consists of strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations to "advocate and monitor" development and implementation of human rights protections. However, the evaluation found that actions under this result focus only on the advocacy part; no actions were identified that are specifically aimed at monitoring. The monitoring of what is established in the prevention plans, within the framework of the legally constituted institutional mechanisms, could be a more grounded way of achieving this result.

Lessons Learned

Under this component, the initial stage of technical assistance required systematic and constant support as well as a direct presence in the territory, given that it is not only about transferring knowledge but also about designing and implementing public policy instruments. However, developing an exit strategy for the technical assistance activities is fundamental to establishing sustainable processes and for HRA to prioritize the allocation of its limited human resources to municipalities that continue to require technical support.

Several CSOs value HRA's presence as an effective strategy to approach government institutions, as they feel HRA gives them greater credibility. "*It is easier to get the government to listen to us when we approach them with the program than when we go alone. So for us, the program is not only a bridge, but also an effective strategy to reach the government institutions.*" (Grantee ASOM, Buenos Aires, Cauca)

Designing and implementing self-protection methodologies is not a generalizable or standardized process. HRA can leverage its expertise to train CSOs and provide them technical support to identify and analyze risks and to design plans of prevention, mitigation and response to human rights violations.

Local CSOs that are based in the municipalities have been creating bridges between their beneficiaries and government institutions. HRA should continue working strategically with these local CSOs as a

strategy to reach vulnerable populations, to make their needs visible, and to give them access to government entities.

Extending HRA for two more years from now, until April 2021, would give the Activity the opportunity to participate in the design process of new municipal and departmental development plans, which can enable HRA to influence the allocation of resources, the design of strategies, and the setting of objectives towards human rights.

Threats

One of the main threats to the implementation of this component is the possibility that the new government, through the MOI, will make significant changes or take different approaches towards prevention and protection public policy, which implies starting again with these processes at the departmental and municipal level.

The lack of security in some of the regions where HRA operates can be a serious threat to promoting processes of participation for leaders or to carrying out risk identification exercises. Community leaders are, nowadays, the group most exposed to risks against their life, liberty, integrity and personal safety, due to the activities they carry out and the locations where they live or carry out their activities.

While the *rutas* play an important role in the empowerment of communities and constitute the first step toward response to human rights violations, they are developed under the assumption that people demanding their rights and reporting abuses coupled with trained government officials to implement the *rutas* will result in an effective response to human rights violations. However, there is skepticism on the part of government officials and social leaders that the *rutas* might fall short or potentially increase the risks of those who file claims. As one government official in Tumaco stated, *“I fear that these rutas, like the one that focuses on gender, are designed for impunity. I know this from experience, the ruta is put in place to enable claims, but after the complaint is filed nothing happens.”*

Component 3: Response

Key Achievements

HRA's support has enabled the AGO to implement a prioritization approach in investigations, which implies advancing investigations from a context analysis lens rather than following the perpetrator who committed a specific violation. This support has resulted in several achievements that are important for the AGO's mission and that enable it to fulfill its functions more effectively. First, the strategic shift towards a prioritization framework has contributed to better engagement and consolidation of efforts within the AGO. AGO officials interviewed report that there has been a mainstreaming of the prioritization language and framework in all of the managerial mechanisms. Moreover, they report that there are currently no Sectional Offices that do not have prioritization plans, so these Offices are now conducting comprehensive analysis of their work and of their strategic vision. These results place the prioritization approach as a policy at the institutional level, which can help guarantee its duration over time, withstanding personnel changes within the AGO. Second, the prioritization of investigations from human rights violations (homicides and threats) to vulnerable populations, such as human rights leaders and defenders and victims of GBV, allows the AGO to develop diagnostic assessments of the work being conducted inside the entity and to develop guidelines that strengthen the work that is currently underway.

The documentation of cases of human rights violations, particularly of GBV cases, has an important role in the strategic litigation in courts. In addition, it contributes to the rehabilitation and recovery of the women affected, so they can overcome the emotional impact of the violence faced.

HRA, through its CSO grantee, *Corporación Humanas*, has developed case guides on GBV for regional prosecutors, which include research, documentation, and judicial tools that are disseminated within dialogue mechanisms with these officials. Also, HRA grantee, *Caribe Afirmativo*, provided technical assistance to the AGO delegate for LGBTI affairs, and jointly developed a best practices guide (currently in draft form) for case investigations of violence against LGBTI persons.

Bottlenecks and Challenges

As discussed in EQ5, the main challenges in HRA's implementation of Component 3 are the lack of clarity from USAID on the comprehensive strategy it wants to advance with the AGO and the absence of high-level discussions between USAID and the AGO, which result in a lack of buy-in and involvement from the key decision-makers in the entity. This makes it harder for HRA to advance in the implementation of certain projects (such as taking the prioritization strategy to the regional and local level) because mid-level officials do not have the "green light" from top-level decision makers to move these actions forward. AGO's rigid hierarchical organizational structure makes the need for high-level dialogue and agreement between USAID and the AGO even more critical.

In the absence of these high-level discussions between USAID and top AGO officials, HRA has been restricted, but strategic, in approaching the AGO through individual offices with "champions" to maximize its small budget, limited capacity, and sphere of influence. However, this has resulted in a piecemeal strategy rather than a high-level comprehensive strategy that aligns with the ambitious objective of IR 3.

HRA's implementation is also being affected by USAID assigning overlapping areas of action under this component to its two programs, HRA and JSP. This is generating a different understanding, between the two programs, of who and how the prioritization strategy will be implemented at the regional and local level. Guidelines from USAID on how the two programs should coordinate more effectively, beyond simply not duplicating efforts, would further harmonize the relationship with the AGO.

The documented cases related to GBV do not necessarily serve as inputs for the prosecution of the perpetrators of the violations. This is due to the continued distrust by the women involved in the judicial system and the ongoing presence of armed actors that deter formal complaints.

The short duration of the grants under this Component limit the ability to assess the contributions or impacts of their activities and initiatives. In the case of *Corporación Humanas* in its work with the regional prosecutors, there is a lack of evaluation instruments to determine if the knowledge is effectively being applied or how its application is impacting the response of the Prosecutor's Office in cases of sexual violence.

The new institutional framework established for the post-conflict period and the new obligations for those entities that the Accord creates represent challenges for an effective response to human rights violations. Given that there is little clarity in the processes to implement the Accord, the actions of the relevant entities are limited. For example, the lack of clarity on how the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) will operate, and what the mechanisms for presenting information and processing cases will be, potentially means that the efforts of organizations such as *Corporación Humanas* may become limited.

The challenge lies in determining how the documentation of cases can serve in instances foreseen in the Accord, in particular, the Truth Commission and the JEP.

Lessons Learned

A clearly defined comprehensive strategy from USAID may facilitate a more effective adoption, implementation, and monitoring of a program such as HRA. Harmonizing this strategy across its different programs requires taking into consideration the resources, capacity, and sphere of influence of each program.

Refining a strategy that focuses on working with a centralized and hierarchical government entity, such as the AGO, can be facilitated by engaging high-level officials in dialogue to obtain buy-in and commitment for specific projects. This would minimize some of the delays and roadblocks HRA has faced with respect to the adoption of the prioritization strategy, not only at the national level, but also at the regional and municipal level.

The coherence between the grants linked to the AGO and the work carried out in the AGO at the national level needs to be more carefully assessed. The actions of these CSOs should align with the prioritization strategy investigations of violations against human rights leaders and defenders. According to interviews, *Corporación Humanas* was not aware of the prioritization methodology being pursued at the AGO. Consequently, *Humanas*' own methodology was applied, which can generate confusion among officials at the territorial level.

Threats

Although the AGO officials interviewed state that the prioritization strategy is being adopted as an institutional policy, the replacement of officials at the management level with the arrival of the new administration after the elections may result in delays that affect the advancement of HRA's projects and deliverables. These delays would be exacerbated if HRA's current period of performance, planned to end in April 2019, is not extended.

There is a potential conflict in competencies between the AGO and the newly created institutions under the Accord, such as the JEP.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for HRA's relevance and adequate adaptation to the changing human rights context

- 1.1 **Economic, social, and cultural rights are priorities for the communities where HRA is working, so USAID should consider how to integrate these rights into its human rights programming.** For example, within Component I, it may be possible to include activities related to economic, social, and cultural rights within more general activities oriented toward civil and political rights. Moreover, USAID should facilitate coordination between HRA and other USAID programs focused on economic, social and cultural issues, such as agriculture and food security, water and sanitation, and education. HRA should be informed on the general activities implemented by USAID in those sectors in order to correctly transfer this information to communities.

- 1.2 **Given USG restriction on working directly with demobilized FARC-EP members, HRA should focus their support on public policy formulation and implementation with national and local government institutions rather than supporting human resources in institutions that have direct contact with this population group.** This would avoid creating legitimacy issues in the institutions that HRA intends to support. As previously documented, the *dupla* financed by HRA was not able to help a victim of sexual violence because she was a demobilized member of FARC-EP. While this may be an isolated case, it does illustrate the problem that the USG restriction poses for HRA's assistance.
- 1.3 **HRA should more clearly develop its differential approach for the Afro-Colombian population to close the gap between what CSO grantees and their beneficiaries report and what is developed conceptually for these activities.** This implies, for example, incorporating ethno-education, community councils, and Law 70 of 1993 into the projects that are implemented through the grants, as well as more focus on ethnic rights in the context of implementation of the Accord. This does not imply stopping work on the pertinent issues for Afro-Colombian youth and women. However, it is necessary to make explicit the relevant topics for the Afro-Colombian population within the Activity.
- 1.4 **USAID should assess how it can expand HRA's strategy on human rights issues associated with illegal mining.** Currently, the focus is on studies and dissemination of the consequences of illegal mining on human rights violations, but there is demand to also focus on working conditions of small-scale workers miners. In this sense, it is necessary that USAID coordinates the activities from HRA with its other programs, such as Oro Legal, to guarantee a comprehensive approach towards mining.
- 1.5 **Given the changing human rights context and increasing risks to human rights leaders and defenders in the regions where the Activity operates, HRA should expand its strategy to work with this population group as a cross-cutting task.** While HRA is currently working with human rights leaders and defenders, its strategies and activities are not well defined under each component. Establishing it as a cross-cutting task would harmonize efforts to promote, protect, and respond to human rights violations for this at-risk group.

Recommendations for improving the understanding of human rights standards

- 2.1 HRA should continue supporting the *personeros* through its grantee, FENALPER.
- 2.2 Given that organizing and facilitating dialogues between the police and vulnerable populations in at least seven departments is an expected result (Result 1.1.2), and activities implemented so far have fallen short, HRA should reassess its approach with the police to achieve this result.
- 2.3 HRA should enhance its LGBTI thematic focus in its training activities for government officials, including the police force. The training modules include topics to minimize discrimination and protect their rights, but equally important are topics about how to treat this community with dignity and integrity, from how to greet persons of different genders to how to facilitate access to public services.
- 2.4 HRA should conduct a strategic and formal review of their grantees' needs with respect to thematic support. This is not only relevant for grassroots organizations.
- 2.5 HRA should promote the replication of experiential methods that have been effective tools for beneficiaries to learn about human rights, such as field trips to meet relevant government entities.

One potential way of doing this would be to establish a Community of Practice for its grantees, where CSOs come together to share and learn from each other's experiences and challenges.

Recommendations for promoting sustainability

- 3.1 HRA's short three-year period of performance, along with two separate option years, limit HRA's ability to promote the sustainability of its activities. The evaluation team recommends extending HRA's period of performance for two years from now, until April 2021.
- 3.2 USAID should continue to promote and leverage the signing of MOUs with departmental governments. This contributes to better alignment and integration with local development plans as well as increased coordination within the departmental governments and with other international assistance partners.
- 3.3 As HRA continues to support local development plans, it should work with local governments to define actions that are financially possible. While this may result in actions that are smaller in scale and coverage, it has a greater likelihood of being implemented given that municipalities face financial constraints.
- 3.4 While the initial stage of technical assistance required systematic and constant support as well as a direct presence in the territory, HRA should start developing exit strategies for their technical assistance activities to government officials that focus on strengthening institutional capacity, through the further documentation of processes and best practices, and minimizing over reliance on HRA advisors. The handover of functions and action plans should be tailored based on the municipality's current and projected capacity with consideration to not overburden officials.
- 3.5 HRA should continue promoting the creation of mechanisms and processes where government officials and community members can engage in dialogue and increase their confidence in each other.
- 3.6 HRA should strategically support and engage the JACs as another stakeholder to minimize reliance on individual officials and to increase local ownership and participation in public policy in rural areas.
- 3.7 HRA should prioritize grants to local CSOs with a strong local presence to increase local capacity and ownership, and to more closely reach local populations.
- 3.8 USAID and HRA should reassess the structure of the Grants Fund to better meet the diverse needs of the different organizations they fund and to provide support through a sustainability lens. HRA grantees range from nascent grassroots organizations to community-based and regional organizations to nationally recognized CSOs, so their technical and financial needs are varied. A flexible Grants Fund to tailor the support HRA can provide to these CSOs could result in a more responsive and efficient use of HRA's resources and capabilities. Two potential enhancements could include:
 - *Funding stages for grassroots organizations:* A dynamic model to strengthen local CSOs and support the scaling up of grassroots organizations while enabling HRA to manage risk sensibly. Seed funding can be provided in the first stage to grassroots organizations or CSOs with no track record. Those who have demonstrated success, through an internal evaluation process, can then receive a larger grant in a second stage, without having programming interruptions due to funding or having to go through the entire proposal process again.
 - *Sliding scale funding to graduate CSOs:* Longer timeframe grants with two or three rounds, where the first round consists of mostly financial support to implement the proposed project and the next round(s) consist of less financial support but more mentoring or technical support for sustainability of the CSO, depending on the needs of the CSO.

Recommendations for maximizing effects on beneficiaries

- 4.1 HRA should strategically continue to fund youth-targeted projects with longer timeframes and evaluate the grantees previously funded for a second round. This population group, specifically, is vulnerable to risks of recruitment, theft, and illicit consumption, so these HRA-supported activities serve a double bottom line of promotion and prevention.
- 4.2 HRA should strategically expand its holistic support – financial, technical, and organizational – to grassroots organization and continue to leverage the expertise of more established CSOs for mentoring.
- 4.3 Given the new or increased risks faced by beneficiaries, HRA should make strategic revisions to its risk and context analysis to develop specific methodologies for contingency plans and more formal “do no harm” plans.

Recommendations for advancing the objective of increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations

- 5.1 USAID should define and design a comprehensive strategy regarding its relationship with the AGO. It should include clearly defined objectives, focused on implementable projects that can that aim to advance these objectives. The relationship between USAID and the AGO must be strategic and not a sum of activities through the different USAID programs. To do this, USAID should:
 - Conduct a needs assessment of the AGO and develop a proposal for a comprehensive strategy with this entity;
 - Link this strategy to its different program offerings, while taking into consideration each program’s conceptual framework, human and financial resources, and sphere of influence;
 - Clearly define the roles of each program within this comprehensive strategy, while taking into consideration the practical and operational challenges of working with the AGO as an external implementer.
- 5.2 Following recommendation 5.1, USAID should pursue high-level meetings with AGO officials with the purpose of getting buy-in from the entity, finalizing this strategy, and defining the adoption and implementation of the different projects linked to it.
- 5.3 Rather than simply focusing on coordination between HRA and other organizations, such as UNOHCHR, USAID should shift toward a collaboration, learning, and adaptation (CLA) framework to leverage and maximize its efforts across these stakeholders. This framework can facilitate a more systematic planning and implementation of strategies that enhances the efforts of other partners while also meeting one’s own goals. USAID would have to clearly lay out the objectives, structure, and benefits for an external stakeholder, like UNOHCHR, to buy-in to a CLA framework.
- 5.4 HRA, with participation from USAID, should coordinate with the Justice for Sustainable Peace Program on taking the prioritization strategy to the local level. Roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined in order to minimize duplication of efforts and to avoid confusing regional prosecutors.
- 5.5 Under the status quo, and in the absence of high-level engagement between USAID and the AGO, HRA and USAID should assess whether it might be efficient to invest more efforts in supporting CSOs who engage with the AGO (such as *Corporación Humanas*, *Caribe Afirmativo*, and *CODHES*).

ANNEXES

ANNEX A: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

ANNEX B: EVALUATION METHODS

ANNEX C: MUNICIPALITY CHARACTERISTICS AND LIST

ANNEX D: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

ANNEX E: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

ANNEX F: CONTEXT ANALYSIS

ANNEX G: INDICATOR PROGRESS

ANNEX A: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

SCOPE OF WORK FOR THE MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF USAID/COLOMBIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITY (HRA) October 2017

2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of this mid-term performance evaluation is to assess if HRA's deliverables and outcomes are being accomplished within schedule, to determine if they are still relevant based on the current local context and if its institutional strengthening interventions are sustainable. In accomplishing this purpose, the Evaluation Team will assess if the support provided by the Activity has contributed to positive changes in key Government of Colombia (GOC) institutions. It will provide information on to what extent the Activity is advancing in its strategy²² of strengthening Colombian institutions and civil society organizations in its targeted areas so that they are capable of promoting a culture of human rights, preventing abuse and violations of human rights, and providing meaningful and effective responses to human rights violations once they have occurred.

The Evaluation findings and conclusions must be constructed through evidence-based information and will support USAID/Colombia and HRA Implementing Partner (IP) accountability among stakeholders. It will also offer lessons learned and recommendations that will contribute to improve HRA's implementation and achieve the expected results and will provide input to help USAID/Colombia make programming decisions extension. This evaluation is scheduled to begin at just past the mid-point of HRA's base period of performance.

3. SUMMARY INFORMATION

Activity: Human Rights Activity (HRA)	Period of Performance : 05 April 2016 to 04 April 2019
Contract No: AID-OAA-I-13-00032 Order No: AID-514-TO-16-00009	Contracting Mechanism: Rule of Law Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) (ROL IQC)
TEC: USD \$14,109,806	Contractor: Chemonics
DO 3: <i>Effective presence of democratic institutions and processes in targeted areas</i> IR 1.3: <i>Improved administration of justice and protection of human rights</i>	Purpose: Support the GOC and civil society to promote a culture of human rights, prevent abuse and violations of human rights, and provide meaningful and effective responses to human rights violations once they have occurred.
Contracting Officer Representative: Leonardo Reales Alternate Contracting Officer Representative: Sol Gaitan	Evaluation Activity Manager (EAM): Omar López - Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist; Program Office USAID/Colombia

²² This is a strategy in which local, regional and national partners build capacities sufficient to not only participate, but lead human rights initiatives.

4. BACKGROUND

In November 2016, the Government of Colombia (GOC) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) signed a finalized peace accord to end its 52-year conflict. As expected, the peace accord’s implementation has been challenging and the human rights situation in the country remains a concern. The rapid shifting dynamics of violence at the local level, the arrival or strengthening of illegal actors and the presence of illegal economies in the majority of critical regions have resulted in an increase of specific determined forms of violence (i.e. against human rights defenders and social leaders) and the appearance of new methods for violating human rights.

With the demobilization of FARC-EP combatants, the government’s ability to provide security for social leaders, human rights defenders, journalists and ethnic communities, while ensuring access to justice for victims and addressing impunity of human rights violations, is being sorely tested.

Many of the advances and inroads made with support from previous human rights programs are still fragile and need ongoing assistance to ensure their sustainability. Substantial challenges remain with respect to institutional structures and strength, implementation of laws and policies at the national and local levels, adaptation capacity, and overall understanding of and support for human rights among Colombians at large.

Civil society organizations are playing a more relevant role in this context, serving as a bridge and trust-builders between an absent state and communities abandoned for decades. CSOs have privileged access to difficult territories and information that may serve the GOC in adapting and better responding to changing challenges.

Over the past 16 years, USAID/Colombia has developed the largest U.S.-stand-alone human rights program in the world. Beginning in 2001, as part of Plan Colombia, the first phase of the Human Rights Program (HRP I) was designed and implemented with the participation of human rights organizations, academics, Colombian authorities, and a broad cross-section of Colombian civil society. HRP I sought to prevent human rights abuses, protect vulnerable groups and communities, and increase the capacity of state agencies and civil society organizations to respond to human rights threats or violations.

USAID launched its second phase of the Human Rights Program (HRP II) in 2006. HRP II built off of the same framework as HRP I, but expanded the program to respond to changed circumstances, including the effects of enhanced security policies and the demobilization of paramilitary forces. HRP II continued HRP I’s focus on prevention, protection, response, and assistance to the Public Ministry²³ and government institutions, but also expanded into other areas, such as support for civil society as a full partner in human rights dialogue and initiatives. HRP II also undertook to “Colombianize” or “nationalize” these efforts, i.e., promoting greater Colombian ownership of and financing of human rights efforts.

HRP III was launched in March 2012 and shifted attention to regional human rights efforts, in particular the implementation of national policies and practices at the local level, and increasing the capacity of regional representatives of national institutions. The continuous field presence of human rights advisors in program’s regions was a critical part of it. HRP III also recognized the need for sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, and undertook permanent monitoring and ongoing assessment of the impact of the program, particularly with respect to victims of human rights violations.

²³ The Colombian Public Ministry is comprised of the Ombudsman’s Office, the Inspector General’s Office, and municipal *personeros*.

During HRP III's implementation period, USAID established a strong relationship and signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Attorney General's Office (AGO) based on the understanding of the importance of prosecuting human rights violations as a key protection factor. HRP III supported AGO's implementation of a new approach for prioritizing investigations and prosecutions.

HRA is focused primarily on regional human rights efforts, while maintaining some national actions, particularly with respect to policy reforms and the implementation of post-accord measures. The design and implementation of effective prevention and protection measures as a part of community, municipal and departmental policies is a priority. Additional priorities are the investigation and prosecution of human rights violations, as well as increased AGO and CSOs capacity and effectiveness at regional and local levels.

As for the threats and homicides of human rights defenders and social leaders, it is important to highlight that recent scrutiny over related figures by some Colombian government entities has generated a fierce debate over whether these cases constitute a trend. More importantly, each regional dynamic is different and the profiles of homicide cases have broadened the traditional definition of human rights defenders and social leaders to be inclusive of community leaders (i.e. community action board presidents, campesino leaders, land restitution leaders, victims, etc.). By virtue of their high visibility within their communities and outspokenness in denouncing human rights violations, these "other" social leaders have been folded into the rising number of homicides of human rights defenders. Most government/State entities are hesitant to label cautious in considering these killings as to be systematic, and instead assess the majority as isolated cases. Driven by the power vacuum left by the FARC-EP demobilization, these killings have been linked to emerging illegal armed groups waging violent conflicts to gain territorial control. On a larger scale, the silencing of those denouncing illegal presence and activities stands to jeopardize any progress made under the nascent and fragile post-accord implementation phase. No doubt this complex situation may have a direct impact on HRA's activities in its targeted regions.

A. Description of Theory of Change and Results Framework

The theory of Change that underlies HRA is that if the program strengthen government institutions and civil society organizations to effectively serve as agents of change at the local level, then respect for human rights and peace will be improved, and policies will reflect special considerations for vulnerable populations.

The following results framework guides HRA's approach to implementing USAID's vision for the project, linked directly to USAID's CDCS 2014-2018. The results framework incorporates crosscutting responses to tasks, including a focus on our differentiated approach on gender inequity and vulnerable population.



potential areas of FARC demobilization.	Result 2.2: Communication/dialogue between and among citizens and police and other local officials in target areas improved to better service delivery.	Result 3.2: Reforms that decrease discretion and increase transparency institutionally embedded into AGO practices.
Result 1.2: Public officials' capacity to interact with vulnerable groups strengthened with sustained meaningful engagement.	Result 2.3: Community protection plans developed and effectively implemented in target municipalities.	Result 3.3: Standard operating procedures and AGO capacity to investigate and prosecute human rights violations strengthened with demonstrable results from court cases.
Result 1.3: Media messages promoting respect for human rights produced and distributed and investigate journalism capacity increased.	Result 2.4: Self-protection systems, strategies, and measures in place for at-risk populations, with a focus on sexual and gender violence.	Result 3.4: GOC enforcement and prosecutorial response to gender-based violence improved with media coverage. Result 3.5: Civil society mechanisms to facilitate an improved state response to human rights violations, including GBV cases, developed or strengthened and supported by the government.
Result 1.4: Human rights education curricula in primary and secondary schools in targeted areas promoted and sustainability enhanced.	Result 2.5: Capacity of the National Ombudsman's office to prevent and address human rights violations resulting from legal and illegal mining and other possible post demobilization challenges strengthened.	Result 3.6: Threats of violence to land restitution claimants, leaders, and organizations investigated and prosecuted.
Result 1.5: Official and effective oversight provided by CSO and/or the media.	Result 2.6: Civil society capacity to advocate for and monitor development and implementation of human rights protections strengthened.	Result 3.7: Civil society capacity to advocate for victims and serve as watchdogs with respect to GOC response to human rights is strengthened. Result 3.8: Partnerships between government and local communities formed to combat human rights violations resulting from illegal mining, leading to improved GOC response.

Cross Cutting Tasks

B. Summary of the Activity to be Evaluated

The overall HRA objective is to support the GOC and civil society to promote a culture of human rights, prevent abuse and violations of human rights, and provide meaningful and effective responses to human rights violations once they have occurred. By the end of the activity term, USAID's goal is to strengthen the capacity of Colombian institutions and civil society organizations such that they can face changing human rights challenges and deliver required services on their own, especially the prosecution of human rights violations. Another priority is increasing the capacity and effectiveness of local representatives of national institutions and regional liaisons.

The Project has three specific objectives, as follows (see Annex A for greater detail):

1. GOC officials, civil society representatives, and the general public in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards and promote compliance with those standards.
2. Policies to prevent human rights violations developed and implemented.

3. Investigation and prosecution of human rights violations increased.

In addition, HRA considers the following organizing principles and tactics when designing and implementing all of its activities:

Regional/local vs. national emphasis: Understanding that Colombia's extensive human rights framework, as well as the peace agreement with the FARC, are only as good as their implementation in the regions and municipalities affected by the conflict, HRA's primary focus is to implement interventions and assist with the implementation of national policies at the local level. HRA emphasis is building on public participation, strong institutions, and tailored solutions at the local level through the support from a decentralized team of regional human rights advisors, a community grants fund, and close partnerships with local leaders.

Although some assistance is provided at the national level, this assistance aims to support the development of national policies that weigh and respond to regional variances and dynamics. HRA mainly partners with local authorities and regional offices of national institutions, in addition to civil society organizations. HRA's activities are planned based on current conditions and strengths and weaknesses of local actors. HRA acts as a liaison and in a consultative, educational, and advisory role and capacity with civil society, GOC, and Public Ministry representatives.

HRA's local capacity building strategies anticipate and address the regular changes of personnel in public institutions and its effects on sustainability.

Empower vulnerable groups and including a differential approach: HRA focuses on strengthening policies and projects that prevent human rights violations against at-risk groups, which include human rights defenders, indigenous and Afro-Colombians, journalists, women, members of the LGBTI community, and victims of the conflict, with a focus on sexual and gender-based violence. The ultimate objective is to increase GOC authorities' awareness of specific risks faced by certain vulnerable populations and enable them to fulfill their obligations to provide for their protection.

HRA prioritizes vulnerable populations in all technical support and collaboration with institutions, by developing special protocols, changing management processes, and by emphasizing civil society accompaniment of state reforms to improve treatment of these groups. Activities include a differentiated approach ensuring that initiatives targeting vulnerable groups are tailored to their cultural characteristics and needs, geographic realities and conflict circumstances.

Flexibility and information-driven decisions: To respond to the dynamic context of the country HRA has an information-driven approach that incorporates continual contextual and thematic analyses to engrain flexibility in programming (including financial and technical) to respond to evolving local human rights issues. HRA design and strategies can and are expected to be altered to seize opportunities to achieve better outcomes with existing resources.

Promote sustainability: HRA applies a strategy in which local, regional and national partners build capacities sufficient to not only participate, but lead human rights initiatives. Sustainability is a serious investment goal for HRA and accordingly, is integrated from the design phases of programming.

Other USAID, USG, and Donor Coordination and Private/Public Partnerships: USAID's priority is to strengthen collaboration and partnership within programs; with other USG agencies and with bilateral donors, multilateral, and international organizations to increase complementarities and avoid duplication. HRA plans and carries out program activities with a clear understanding of the scope and

impacts of other donors or programs, not only in order to avoid duplication or inconsistencies in efforts, but to leverage maximum impact, and identify opportunities for joint implementation or collaboration. In addition, HRA is urged to investigate and utilize the potential for private/public partnerships and alliances to ensure sustainability of activities and processes after the end of the program.

Other principles and tactics can be consulted in Section C of the HRA contract (ANNEX II).

C. Summary of Relevant Documents, Information and Data of HRA

The following documents contain the information regarding the design, implementation, reporting and monitoring of HRA:

- Base Task Order and Modifications
- Program Annual Work plans
- Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
- Annual and Quarterly Reports
- Quarterly or other Financial Reports
- Biweekly Highlights and quarterly snapshots
- CSO Grants and GOC projects' concept papers
- USAID/Colombia Country Development Cooperation Strategy

The project utilizes the USAID/Colombia MONITOR system to report on the indicators described in the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan. For the indicators which required a baseline, HRA collected baseline data.

The Evaluation team must do a careful and detailed review and analysis the HRA documents, information and data listed and described above.

5. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Considering the HRA purpose stated above, the evaluation must answer the following questions²⁴ in order of priority, to assess the performance of the Activity:

- 1) Do the overarching and specific strategies of the Activity remain relevant in the changing human rights context from a municipal, departmental and national perspective? Has HRA adapted adequate and relevant strategies to address this changing human rights context?
- 2) To what extent do Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and the beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards and view compliance with those standards as the norm?
- 3) Are HRA's strategies and approaches promoting sustainability of the initiatives supported by the Activity at the GOC and civil society levels?
- 4) What effect has HRA had on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity, especially on human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, women, local journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected municipalities covered by HRA?
- 5) Are HRA's strategies effective and adequate for the objective of increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations? Is HRA effectively coordinating with other programs or international organizations working on impunity, as UNOHCHR?
- 6) What have been the achievements, bottlenecks and lessons learned during the implementation of the three components of HRA and its cross-cutting themes?

²⁴ Minor revisions to the evaluation questions, reflected here, were approved by USAID on February 7, 2018.

According to the findings and conclusions obtained from the answers to these questions, the evaluation must help provide finding, conclusions information and recommendations for improving the achievement of HRA results and outcomes. It should offer findings that will allow USAID to make decisions for improving the sustainability of the initiatives supported by the Activity at the GOC and civil society levels. Also, it should indicate which selected actions or cross-cutting themes and corresponding activities for the three HRA components should be further emphasized, modified, or eliminated, and why. It may also offer relevant information for follow-on human rights programming of USAID/Colombia.

To the extent possible for relevant for each question above, the evaluation findings should be disaggregated into the following categories: should help USAID understand the differential issue related to human rights defenders, women, youth, Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities and LGBTI persons.

6. EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team must propose the design and methodology that will generate the highest-quality and most credible evidence that corresponds to the evaluation purpose and questions. This design and methodology should take into account the following general methodological principles and guidance.

a. Identification of the dimensions, variables and indicators of the evaluation

Based on the three objectives of HRA and the results framework laid out herein as well as the evaluation questions, the Evaluation Contractor must propose the dimensions, variables and indicators of the study. The dimensions, variables and indicators constructed proposed will also include those linked to key assumptions and other economic, cultural, social and institutional context factors linked to HRA interventions and human rights status in the regions selected. This context information must take into account recent human rights phenomenon such as threats and homicides of human rights defenders and social leaders and institutional and policy changes linked to institutional reforms related to the implementation of the peace agreement.

This identification of the dimensions, variables and indicators of the evaluation must entail a careful review and understanding of HRA design and implementation and a careful and detailed review of available information regarding institutions and organizations supported by this Activity and human rights trends and status in the regions receiving HRA support.

The Evaluation Contractor may receive feedback from USAID and HRA implementer in this selection of these dimensions, variables and indicators. The Evaluation Contractor must also clarify the units of intervention of each component of HRA and according to it, specify the unit of analysis for each indicator and variable selected²⁵.

b. Methodological approach and sources of information

To reach the purpose and the evaluation questions described above, the Evaluation must offer empirical quantitative and qualitative information of HRA performance and context linked to the dimensions,

²⁵ Depending on the component, the unit of intervention may be regions, municipalities, veredas, communities, organizations, households or individuals.

variables and indicators defined, constructed and selected. The Evaluation must use a mix of secondary and primary data sources at the national, departmental, municipal, organizational, and (if necessary) household levels. For collecting quantitative information, primary sources may include surveys on of stakeholders, organizations and household and national and municipal institutions. For collecting qualitative information it may include instruments such as key informant structured, semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Structured or semi-structured interviews should also be developed with human right defenders, Attorneys and *Procuraduría* officers, police officers and other relevant actors. Such interviews must be cross-referenced with primary or secondary quantitative data (primary or secondary information) so personal biases and perceptions are reduced.

The Evaluation must do a careful and detailed collection, review and use of data, information and analysis coming from secondary sources. These sources used and reviewed must include:

- 1) Relevant data available coming from relevant national GOC institutions such as the Victims Unit, Ombudsman's Office, the Attorney General's Office, the Inspector General's Office and the National Police; international organizations such as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR); and regional institutions such as Mayors' and Governors' offices;
- 2) Available assessments, evaluation, data initiatives and studies carried out by third party GOC institutions, NGOs, the Academia and private entities; and
- 3) Previous studies and regional case studies carried out or supported by USAID/Colombia that will be available as ancillary sources of information as well as data sets.

Regarding primary source surveys, depending on the variables/indicators and the universe, the Evaluation Contractor may concentrate efforts either in a sample or the whole universe. For example, data for some performance indicators of organization and institutions supported may be collected at the universe level, while for some others at the household level may require a sample. For the cases of using a sample, the contractor must clearly specify the techniques to use (randomized, purposively, etc.), as well as the unit of measurement linked to the respective variable/indicator. Samples should allow representativeness for the most relevant variables at the clusters of interventions with a margin of error of less than + 10 percent.

The Evaluation contractor must construct a Design Matrix²⁶ template according to the USAID template (#2) and corresponding guidance for constructing the USAID Evaluation Design Matrix. The matrix must have the following columns:

1. Researchable Question(s)
2. Information Required and Source(s)
3. Scope and Methodology
4. Limitations and assumptions
5. What the answer to the researchable question will likely allow the Evaluation to Say

Given the diversified and heterogeneous geographic scope of this study and the secondary information that should be taken into consideration, the contractor must present specific approaches to analyze and deliver the requested information, allowing accounting for meaningful geographic comparisons and presenting presentation of results, with emphasizing an emphasis on combined graphic displays and dashboard-like output simple, easy to understand charts and graphs.

²⁶ https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/evaluation_design_matrix_templates.pdf

A central aspect of the baseline’s design will be the definition of the universes of beneficiaries and the identification of those the will be surveyed or interviewed. The Evaluation Contractor must work closely with USAID/Colombia and HRA implementer to determine these definitions and identification.

c. Analysis Plan and Other Provisions

Once the contractor defines and agrees upon the design and methodology with USAID/Colombia, they must collect, organize, filter, compile, analyze, summarize and present the field information collected. Once that is finalized, the contractor must deliver existing statistics, records, studies or qualitative information available in secondary sources and all the data sets of the Evaluation to USAID/Colombia. The analysis will offer findings and conclusions that will concretely respond to the evaluation questions.

The evaluation process and products must:

1. Enhance ownership among stakeholders of HRA and its objectives.
2. Be participatory, including GOC partners, USAID, and the IP in ways that preserve objectivity while improving the quality of data collected, collective learning, and ownership of the evaluation results.
3. Provide useful recommendations that are specific, actionable, time-bound and targeted to specifics of the human rights environment in each region
4. Obtain information of individuals from all relevant demographic groups (and be able to report on differential perception, impacts, and experience among them), including:
 - Men and women
 - Youth
 - Afro-Colombian and Indigenous populations
 - LGBTI
5. Include exercises to understand the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and constraints for the implementing partner to effectively coordinate with national and local GOC institutions, USAID/Colombia, other USAID programs, other donors, private actors among others to achieve the required results.
6. Develop or suggest tools and/or frameworks to track progress to implementation of the key policy elements of HRA.
7. Have the ability to adapt the team to complete a demanding data collection effort and complex analytic exercise
8. The Evaluation Team must elaborate protocols for ensuring respondents of primary sources instruments are not harmed (especially if there are sensitive questions involved) and for the collection and safety of private data.

As part of the overall security requirements, the Evaluation Contractor must report any security threats and/or incidents verbally in person or by telephone, immediately to USAID/Colombia. Subsequently, a written report must be promptly submitted within no more than three days after the incident occurred. All subcontractors will be required to report any threats/incidents to the prime Contractor, who will immediately after, notify the USAID/Colombia

7. DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The Evaluation Team is expected to begin work immediately upon contract signature and to begin fieldwork in country within 30 working days of contract signature. The Team must submit to the USAID /Colombia the deliverables detailed in the following table, taking into account the illustrative timeframes presented below.

Deliverable	Timeframe	Description
1. Draft Evaluation Design and Work Plan	Within 30 business days of contract signature	A pre-departure preparation through a desk study that will cover all relevant materials and identification of stakeholders' interviews will be held prior to the start of the evaluation field work in country. During this time, the evaluation team will hold initial conference calls with USAID and HRA to seek their guidance and feedback on the draft evaluation design and list of stakeholders ²⁷ . The revised draft evaluation design and work plan will be sent for review by USAID at least two weeks before the arrival of the evaluation team in country for final review and comments.
2. Evaluation Planning Meeting completed	During the Evaluation Expat Team's members first week in Colombia	The Evaluation Team is expected to hold a meeting in Bogotá, at the outset of the work, in which the Team will invite experts to brief them on the context and project and the Team will finalize preparations for the evaluation.
3. Final Evaluation Design and Work Plan	By the end of the evaluation team's second week in-country	The work plan must include the final written evaluation design, including data collection instruments and a timeline, highlighting any agreed-upon changes from the draft submitted to USAID.
4. Weekly Reports	Each week, beginning with the third week in country, until fieldwork is completed. The fieldwork is to be completed within 10 weeks of beginning work in Colombia	<p>The fieldwork will begin within 6 to 8 weeks after the start of the Activity. This fieldwork may imply the implementation of the instruments to collect qualitative and quantitative data in Colombia.</p> <p>The Team will report to the EAM or his designate each week. Whether format will be in person, by telephone, or in writing will be agreed during the planning phase. Reports of bulleted lists (no more than 5-10 bullets) must be delivered.</p>
5. Pre-Drafting Debriefing completed	By the 11 th week in country of the Expat Team's members	The Evaluation Team will hold an informal debriefing with the EAM, and any others that the Team and EAM consider should attend, to share their preliminary insights to findings, conclusions and recommendations from the analysis to that point. Some of these preliminary notions will change as analysis and drafting continue.
6. Draft evaluation report	Two weeks after the data collection in primary sources have been completed the evaluation Team	The Evaluation Team must submit to USAID/Colombia and present orally a draft hard copy and electronic report including conclusions, findings, recommendations, best practices and lessons learned

²⁷ The Evaluation Team will revise the draft evaluation design and work plan included in the proposal, highlighting any changes based on the desk study, the proposed stakeholders for interview, and agreed-upon changes from the proposal submitted to USAID.

Deliverable	Timeframe	Description
	should deliver a draft of the report.	for USAID’s review, discussion, and feedback prior to the evaluation team departure from Colombia. USAID will submit comments on the draft report to the evaluation team, two weeks after receipt of the draft report
7. Final report	Two weeks after receiving USAID’s comments	<p>The Evaluation Team will submit the final report electronically to USAID/Colombia. This report will incorporate all comments received by the Mission. Recognizing that USAID will not agree with all comments, and to be sure that each and every comment is considered carefully by the Evaluation Team, the Contractor will also submit a table that lists each comment, the response of the Evaluation Team to the comment, and where the changes resulting from the comment – if any – can be found in the document. This same cell will also indicate if no changes were made.</p> <p>Recognizing that the peer review of the report led by USAID, will not agree with all comments, and to be sure that each and every comment is considered carefully by the Evaluation Team, the Contractor will also submit a table that lists each comment, the response of the Evaluation Team to the comment, and where the changes resulting from the comment – if any – can be found in the document. This same cell will also indicate if no changes were made and why not.</p> <p>After this submission, USAID can still send comments that may entail final adjustments before approval and acceptance of the final report. These comments will be based in the <i>criteria for ensuring the quality of the Evaluation</i> a listed above in this section.</p>
8 Presentations of the Evaluation		The evaluation team is expected to hold dissemination/debriefing/workshop services. It may include at least 2 (and no more than 4) final presentations in person to discuss the summary of findings and recommendations with USAID/Colombia, the Evaluation contractor and other key stakeholders identified by USAID. These presentations will be scheduled as agreed upon USAID.
9. Evaluation documentation	Must be included in the final annexes of the report	The Evaluation Team must submit to USAID a listing of data sources used, such as: populated databases and records of data collected from interviews of key informants and focus groups conducted. These must be included along with the following, per the Evaluation Policy and consequent USAID guidance:

Deliverable	Timeframe	Description
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The evaluation Statement of Work, including any adjustments agreed in writing during the course of the evaluation. 2. Detailed description of the evaluation design and methods, and any instruments, surveys, question lists, etc. 3. Disclosure of any conflict of interest – a signed statement by evaluation team members that attests to a lack of conflict of interest or describes an existing conflict of interest relative to the project being evaluated

8. GEOGRAPHIC AREAS FOR THE EVALUATION

The evaluation will be conducted in Colombia. Specific geographic areas that the Evaluation Team plans will visit are the HRA geographic coverage including Bogotá where national institutions are based. The list of municipalities covered by HRA is included in Annex D.

The definite list of municipalities where the qualitative and quantitative instrument will be implemented may be defined in the design stage of the evaluation.

9. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

It is estimated that this evaluation will be carried out over a five-month period.

10. TEAM COMPOSITION

The key personnel that the Evaluation Contractor must furnish for the performance of this Evaluation are as follows and may constitute the Evaluation Team:

- a) Mid-term Evaluation Team Leader Team Leader
- b) Humans Rights Expert in human rights
- c) Evaluation Specialist

This team may be supported with short-term advice experts in human rights, institution strengthening and social capital when designing the study and when preparing the analysis of the information obtained. These experts may have masters or other advanced degrees and have at least five (5) years of experience in each respective field. This team may also be supported by assistants with at least 3 years of experience in its respective field.

The field collection of data must be implemented by an experienced team doing this task. This work can be done through a sub-contract and may need to be coordinated by a survey manager having at least six (6) years of experience in coordinating surveys to collect quantitative and qualitative data; a data and statistics specialist having at least four (4) years in processing and data mining; and field work supervisors and interviewers having at least three (3) years of experience working with surveys.

The initial starting salaries for all key personnel positions, unless previously approved and budgeted for in the Evaluation Contract, must be approved in advance and in writing by the Contracting Officer.

- a) The key personnel that the Contractor must furnish for the performance of this contract are as follows:

Team Leader

The Team Leader will have overall responsibility for all aspects of the study. S/he will be primarily responsible for communicating technical issues with USAID, developing and implementing the detailed baseline methodology, managing and implementing the work plan and all related mid-term evaluation team activities, leading the literature review, guiding the collection of data through surveys, conducting interviews, and leading the writing of the baseline technical products. S/he will also be responsible for presenting findings during briefings, out-briefings, and final presentations.

Required Qualifications:

- Masters or other advanced degrees in international development, economics, public policy, sociology, evaluation, or other relevant related areas.
- At least eight (8) years of experience in participating in field-based evaluations of development program and projects. Of these, three (3) may be in managing and leading field-based evaluations; (2) years in evaluating international cooperation funded projects; three (3) years in evaluating human rights of other Democracy and Governance programs²⁸; three (3) of these eight (8) years can be replaced by experience in monitoring development projects.
- Understanding of project administration, finance and management of USAID.
- Knowledge extensive k of human rights issues in Colombia, specifically territorial political and social conditions in conflict affected areas.
- Relevant subject matter expertise as demonstrated by published evaluations or peer reviewed articles.
- Good understanding of gender and ethnic minority issues in Colombia.
- Strong analytic skills.
- Excellent written and oral communication skills in English and Spanish.

Human Rights Expert

The Expert in Human Rights will serve on the evaluation team and will support the Team Leader with research, data collection, analysis, and writing.

Required Qualifications:

- Master's or an equivalent advanced degree in social sciences, Public Policy or a related area.
- At least six (6) years of experience working in Colombia on human rights issues.
- At least four (4) years of experience working in conflict and post-conflict areas.
- Human rights, democracy and governance expertise as demonstrated by published studies or peer reviewed articles.
- Strong knowledge regarding human rights conditions in conflict affected areas.
- Relevant expertise and experience conducting program evaluation or similar research and analytical work.
- Working-level written and verbal communication skills in English and Spanish and ability to conduct interviews and focus groups in Spanish and provide presentations and documents in English.

Evaluation Specialist

²⁸ These years do not have to be cumulative.

The Evaluation Specialist will provide technical expertise in the qualitative and quantitative program baseline and evaluation methodologies, tools, and data analyses that can be applied to rural social and economic development and conflict resolution programs.

Required Qualifications:

- At least five (5) of experience in conducting and leading field-based evaluations of development program and projects Two (2) of these five (5) years can be replaced by experience in monitoring development projects. 1 (one) of these years may be in monitoring development projects.
 - Substantial knowledge and experience in evaluation quantitative and qualitative methodologies, preferably in the context of rural and alternative development and territorial socio-economic conditions in conflict affected areas.
 - Demonstrated capability in designing evaluation tools, conducting evaluation interviews, focus groups, managing and interpreting qualitative and quantitative data collection, analysis processes and utilizing secondary data.
 - Experience working with survey statistics, integrating and analyzing different datasets, and conducting group interviews/focus groups.
 - Ability to manage logistics, including arranging key informant interviews and group interviews/focus groups, accommodations, and travel.
 - Excellent oral and writing skills in Spanish and English
- b) Key personnel are considered essential to the work being performed under this contract. The Evaluation Contractor will provide key personnel fully dedicated (100% level of effort) for the term of this contract unless otherwise approved by USAID. Each key person will be under the direct supervision of the prime Contractor (not under a subcontractor), unless otherwise approved by USAID.
- c) Failure to provide key personnel may be considered nonperformance unless such failure is beyond the control of the Evaluation Contractor. All individuals listed as Key Personnel must reside in Colombia for the duration of the Activity.
- d) The Contractor must immediately notify USAID of any key personnel's departure and the reasons therefore. The Contractor must promptly propose a replacement for each vacated position. The proposed replacement must possess the qualifications listed above for the corresponding personnel. A budget impact statement must also be submitted in sufficient detail to permit evaluation of the impact on the program. The Contractor must not replace any of the Key Personnel without the prior written approval of USAID
- e) USAID reserves the right to adjust the number of Key Personnel during the performance of this contract.

Team members should not have past or current business relationships with HRA or prior phases of the Human Rights Program.

11. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

The Evaluation Team is responsible for arranging all logistical support for the evaluation. However, given the difficulties of travel within project intervention sites, HRA will be available to provide advice on security issues to the Evaluation Team.

12. OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT

The Evaluation Team will report to USAID's Evaluation Activity Manager, as named above, or subsequently delegated.

13. FINAL REPORT FORMAT

The evaluation final report should include an abstract; executive summary; background of the local context and the strategies/projects/activities being evaluated; the evaluation purpose and main evaluation questions; the methodology or methodologies; the limitations to the evaluation; findings, conclusions, and recommendations. For more detail, see “How-To Note: Preparing Evaluation Reports” and **ADS 201mah, USAID Evaluation Report Requirements**. An optional evaluation report template is available in the Evaluation Toolkit.

The executive summary should be 2–5 pages in length and summarize the purpose, background of the project being evaluated, main evaluation questions, methods, findings, conclusions, and recommendations and lessons learned (if applicable).

The evaluation methodology shall be explained in the report in detail. Limitations to the evaluation shall be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (e.g., selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.)

The annexes to the report shall include:

- The Evaluation SOW;
- Any statements of difference regarding significant unresolved differences of opinion by funders, implementers, and/or members of the evaluation team;
- All data collection and analysis tools used in conducting the evaluation, such as questionnaires, checklists, and discussion guides;
- All sources of information, properly identified and listed; and
- Signed disclosure of conflict of interest forms for all evaluation team members, either attesting to a lack of conflicts of interest or describing existing conflicts of.
- Any “statements of difference” regarding significant unresolved differences of opinion by funders, implementers, and/or members of the evaluation team.
- Summary information about evaluation team members, including qualifications, experience, and role on the team.

In accordance with ADS 201, the contractor will make the final evaluation reports publicly available through the Development Experience Clearinghouse within three months of the evaluation’s conclusion.

14. CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

Per **ADS 201maa, Criteria to Ensure the Quality of the Evaluation Report**, draft and final evaluation reports will be evaluated against the following criteria to ensure the quality of the evaluation report.²⁹

- Evaluation reports should represent a thoughtful, well-researched, and well-organized effort to objectively evaluate the strategy, project, or activity.
- Evaluation reports should be readily understood and should identify key points clearly, distinctly, and succinctly.

²⁹ See **ADS 201mah, USAID Evaluation Report Requirements** and the Evaluation Report Review Checklist from the Evaluation Toolkit for additional guidance.

- The Executive Summary of an evaluation report should present a concise and accurate statement of the most critical elements of the report.
- Evaluation reports should adequately address all evaluation questions included in the SOW, or the evaluation questions subsequently revised and documented in consultation and agreement with USAID.
- Evaluation methodology should be explained in detail and sources of information properly identified.
- Limitations to the evaluation should be adequately disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
- Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and not based on anecdotes, hearsay, or simply the compilation of people's opinions.
- Findings and conclusions should be specific, concise, and supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence.
- If evaluation findings assess person-level outcomes or impact, they should also be separately assessed for both males and females.
If recommendations are included, they should be supported by a specific set of findings and should be action-oriented, practical, and specific.

15. OTHER REQUIREMENTS

All quantitative data collected by the evaluation team must be provided in machine-readable, non-proprietary formats as required by USAID's Open Data policy (see ADS 579). The data should be organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or the evaluation. USAID will retain ownership of the survey and all datasets developed.

All modifications to the required elements of the SOW in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology, or timeline, need to be agreed upon in writing by the COR. Any revisions should be updated in the SOW that is included as an annex to the Evaluation Report.

ANNEX B: EVALUATION METHODS

Evaluation Approach

This section provides a description of the approaches that are used to answer each of the EQs. The Evaluation Design Matrix is included at the end of this Annex.

EQ1: Relevance of HRA Strategies in the Changing Human Rights Context

To answer EQ1, the evaluation team conducted a context analysis to define the changing factors at the regional and national levels. This context analysis explains the factors that have contributed to a shifting operational context for HRA and defines the variables (e.g., types of human rights violations, population groups affected, structural changes, etc.) that track the deteriorating human rights situation. It also provides insights into the changing power dynamics due to the expansion and reconfiguration of new illegal actors (e.g., GAOs) as well as the relationships between different actors with respect to territorial disputes, social control and conflict, and community organizing. Following the context analysis, the evaluation team incorporated HRA's context information and conducted KIIs with sector experts, government officials, local CSOs and other actors to gain additional insights on the changing human rights context.

In order to assess the relevance of HRA's strategies in the defined changing context and whether the Activity has adapted to address this changing human rights context, the evaluation team conducted a desk review of the HRA activities as they relate to each component and its objectives. This review was linked to the context analysis. This desk review was complemented with KIIs of key HRA regional staff, GOC officials, municipal leaders, and CSO grantees to assess the relevance of the HRA strategies in the changing human rights environment. The evaluation team assessed relevance based on whether the Activity is in line with national, departmental, and municipal needs and priorities as they relate to human rights and whether it is flexible enough to respond to the changing dynamics.

EQ2: Improved Understanding of Human Rights Standards

In order to assess the extent to which Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards and view compliance with those standards as the norm, the evaluation team reviewed the topics and trainings provided by HRA and conduct KIIs and GDs with training participants to determine whether there has been a change in the understanding of human rights. Once the team identified whether and to what extent change has occurred, it used contribution analysis to assess the relative contribution of the HRA to the observed change.

The contribution analysis involved assessing whether and how much the Activity has contributed, vis-à-vis other factors, to observed results/changes. To do this, the causal logic model on how HRA activities would be expected to improve understanding of human rights standards was mapped out. Then, data collected through KIIs and GDs was used to assess whether the anticipated results in the causal logic model have been achieved and/or whether other factors external to HRA may have significantly influenced the achievement of the results. For example, CSO representatives may demonstrate a clear understanding of human rights standards but they may also report various other venues, besides the HRA activity, where they get information and support, so other factors may also be contributing to this positive effect.

EQ3: Promoting Sustainability of Entities and Initiatives

To assess the promotion of sustainability at the GOC and civil society levels, the evaluation team focused on five domains (i.e. relevant factors and conditions) that are likely to influence the continuation of initiatives supported by the Activity: policy, participation and ownership, management and

organization, technical training, and financial (see Table 6 below).³⁰ In addition, sustainability is more likely when an activity, action or behavior is valued by the recipient. A beneficiary assessment from the KILs with GOC officials and civil society organization representatives provided insights into beneficiaries' perceptions of the value of HRA interventions and results. It is worth noting, the sustainability of initiatives can only be verified ex-post, so this performance evaluation can only assess factors that theoretically would contribute to the sustainability of the initiatives.

Table 6: Sustainability Factors

Factors	Description	Guiding Questions
Policy	Support is consistent with government sectoral policies and these policies are implemented at the local level.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are the initiatives supported by HRA consistent with, and supportive of, relevant national and local human rights policies? • Has the State's response to the protection and defense of human rights increased or improved at the local government levels?
Participation and Ownership	Local stakeholders participate in and support the interventions, which respond to clearly expressed local needs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have local stakeholders actively participated in the identification and design process of the initiatives supported by HRA? • Are leaders or senior representatives of stakeholder groups clearly supportive? • Are participatory approaches a clear element of the implementation strategy? • Have HRA-supported initiatives been implemented independently elsewhere?
Management and Organization	Local actors are equipped with management and organizational skills to be adaptive and resilient. The project builds on local management structure rather than establishing new or parallel structures.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do the local entities/organizations have the institutional and absorptive capacity to support the sustainability of the initiatives supported by HRA? • Is the institutional structure sufficient and flexible to withstand turnover or does it depend on specific individuals? • Has a phase-out strategy been included or discussed with local stakeholders?
Technical Training	The project assessed the technical expertise (non-managerial or financial skills) of project stakeholders and developed training that addressed these needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were the local needs for information dissemination and awareness training assessed in the design of the initiatives? • Has a training strategy been developed to address sustainability issues?
Financial	Local institutions are capable and committed to continued operation in core capacities even if external funding is withdrawn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is it clear how local organizations will access financial resources from "own" sources during and after implementation? • Are there viable alternative sources of financing that can be accessed?

³⁰ AusAID (2000). Promoting Practical Sustainability. <https://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdndep/31950216.pdf>

EQ4: Effects on Beneficiaries and Vulnerable Groups

In order to assess the effects from HRA on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity, the evaluation team mapped out the causal logic model on how the HRA activities would be expected to affect different beneficiaries, including human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, women, local journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected municipalities covered by HRA. Once the anticipated effects were mapped out, the evaluation team conducted KIIs and GDs to determine what has changed since the initiation of the HRA. These interviews and GDs also provided insights into unintended or unanticipated effects. Once the team identified whether changes occurred, they conducted a contribution analysis, as described under EQ2, to assess the relative contribution of HRA to the observed changes.

EQ5: Strategies for Objective of Increased Investigations and Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations

In order to assess whether HRA's strategies are effective and adequate for the objective of increased investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations (e.g., homicides, forced displacement, kidnapping, child recruitment, disappearances, sexual violence, among others), the evaluation team conducted KIIs and secondary sources to determine whether there has been an increase in the investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations since the start of the program, per USAID's request. Given the longer timeframe needed observe changes in the number of investigations and prosecutions, it is unlikely that there will be a measureable change in less than two years of HRA implementation. Thus, the evaluation team also focused on triangulating perceptions and insights about HRA's strategies from different relevant stakeholders inside the AGO as well as stakeholders external to the AGO but also providing support to this government entity.

In order to assess the sub-question of whether HRA is effectively coordinating with other programs or international organizations working on impunity, the evaluation team conducted KIIs with HRA staff, USAID, and other programs such as UNOHCHR and USAID's Justice for Sustainable Peace activity to inquire about processes for coordination and anticipated results.

EQ6: Achievements, Bottlenecks, and Lessons Learned

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the other evaluation questions serve as the basis for identifying many of the achievements, bottlenecks, and lessons learned to answer EQ6. For HRA's Component 1 and Component 3, the achievements were in large part based on an analysis of findings for EQ2 and EQ5, respectively. However, the evaluation team did not limit its lines of inquiry and analysis to those two question categories. The broad language of EQ6 provides a venue for the provision of bottlenecks and lessons learned that may not fit neatly within the parameters of the other two questions. Thus, a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis was conducted on the implementation of the three components and its cross-cutting themes. This conceptual framework integrates quantitative metrics from primary and secondary sources (e.g. reporting documents and publicly available contextual and demographic data) and qualitative information from key informants and high-level decision-makers to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Observation and analysis by the evaluation team's human rights experts was also an essential part of identifying important lessons learned for future human rights programming.

Data Collection Methods

Key Informant Interviews

The evaluation team conducted face-to-face in-depth interviews with a range of HRA stakeholders at the national, departmental, and municipal levels, including individuals who have knowledge of and direct involvement with the HRA activities, individuals who are experts on the human rights context in

Colombia, and individuals who may have indirect involvement with the HRA activities but are leaders in their municipalities. The purpose of these interviews was to gain a qualitative understanding of the perspectives, experiences, and opinions from various HRA stakeholders concerning the relevance of the strategies, underlying interactions, and contributions of HRA. KIIs are also especially appropriate for addressing sensitive topics that people might be reluctant to discuss in a group setting. The semi-structured nature of the interviews maintained a balance between keeping the interviewee on the topic of interest and allowing sufficient scope for a free-flowing discussion to take place. The semi-structured interviews primarily relied on open-ended questions. Information derived from semi-structured interviews was used to address all of the evaluation questions.

The evaluation team designed KII guides linked to the EQs and stakeholder categories. This process consisted in first creating an evaluation framework where research questions were derived from each EQ. From those research questions, sub-questions and themes were defined. Then the different stakeholder categories were linked to the sub-questions. This resulted in KIIs guides that covered key themes to answer each EQ and ensured that multiple information sources were linked to each EQ. The KII guides were then prepared for each stakeholder category, covering the relevant themes from the evaluation framework. While the guides vary based on stakeholder category, most had some variation of the following sections:

- Perception of human rights context and changing dynamics
- Understanding of human rights issues and standards
- Respondent's relationship to HRA activities
- Participation in HRA activities and perceived benefits or effects
- Experience with HRA activity coordination and outreach
- Relationship with other activities, stakeholders or other factors that could affect HRA outcomes
- Sustainability dimensions
- Bottlenecks and recommendations for improvement

The selection of KII respondents was done in consultation with HRA to identify the most relevant respondents within the government entities and organizations. The list of government entities and organizations was compiled with HRA's support and supplemented by the evaluation team through the review of HRA's ongoing activities, work plans, and contract deliverables. HRA provided contact information for all of the selected respondents. While the evaluation team coordinated with the HRA regional advisors on logistics and scheduling, the evaluation team called all respondents directly to schedule the KIIs. The evaluation team reached a 96 percent response rate from the initial list of respondents.

Group Discussions

In addition to semi-structured interviews, the evaluation team collected data through group discussions where the key objective of the research was to identify *why* classes of respondents espouse a specific view and to explore group norms. GDs were mainly used to understand the process and results associated with increased understanding of human rights standards (EQ2) and the effects on beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity (EQ4). GDs allowed respondents to reflect upon and make sense of a shared experience, as well as allowed them to probe one another's understanding in a where the evaluation team could develop an in-depth understanding of the key drivers and barriers behind the impacts that have been experienced. These group approaches also allow the evaluation team to validate evidence obtained through other sources, such as KIIs and HRA document review.

GDs were led by a member of the evaluation team, who ensured that key areas of interest were covered and fully documented while allowing discussion to flow freely, intervening when required to ensure all participants have an opportunity to voice their opinions. The evaluation team prepared semi-structured GD guides that cover key discussion topics identified through the evaluation framework process described above, as well as situational vignettes which describe a hypothetical situation to which participants will respond thereby revealing their knowledge, perceptions, values, social norms, and impressions of the events.³¹

The vignettes were constructed as locally relevant short stories about a hypothetical person experiencing a situation where their human rights are threatened or violated. Participants were then asked what they thought of the situation, what they would do if they were the person in the vignette, whether there would be any positive or negative implications for their actions, and how frequent this type of situation occurs in their community. These vignettes provided an opportunity for participants to reveal their knowledge and perceptions about human rights and about the mechanisms to report human rights violations in a more practical way rather than being directly asked what they know about human rights standards and enforcement of these standards. It also provided insights into the social norms related to these types of events and the perceived risks and consequences for their actions. The vignettes also provided a less personal and therefore less threatening way of exploring sensitive topics. It also allowed participants to voice their opinions on topics which they may not have had a personal experience. In order to reduce social desirability bias, where participants respond with answers of what *should* be done rather than what they *would* do, participants were asked to respond from characters' perspective as if they were that person in the vignette situation, rather than on the basis of their own lives. The responses to these vignettes were not used to determine the actions that participants would take, but rather to assess their knowledge on human rights issues and perceived risks and social norms tied to them.

GD participant recruitment was done in collaboration with HRA and CSO grantees. While a random selection of beneficiaries was proposed in the Evaluation Design Report, in practice the evaluation team was not able to accomplish this. The grantee CSOs did not agree to provide anonymized lists of their beneficiaries. The stated reasons included: security concerns since their beneficiaries are vulnerable populations; internal organization regulations that prohibit them from sharing beneficiary data; and a preference for contacting their own beneficiaries directly. The CSOs refused the proposed random selection process even after the evaluation team explained that the random selection could be made without sharing all of their data by creating a code key and then only sending the necessary data of the selected beneficiaries. Instead of random selection, the evaluation team coordinated with the CSOs by indicating the profiles of the required persons. For each GD, ten beneficiaries were invited to participate in order to obtain the attendance of at least eight beneficiaries. The evaluation team reimbursed participants' transportation, lodging, and food expenses, when necessary, due to long distances that some had to travel from their homes to participate in the discussion (this occurred primarily with the indigenous communities). All GDs included refreshments during the session.

Privacy and Confidentiality

The evaluation obtained informed consent from all respondents before carrying out any KIIs or GDs. Respondents were read a consent form in Spanish. Careful attention was paid to ensure that respondents understood that their responses would be used for research purposes and were expected to be made public without compromising their confidentiality and anonymity. The evaluation team maintained high standards in methods, quality, and data security throughout the entire evaluation period.

³¹ Hughes, R., & Huby, M. (2012). The construction and interpretation of vignettes in social research. *Social Work and Social Sciences Review*, 11(1), 36-51.

All data collection activities adhered to the professional standards of the American Evaluation Association and all data were handled in such a manner as to protect the identities of informants in any situations where their comments could potentially have a negative impact on their security. The evaluation team safeguarded the confidentiality and anonymity of GD and KII respondents.

Table 7 shows the Evaluation Design Matrix summarizing the evaluation approach, data collection methods, and limitations.

Table 7: Evaluation Design Matrix

EQ	Focus	Information Required and Sources	Scope and Methodology	Limitations	What the Evaluation will be likely allowed to say
1	Relevance of HRA strategies in changing human rights context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review of project documents and performance data; • KIIs with USAID and HRA • KIIs with selected human rights experts, GOC officials, department and municipal officials, and CSOs representatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Context analysis at the national, departmental, and municipal levels • Pre-Current comparison: HRA activity cataloguing and comparison of work plans and actual implementation • Relevance assessment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complex environment resulting in changing context with multiple actors and relationships 	Whether the HRA strategies remain relevant to the changing human rights context and if they have been able to adapt and respond to the changing context, and if not, then why not.
2	Improved understanding of human rights standards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KIIs with trained public officials, CSO grantees, and FENALPER. • Group discussions with trained beneficiary groups • Review of training materials • Site visit to <i>Escuelas de Paz</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre – current comparison • Contribution analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited baseline information • Recall bias from respondents • Attribution to HRA is not possible 	Whether government officials, civil society representatives, and beneficiaries report improved understanding of human rights standards and whether there is evidence to support HRA's contribution to this change
3	Promoting sustainability of entities and initiatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KIIs with USAID and HRA • KIIs with GOC and CSO grantees • Site visits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability criteria assessment • Beneficiary assessment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The presence or absence of the domains identified may not be necessary nor sufficient to result in sustainability • Sustainability of an intervention can only be verified ex-post 	Whether there is evidence to support that HRA is promoting factors that would theoretically contribute to the sustainability of the initiatives it supports

EQ	Focus	Information Required and Sources	Scope and Methodology	Limitations	What the Evaluation will be likely allowed to say
4	Effects on beneficiaries and vulnerable groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KIIs with HR defenders, social leaders, and local journalists • Group discussions with vulnerable groups (LGBTI, women, ethnic communities, youth) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Causal tracing • Pre – current comparison • Contribution analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited baseline information • Recall bias from respondents • Attribution to HRA is not possible 	What intended and unintended effects are reported by beneficiaries of vulnerable groups and whether there is evidence to support HRA’s contribution to these changes
5	Strategies for objective of increased investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Third-party data analysis on human rights violations and investigation / prosecution trends • KIIs GOC, municipal leaders • KIIs with HRA staff, USAID, other programs such as UNOHCHR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre – current comparison • Bottleneck analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timeframe too short to expect measurable change in this result given HRA’s limited sphere of influence • Most of the activities under this component depend on the AGO 	Whether HRA’s strategies are adequate for the Component 3 objective and what might be some bottlenecks for fulfilling the deliverables. Whether and how HRA is coordinating with other donors / programs in this area
6	Achievements, bottlenecks, and lessons learned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review of project documents and analysis of performance data • KIIs with HRA staff, USAID, GOC and municipality counterparts, CSO grantees • Data compiled to answer all other evaluation questions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beneficiary assessment • SWOT analysis • Evidence Synthesis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The evaluation team cannot visit all 40 municipalities, so might miss some specific cases 	What the achievements, bottlenecks, and lessons learned are for the three components and cross-cutting tasks

ANNEX C: MUNICIPALITY CHARACTERISTICS AND LIST

The 13 municipalities selected as part of the evaluation sample are highlighted in blue. In Meta, Mesetas and La Macarena were originally selected; however the week of the field visit there was no air access in La Macarena as part of the landing strip was closed for maintenance and the other part was being used to respond to a forest fire. Thus, La Macarena was replaced with Vistahermosa. The municipalities in *underlined italics* correspond to the ten new municipalities added to HRA's coverage area after the Activity closed its office in Norte de Santander and decided to not open an office in Arauca.

Figure 6: HRA Municipality Characteristics

Department	Municipality	PDET	Homicide Rate (2015)	Homicide Rate (2016)	Forced Displacement (2016)	Forced Displacement (2017)	FARC Demob. Zone	Indigenous Population (2005)	Afro-Colombian Population (2005)	Pop.	Urban Pop. (%)	# of HRA Grants
ANTIOQUIA	Anorí	Yes	22	10	129	67	Yes	0%	2%	17,737	40%	2
	Briceño	Yes	23	17	436	161	No	0%	11%	8,673	30%	2
	Ituango	Yes	17	5	296	218	Yes	1%	3%	19,919	29%	5
	<i>Remedios</i>	Yes	N/A	N/A	196	205	Yes	0%	15%	31,333	37%	0
	Segovia	Yes	67	56	626	484	No	1%	16%	41,711	79%	4
	Valdivia	Yes	25	25	264	439	No	0%	3%	23,931	30%	2
	El Bagre	Yes	45	38	2,580	552	No	2%	16%	50,557	52%	3
	Cáceres	Yes	27	21	612	431	No	2%	20%	41,012	23%	6
	Caucasia	Yes	45	37	651	451	No	1%	7%	120,479	83%	4
	Nechí	Yes	8	2	502	390	No	0%	23%	28,585	54%	3
	Tarazá	Yes	27	20	544	572	No	0%	6%	46,343	65%	4
	Zaragoza	Yes	29	32	523	200	No	5%	31%	31,884	45%	3
CÓRDOBA	Tierralta	Yes	25	32	681	404	Yes	4%	20%	107,302	44%	5
	Montelíbano	Yes	17	25	355	262	No	2%	16%	86,858	79%	3
	Puerto Libertador	Yes	10	12	982	396	No	9%	1%	52,371	41%	3
TOLIMA	Ataco	Yes	10	6	176	61	No	3%	10%	22,752	24%	3
	Chaparral	Yes	9	11	471	77	No	5%	0%	47,344	57%	3
	<i>Cajamarca</i>	No	N/A	N/A	189	41	No	0%	0%	19,611	51%	1

Department	Municipality	PDET	Homicide Rate (2015)	Homicide Rate (2016)	Forced Displacement (2016)	Forced Displacement (2017)	FARC Demob. Zone	Indigenous Population (2005)	Afro-Colombian Population (2005)	Pop.	Urban Pop. (%)	# of HRA Grants
	<u>Ortega</u>	No	N/A	N/A	169	59	No	41%	0%	32,256	25%	0
	Planadas	Yes	13	8	518	90	Yes	5%	3%	30,066	26%	2
	Rioblanco	Yes	11	6	361	48	No	3%	1%	24,244	19%	3
CAUCA	Corinto	Yes	40	31	288	131	No	31%	19%	33,107	40%	4
	Santander de Quilichao	Yes	72	77	231	126	No	19%	33%	97,965	58%	6
	Caloto	Yes	10	13	61	62	No	23%	63%	17,736	26%	3
	<u>Buenos Aires</u>	Yes	N/A	N/A	123	78	Yes	16%	69%	34,037	8%	1
	<u>Caldono</u>	Yes	N/A	N/A	71	21	Yes	71%	0%	33,910	4%	0
	Miranda	Yes	13	16	92	133	Yes	17%	53%	41,925	73%	5
	Tumaco	Yes	130	147	5,282	3,683	No	4%	63%	212,692	57%	6
NARIÑO	<u>Barbacoas</u>	Yes	N/A	N/A	1,157	630	Yes	12%	60%	40,429	43%	0
	<u>Francisco Pizarro</u>	Yes	N/A	N/A	214	547	No	0%	65%	16,461	51%	0
	Mesetas	Yes	5	1	42	79	Yes	2%	3%	11,481	34%	3
META	Uribe	Yes	14	3	69	77	No	1%	0%	17,329	24%	1
	La Macarena	Yes	4	2	208	116	Yes	0%	0%	35,766	13%	2
	<u>El Castillo</u>	No	N/A	N/A	25	35	No	0%	1%	6,184	34%	0
	Puerto Rico	Yes	9	9	151	75	No	1%	3%	33,623	43%	1
	Vistahermosa	Yes	22	10	174	83	Yes	0%	1%	26,790	37%	3
	Cartagena del Chaira	Yes	17	7	456	272	No	0%	2%	34,953	37%	4
CAQUETÁ	San Vicente del Caguan	Yes	34	33	1,051	516	Yes	0%	0%	71,704	64%	5
	<u>Valparaiso</u>	Yes	N/A	N/A	125	40	No	2%	5%	11,772	33%	0
	La Montañita	Yes	4	4	315	109	Yes	0%	9%	24,140	21%	6

Sources:

PDET (Agencia de Renovación del Territorio); Homicide rates (National Police data - HRA baseline); Forced displacements (Registro Único de la Unidad de Víctimas); FARC demobilization zone; Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE); Population and Urban population (DANE).

Figure 7: HRA Municipalities

Department	Municipalities	HRA Office Location
Antioquia	Anorí	Medellín
	Briceño	
	Ituango	
	<u>Remedios</u>	
	Segovia	
	Valdivia	
	El Bagre	Caucasia
	Cáceres	
	<u>Caucasia</u>	
	Nechí	
	Tarazá	
Córdoba	Zaragoza	Montería
	<u>Tierralta</u>	
	Montelíbano	
Tolima	Puerto Libertador	Ibagué
	Ataco	
	Chaparral	
	<u>Cajamarca</u>	
	<u>Ortega</u>	
	Planadas	
	Rioblanco	
Cauca	Corinto	Popayán
	<u>Santander de Quilichao</u>	
	Caloto	
	<u>Buenos Aires</u>	
	<u>Caldono</u>	
Nariño	Miranda	Tumaco
	<u>Tumaco</u>	
	<u>Barbacoas</u>	
Meta	<u>Francisco Pizarro</u>	Villavicencio
	Mesetas	
	Uribe	
	La Macarena	
	<u>El Castillo</u>	
	Puerto Rico	
Caquetá	<u>Vistahermosa</u>	Florencia
	Cartagena del Chairá	
	<u>San Vicente del Caguán</u>	
	<u>Valparaiso</u>	
	La Montañita	

ANNEX D: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The evaluation team reviewed the following documentation provided by HRA:

- Base Task Order and Modifications
- Program Annual Work plans
- Strategic Review
- Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
- Annual and Quarterly Reports
- Biweekly Highlights and Quarterly Snapshots
- CSO Grants and GOC Projects' Concept Papers
- Gender and Vulnerable Populations Strategy
- HRA Baseline Report
- HRA's deliverables tracker and performance indicators

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List of Interviews Conducted

#	Date	Department	Municipality	Entity	Stakeholder Category	Sex
1	2/13/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	F
2	2/14/2018	Tolima	Ibagué	Secretary of Social Inclusion	Departmental Government	M
3	2/14/2018	Tolima	Ibagué	Secretary of the Interior	Departmental Government	M
4	2/14/2018	Tolima	Ibagué	Human Rights Activity	HRA Regional	F / F
5	2/15/2018	Tolima	Chaparral	Police	Municipal Government	M
6	2/15/2018	Tolima	Chaparral	Family Commissary	Municipal Government	F
7	2/15/2018	Tolima	Chaparral	<i>Personería</i>	Municipal Government	F
8	2/15/2018	Tolima	Chaparral	Municipal Government Secretary	Municipal Government	M
9	2/15/2018	Tolima	Chaparral	Casa Teatro Antonio Camacho	CSO (grantees)	F
10	2/15/2018	Tolima	Chaparral	Fundación Ideas para la Paz	CSO (grantees)	F
11	2/15/2018	Tolima	Ibagué	Ombudsmen's Office - EWS	Departmental Government	M
12	2/16/2018	Tolima	Cajamarca	Family Commissary	Municipal Government	F
13	2/16/2018	Tolima	Cajamarca	Municipal Government Secretary	Municipal Government	M
14	2/16/2018	Tolima	Cajamarca	Victims' Liaison	Municipal Government	M
15	2/16/2018	Tolima	Ibagué	Office of Human Rights	Departmental Government	F
16	2/20/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	IGO	National Government	F
17	2/20/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	CPDH	National Government	F
18	2/20/2018	Caquetá	Florencia	Red Caquetá Paz	CSO (grantees)	F
19	2/21/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Fundación Ideas para la Paz	CSO (grantees)	M
20	2/21/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Corporación Humanas	CSO (grantees)	F
21	2/21/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Fundación Escuelas de Paz	CSO (grantees)	F
22	2/21/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	CREER	CSO (grantees)	F
23	2/21/2018	Caquetá	Florencia	Human Rights Activity	HRA Regional	M
24	2/21/2018	Caquetá	Florencia	Ombudsmen's Office	Departmental Government	M
25	2/22/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Ombudsmen's Office - EWS	National Government	M
26	2/22/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	MOE	National Government	M
27	2/22/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Colombia Diversa	CSO (grantees)	F
28	2/22/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Comisión Colombiana de Juristas	CSO (grantees)	F
29	2/22/2018	Caquetá	San Vicente de Caguán	Municipal Council	Municipal Government	M
30	2/22/2018	Caquetá	San Vicente de Caguán	<i>Personería</i>	Municipal Government	F

#	Date	Department	Municipality	Entity	Stakeholder Category	Sex
31	2/22/2018	Caquetá	San Vicente de Caguán	Victim's Liaison	Municipal Government	F
32	2/23/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Viva la Ciudadanía	CSO (grantees)	M
33	2/23/2018	Caquetá	Florencia	Corpomanigua	CSO (grantees)	M
34	2/23/2018	Caquetá	Florencia	Education Secretary	Departmental Government	M
35	2/23/2018	Caquetá	Florencia	LGBTI Liaison	Departmental Government	M
36	2/23/2018	Caquetá	La Montañita	<i>Personería</i>	Municipal Government	M
37	2/27/2018	Cordoba	Montería	Human Rights Activity	HRA Regional	F / F
38	2/27/2018	Cordoba	Montería	Women's social organizations network	Social Leader	F
39	2/28/2018	Cordoba	Tierralta	Guarantees Roundtable	Social Leader	M
40	2/28/2018	Cordoba	Tierralta	Victims' Roundtable	Social Leader	M
41	2/28/2018	Cordoba	Tierralta	Hermanas Misioneras de la Madre Laura	CSO (grantees)	F
42	2/28/2018	Cordoba	Tierralta	Municipal Government Secretary	Municipal Government	M
43	2/28/2018	Nariño	Tumaco	Human Rights Activity	HRA Regional	F
44	2/28/2018	Nariño	Tumaco	Diócesis de Tumaco	CSO (grantees)	F
45	2/28/2018	Nariño	Tumaco	Concejo Comunitario Rio Gualajo	CSO (grantees)	M
46	2/28/2018	Nariño	Tumaco	Municipal Government Secretary	Municipal Government	F
47	2/28/2018	Nariño	Tumaco	<i>Personería</i>	Municipal Government	F
48	3/1/2018	Nariño	Tumaco	Ombudsmen's Office	Municipal Government	M
49	3/1/2018	Antioquia	Caucasia	Human Rights Activity	HRA Regional	F / M
50	3/1/2018	Antioquia	Caucasia	Caribe Afirmativo	CSO (grantees)	M
51	3/1/2018	Antioquia	Caucasia	Corporación Rio Abajo	CSO (grantees)	M
52	3/1/2018	Antioquia	Caucasia	Fundación Oleoducto Colombia	Social Leader	M
53	3/1/2018	Antioquia	Caucasia	<i>Personería</i>	Municipal Government	F
54	3/1/2018	Antioquia	Caucasia	Gender Equity Liaison	Municipal Government	F
55	3/1/2018	Antioquia	Caucasia	Municipal Government Secretary	Municipal Government	M
56	3/1/2018	Antioquia	Caucasia	Victims' Liaison	Municipal Government	F
57	3/2/2018	Cordoba	Montería	Office of Human Rights	Departmental Government	F
58	3/2/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	CPDH	National Government	M
59	3/2/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	USAID	USAID	M
60	3/2/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	USAID	USAID	F
61	3/2/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	M
62	3/2/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	M
63	3/2/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	F
64	3/4/2018	Cordoba	Montería	ARN	Departmental Government	F

#	Date	Department	Municipality	Entity	Stakeholder Category	Sex
65	3/5/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Círculo de Estudios Culturales y Políticos	CSO (grantees)	F
66	3/5/2018	Cauca	Popayán	Women's Secretary	Departmental Government	F
67	3/5/2018	Cauca	Popayán	Technical Office of International Cooperation	Departmental Government	F
68	3/5/2018	Cauca	Popayán	Human Rights Activity	HRA Regional	F / M
69	3/5/2018	Meta	Vistahermosa	Civil society representative	Social Leader	F
70	3/5/2018	Meta	Vistahermosa	Civil society representative	Social Leader	F
71	3/5/2018	Meta	Vistahermosa	Personería	Municipal Government	M
72	3/6/2018	Cauca	Buenos Aires	Asociación Municipal de Mujeres - ASOM	CSO (grantees)	F
73	3/6/2018	Cauca	Caloto	Victim's Liaison	Municipal Government	M
74	3/6/2018	Cauca	Caloto	Women's Secretary	Municipal Government	F
75	3/6/2018	Cauca	Caloto	Personería	Municipal Government	M
76	3/6/2018	Cauca	Caloto	Diploma course participant - Teacher	Social Leader	M
77	3/6/2018	Meta	Mesetas	Municipal Government Secretary	Municipal Government	F
78	3/6/2018	Meta	Mesetas	Secretary of Social Participation	Municipal Government	F
79	3/6/2018	Meta	Vistahermosa	Municipal Government Secretary	Municipal Government	F
80	3/7/2018	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	Municipal Government Secretary	Municipal Government	F
81	3/7/2018	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	Personería	Municipal Government	F
82	3/7/2018	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	Indigenous social leader	Social Leader	M
83	3/7/2018	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	AMBULUA	CSO (grantees)	F
84	3/7/2018	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	Fundamor	CSO (grantees)	F
85	3/7/2018	Meta	Villavicencio	CIPRUNNA	Departmental Government	F
86	3/7/2018	Meta	Villavicencio	Women and Gender Equity Secretary	Departmental Government	F
87	3/7/2018	Meta	Villavicencio	Secretary of Victims, Human Rights, and Peace	Departmental Government	F
88	3/7/2018	Meta	Villavicencio	Technical Office of International Cooperation	Departmental Government	F
89	3/7/2018	Meta	Villavicencio	Ombudsmen's Office - EWS	Departmental Government	M
90	3/7/2018	Meta	Villavicencio	Human Rights Activity	HRA Regional	F
91	3/7/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Police	National Government	M
92	3/9/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Police	National Government	F

#	Date	Department	Municipality	Entity	Stakeholder Category	Sex
93	3/9/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	F
94	3/9/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	F
95	3/12/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	F
96	3/12/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	F
97	3/12/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	F
98	3/12/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	F
99	3/12/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Human Rights Activity	HRA HQ	F
100	3/12/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	CODHES	CSO (grantees)	M
101	3/13/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	USAID / JSP	USAID / JSP	M
102	3/13/2018	Meta	Villavicencio	LIMPAL	CSO (grantees)	F
103	3/13/2018	Antioquia	Remedios	Victims' Roundtable	Social Leader	M
104	3/13/2018	Antioquia	Remedios	Victims' Roundtable	Social Leader	F
105	3/13/2018	Antioquia	Remedios	Personería	Municipal Government	M
106	3/13/2018	Antioquia	Remedios	Municipal Government Secretary	Municipal Government	F
107	3/13/2018	Antioquia	Ituango	Asociación de Mujeres Ideales de Ituango	CSO (grantees)	F
108	3/13/2018	Antioquia	Ituango	Red de Mujeres Unidas del Norte	Social Leader	F
109	3/13/2018	Antioquia	Ituango	Beneficiary - Corporación Paz y Democracia	Social Leader	M
110	3/13/2018	Antioquia	Ituango	Family Commissary	Municipal Government	F
111	3/14/2018	Antioquia	Ituango	Personería	Municipal Government	M
112	3/14/2018	Antioquia	Segovia	Municipal Government Secretary	Municipal Government	M
113	3/14/2018	Antioquia	Segovia	Personería	Municipal Government	M
114	3/14/2018	Antioquia	Segovia	Mining Roundtable - IPC beneficiary	Social Leader	M
115	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Segovia	Community Action Board	Social Leader	F
116	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Segovia	Corporación Tapir Dorado	CSO (grantees)	M
117	3/15/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	FENALPER	CSO (grantees)	M
118	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Medellín	Human Rights Activity	HRA Regional	F
119	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Medellín	Human Rights Activity	HRA Regional	F
120	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Medellín	Education Secretary	Departmental Government	M
121	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Medellín	Women's Secretary	Departmental Government	F
122	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Medellín	Office of Human Rights	Departmental Government	M
123	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Medellín	UNDP	International Organization	F
124	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Medellín	Organización Indígena de Antioquia	CSO (grantees)	F
125	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Medellín	IPC	CSO (grantees)	F

#	Date	Department	Municipality	Entity	Stakeholder Category	Sex
126	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Medellín	Corporación Paz y Democracia	CSO (grantees)	F
127	3/16/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa	CSO (grantees)	M
128	3/18/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	UNOHCHR	International Organization	M
129	3/18/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	UNOHCHR	International Organization	F / F
130	3/20/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	CINEP	CSO (grantees)	F
131	3/20/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	Ombudsmen's Office - EWS	National Government	M
132	3/20/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	National Protection Unit	National Government	M
133	3/22/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	AGO	National Government	F
134	4/3/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	MOI	National Government	F
135	4/16/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	AGO	National Government	F
136	4/26/2018	Bogotá	Bogotá	AGO	National Government	F

List of Group Discussions Conducted

#	Date	Department	Municipality	Beneficiary Group	HRA Grantee
1	2/15/2018	Tolima	Chaparral	Youth	Casa Teatro Antonio Camacho
2	2/15/2018	Tolima	Chaparral	Social leaders	---
3	2/22/2018	Caquetá	San Vicente de Caguán	Social leaders	---
4	2/28/2018	Nariño	Tumaco	Women (Afro-Colombian)	Círculo de Estudios Culturales y Políticos
5	2/28/2018	Cordoba	Tierralta	Women (Indigenous)	Hermanas Misioneras de la Madre Laura
6	3/1/2018	Antioquia	Caucasia	Indigenous population	Corporación Rio Abajo
7	3/1/2018	Nariño	Tumaco	Youth (Afro-Colombian)	Diócesis de Tumaco
8	3/1/2018	Nariño	Tumaco	LGBTI (Afro-Colombian)	Fundación Arcoiris
9	3/5/2018	Meta	Vistahermosa	Women	LIMPAL
10	3/6/2018	Meta	Mesetas	Social leaders	---
11	3/6/2018	Cauca	Buenos Aires	Women (Afro-Colombian and indigenous)	ASOM
12	3/7/2018	Cauca	Santander de Quilichao	Youth	Fundamor
13	3/14/2018	Antioquia	Ituango	Women	Asociación de Mujeres Ideales de Ituango
14	3/14/2018	Antioquia	Segovia	Indigenous population	OIA
15	3/15/2018	Antioquia	Segovia	LGBTI	Caribe Afirmativo

ANNEX E: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Key Informant Interview Guides

GUÍA DE ENTREVISTAS

Presentación de la actividad

Buen día/tarde. Muchas gracias por permitirnos realizar esta entrevista. Mi nombre es _____ y hago parte del Centro Nacional de Consultoría, una empresa privada con sede en Bogotá dedicada al estudio de los mercados, la opinión y las políticas públicas. Actualmente nos encontramos realizando un estudio sobre el bienestar y calidad de vida de la población en diferentes zonas del país, sobre cómo está cambiando el contexto de derechos humanos en su departamento y para documentar los aprendizajes y recomendaciones para el mejoramiento y orientación del Programa de Derechos Humanos de USAID.

Para el estudio es muy importante conocer sus opiniones. Esta entrevista es confidencial y sus opiniones solo van a hacer usadas para efectos de la evaluación.

¿Me permite grabar la entrevista? ¿Podemos comenzar?

Para empezar por favor indíqueme cuál es su cargo y hace cuánto tiempo lleva en el mismo.

GOBERNACIÓN

Contexto y Relevancia del Programa

1. ¿Cree que han habido cambios en el contexto de derechos humanos en su departamento desde la firma del acuerdo de paz? Si es así, ¿cuáles son esos cambios?
2. En su departamento, ¿cuáles son las principales afectaciones/ violaciones a los derechos humanos que se presentan?
3. ¿Hay alguna(s) población en particular que usted considere esté siendo más afectada?
4. ¿Qué retos ha implicado para su administración estos cambios en el contexto de DDHH?
5. Desde la perspectiva de las competencias de la Gobernación, ¿han surgido nuevas obligaciones en materia de prevención y protección para la entidad una vez firmado el acuerdo de paz?
6. ¿Cuál cree que es el objetivo principal del PDH?

Apoyo del PDH

7. ¿Me puede mencionar algunas actividades que haya realizado su Gobernación de la mano del PDH? ¿Cuáles resaltan o han sido más relevantes? ¿Por qué?
 - ¿Cómo decidieron enfocarse en estas actividades? ¿Cuál fue el proceso?
 - ¿Estas actividades fueron diseñadas y concretadas de manera conjunta?
8. ¿Han implementado las iniciativas o actividades creadas por el PDH en otros municipios por su cuenta?
9. ¿Usted cree que el apoyo del PDH se alinea con las necesidades de este departamento?
10. ¿Que beneficios ha sacado la Gobernación del apoyo del PDH?
 - ¿Considera que el apoyo del PDH ha contribuido a visibilizar la situación de derechos humanos en su departamento? ¿Como? o ¿porque no?
 - ¿Considera que el apoyo del PDH ha contribuido a implementar las políticas nacionales en su departamento? ¿Como? o ¿porque no?
 - ¿Qué otros aspectos debería priorizar o tener en cuenta el PDH para mejorar la situación de DDHH en su departamento? ¿Y para hacer frente a los cambios identificados?

11. Si no hablaron de esto antes: ¿Han recibido asistencia técnica del PDH?
12. ¿Cree que esta asistencia técnica ha fortalecido a su entidad? ¿De qué manera?
 - ¿En qué área de la gestión de la entidad se han mejorado las capacidades como resultado del apoyo del PDH?
 - ¿Qué competencias, capacidades ha ganado gracias al apoyo del PDH?
 - ¿Ha habido algún cambio en sus actividades como producto de esta asistencia técnica?

Conocimiento de DDHH y su aplicación

13. En los últimos dos años, ¿usted ha asistido o ha recibido alguna capacitación sobre temas de DDHH de parte del PDH? ¿De otro programa, entidad u organización?
14. Antes de asistir a esta capacitación, ¿se sentía familiarizado con el tema de derechos humanos?
 - ¿Cómo/dónde/ cuándo aprendió esto?
15. ¿Qué ha aprendido sobre diferentes temas de derechos humanos? ¿Ha ampliado o profundizado sus conocimientos en materia de derechos humanos?
 - ¿Qué temas en particulares fueron los nuevos que aprendió?
 - ¿Recibió algún material de capacitación, como un manual?
16. ¿Cómo aplica estos conocimientos en su trabajo?
 - ¿Podría darme ejemplos concretos de cómo el apoyo del PDH le ha servido en su trabajo?
17. ¿Ha habido algún cambio en sus actividades como producto de las capacitaciones que recibió?
 - ¿Estos conocimientos han aportado a la interacción y el diálogo con la comunidad?
 - ¿Ha incorporado el tema de los derechos humanos en espacios e instrumentos de política pública? Si es así, ¿cuáles son esos instrumentos/ espacios? Si no es así, ¿por qué?
 - ¿El PDH le ha hecho seguimiento después de la capacitación para ver cómo ha aplicado el conocimiento de esta capacitación en su trabajo?
18. ¿Cómo se podría mejorar la capacitación del PDH?
19. ¿Con respecto a las principales afectaciones en este departamento en el tema de derechos humanos, cree que las entidades responsables están cumpliendo su deber?
 - ¿Quiénes son los responsables de que se cumplan/respeten los derechos humanos en su departamento?
 - ¿Qué responsabilidad tiene la Gobernación en materia de garantía y protección de los derechos humanos?
 - ¿Cómo está cumpliendo con esta responsabilidad la Gobernación?
 - ¿Las demás entidades están cumpliendo con sus responsabilidades en su departamento?
 - ¿Ha contribuido el PDH a un mayor acercamiento de su Gobernación con las organizaciones de sociedad civil?

Sostenibilidad

20. ¿Ha habido incremento de recursos (financieros/técnicos/etc.) en su departamento para cubrir las temáticas relacionadas con los derechos humanos?
21. Si el PDH se fuera en un mes, ¿podría cubrir y responder por las actividades que realizan? ¿Qué haría falta para que el departamento pudiera responder a las demandas de la población?
22. Si pudiera cambiar algo sobre el apoyo del PDH para garantizar la sostenibilidad de sus actividades/acciones, ¿qué cambiaría? O qué pudiera hacer el PDH para apoyar su sostenibilidad?

Coordinación

23. ¿Cree que el PDH se articula con otros actores en el territorio? Si es así, ¿me podría describir cómo? Si no es así, ¿por qué cree que pasa esto?
24. ¿Cuál es la diferencia del PDH con otros actores que trabajan en su territorio?

Logros y dificultades

25. Tomando en cuenta el contexto complejo de DDHH, ¿qué logros se han alcanzado en su departamento con el apoyo del programa?
 - ¿Se han cumplido las metas propuestas en relación a los resultados, a la cobertura y los tiempos programados??
26. ¿Qué dificultades se han presentado para la implementación de las actividades previstas?
27. ¿Cuáles son los obstáculos más difíciles de sobrepasar, atender o cambiar dentro de los contextos locales?
28. ¿Qué recomendaciones le haría al Programa para apoyarle a sobrepasar esos obstáculos y tener un mayor impacto en sus objetivos?
29. ¿Qué recomendaciones le haría al Programa para mejorar la implementación de sus estrategias y apoyo?

ALCALDÍAS

Contexto y Relevancia del Programa

1. ¿Cree que han habido cambios en el contexto de derechos humanos en su municipio desde la firma del acuerdo de paz? Si es así, ¿cuáles son esos cambios?
2. En su municipio, ¿cuáles son las principales afectaciones/ violaciones a los derechos humanos que se presentan?
3. ¿Hay alguna(s) población en particular que usted considere esté siendo más afectada?
4. ¿Qué retos ha implicado para su administración estos cambios en el contexto de DDHH?
5. Desde la perspectiva de las competencias de la Alcaldía, ¿han surgido nuevas obligaciones en materia de prevención y protección para la entidad una vez firmado el acuerdo de paz?
6. ¿Cuál cree que es el objetivo principal del PDH?

Apoyo del PDH

7. ¿Me puede mencionar algunas actividades que haya realizado la Alcaldía de la mano del Programa?
¿Cuáles resaltan o han sido más relevantes? ¿Por qué?
 - ¿Cómo decidieron enfocarse en estas actividades? ¿Cuál fue el proceso?
 - ¿Estas actividades fueron diseñadas y concretadas de manera conjunta?
 - ¿Han implementado las iniciativas o actividades creadas por el PDH por su cuenta?
8. ¿Usted cree que el apoyo del PDH se alinea con las necesidades de este municipio?
 - ¿Considera que el apoyo del PDH ha contribuido a visibilizar la situación de derechos humanos en su municipio? ¿Como? o ¿porque no?
 - ¿Considera que el apoyo del PDH ha contribuido a implementar las políticas nacionales en su municipio? ¿Como? o ¿porque no?
 - ¿Qué otros aspectos debería priorizar o tener en cuenta el PDH para mejorar la situación de DDHH en su municipio? ¿Y para hacer frente a los cambios identificados?
9. ¿Qué tipo de asistencia técnica ha recibido del PDH?
10. ¿Cree que esta asistencia técnica ha fortalecido a su entidad? ¿De qué manera?
 - ¿En qué área de la gestión de la entidad se han mejorado las capacidades como resultado del apoyo del PDH?
 - ¿Qué competencias, capacidades ha ganado gracias al apoyo del PDH?
 - ¿Ha habido algún cambio en sus actividades como producto de esta asistencia técnica?

Conocimiento de DDHH y su aplicación

11. En los últimos dos años, ¿usted ha asistido o ha recibido alguna capacitación sobre temas de DDHH de parte del PDH? ¿De otro programa, entidad u organización?

12. Antes de asistir a esta capacitación, ¿se sentía familiarizado con el tema de derechos humanos?
 - ¿Cómo/dónde/ cuándo aprendió esto?
13. ¿Qué ha aprendido sobre diferentes temas de derechos humanos? ¿Ha ampliado o profundizado sus conocimientos en materia de derechos humanos?
 - ¿Qué temas en particulares fueron los nuevos que aprendió?
 - ¿Recibió algún material de capacitación, como un manual?
14. ¿Cómo aplica estos conocimientos en su trabajo? ¿...en la atención a la ciudadanía?
 - ¿Podría darme ejemplos concretos de cómo el apoyo del PDH le ha servido en su trabajo?
15. ¿Ha habido algún cambio en sus actividades como producto de las capacitaciones que recibió?
 - ¿Estos conocimientos han aportado a la interacción y el diálogo con la comunidad?
 - ¿Ha incorporado el tema de los derechos humanos en espacios e instrumentos de política pública? Si es así, ¿cuáles son esos instrumentos/ espacios? Si no es así, ¿por qué?
16. ¿El PDH le ha hecho seguimiento después de la capacitación para ver cómo ha aplicado el conocimiento de esta capacitación en su trabajo?
17. ¿Cómo se podría mejorar la capacitación del PDH?
18. ¿Con respecto a las principales afectaciones en este municipio en el tema de derechos humanos, cree que las entidades responsables están cumpliendo su deber?
 - ¿Quiénes son los responsables de que se cumplan/respeten los DDHH en su municipio?
 - ¿Qué responsabilidad tiene la Alcaldía en materia de garantía y protección de los DDHH?
 - ¿Cómo está cumpliendo con esta responsabilidad la Alcaldía?
 - ¿Las demás entidades están cumpliendo con sus responsabilidades en su municipio?
 - ¿Ha contribuido el PDH a un mayor acercamiento de la Alcaldía con las organizaciones de sociedad civil? ¿...con la Gobernación?

Sostenibilidad

19. ¿Ha habido incremento de recursos (financieros/técnicos/etc.) en su municipio para cubrir las temáticas relacionadas con los derechos humanos?
20. Si el PDH se fuera en un mes, ¿podría cubrir y responder por las actividades que realizan? ¿Qué haría falta para que el municipio pudiera responder a las demandas de la población?
21. Si pudiera cambiar algo sobre el apoyo del PDH para garantizar la sostenibilidad de sus actividades/acciones, ¿qué cambiaría? O qué pudiera hacer el PDH para apoyar su sostenibilidad?

Coordinación

22. ¿Cree que el PDH se articula con otros actores en el territorio? Si es así, ¿me podría describir cómo? Si no es así, ¿por qué cree que pasa esto?
23. ¿Cómo se relaciona la Alcaldía con las organizaciones de sociedad civil y la ciudadanía para mejorar la protección y defensa de DDHH?
24. ¿Cuál es la diferencia del PDH con otros actores que trabajan en su territorio?

Logros y dificultades

25. Tomando en cuenta el contexto complejo de DDHH, ¿qué logros se han alcanzado en su municipio con el apoyo del programa?
 - ¿Se han cumplido las metas propuestas en relación a los resultados, a la cobertura y los tiempos programados?
26. ¿Qué dificultades se han presentado para la implementación de las actividades previstas?
27. ¿Cuáles son los obstáculos más difíciles de sobrepasar, atender o cambiar dentro del contexto local?
28. ¿Qué recomendaciones le haría al Programa para apoyarle a sobrepasar esos obstáculos y tener un mayor impacto en sus objetivos?
29. ¿Qué recomendaciones le haría al PDH para mejorar la implementación de sus estrategias y apoyo?

ORGANIZACIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL

Contexto y Relevancia del Programa

1. ¿Cómo cree que ha cambiado el contexto de derechos humanos desde la firma del acuerdo de paz?
 - ¿Cuáles son los principales factores de cambio en las comunidades donde trabajan?
 - ¿Cuáles son las afectaciones a la población? ¿Y al grupo que sirve?
2. ¿Qué rol cumplen las organizaciones de sociedad civil, como esta, en el contexto de derechos humanos?
 - ¿Qué oportunidades y limitaciones se le presentan para cumplir con esa labor desde la firma del acuerdo de paz?
3. ¿Cuáles son las solicitudes que le hacen las personas o los grupos con los que su organización trabaja? ¿Cómo responde su organización a esas necesidades?
4. ¿Cuál cree que es el objetivo principal del PDH?
5. ¿Usted cree que el apoyo del PDH se alinea con las necesidades de los municipios donde trabaja y las afectaciones a los grupos de las personas que su organización sirve?
6. ¿Qué otros aspectos debería priorizar o tener en cuenta el PDH para mejorar la situación de DDHH en los municipios donde trabaja? ¿Y para hacer frente a los cambios identificados?

Apoyo del PDH

7. ¿Cuál es el proyecto que apoya el PDH?
 - ¿Es un proyecto nuevo o son actividades que ya vienen haciendo desde antes?
 - ¿En cuáles municipios implementa este proyecto?
 - ¿Planea continuar implementando estas actividades en este u otros municipios por su cuenta, después de que termine su donación con el PDH?
8. Aparte de la donación, ¿está recibiendo otro tipo de apoyo del PDH?
 - ¿Asistencia técnica? ¿Capacitación?
9. ¿Me puede describir el proceso para conseguir la donación del PDH?
 - ¿Su organización hizo la propuesta y diseño el Proyecto?
 - ¿Hubo alguna dificultad en la entrega de los recursos financieros, humanos, físicos, y de la información necesaria para comenzar a implementar su proyecto? ¿Cómo lo resolvieron?
 - ¿Hubo algún cambio a la cobertura, actividades, o tiempos propuestos inicialmente? ¿Por qué ocurrieron estos cambios?
10. ¿Qué tipo de contacto mantiene con el PDH desde que le aprobaron la donación?
11. ¿Su organización participa en espacios públicos o interinstitucionales relacionados con los derechos humanos?
 - ¿En cuáles? ¿Cuál ha sido su rol o participación en este espacio?
 - ¿Qué beneficio ha sacado de esta participación? ¿El PDH ha facilitado o apoyado en estos espacios?
12. ¿El PDH le ha ayudado a coordinar con otras organizaciones que están haciendo actividades similares u otras OSC en los municipios donde trabaja?
 - ¿Cree que el PDH coordina con otras OSC y donantes para no duplicar esfuerzos? ¿...para incrementar el impacto de las acciones realizadas?
 - ¿Hay algo que el PDH pudiera hacer mejor para aprovechar lo que otras OSC están haciendo en el ámbito de derechos humanos?

Si recibieron asistencia técnica:

13. ¿Qué tipo de asistencia técnica recibió del PDH?
14. ¿Cree que esta asistencia técnica ha fortalecido a su organización? ¿De qué manera?

- ¿En qué área de la gestión de la organización se han mejorado las capacidades como resultado del apoyo del PDH?
- ¿Qué competencias, capacidades ha ganado gracias al apoyo del PDH?
- ¿El PDH les apoyo en temas administrativos, comunicación, monitoreo/evaluación, presentación de propuestas y consecución de recursos?

Si recibieron capacitación sobre DDHH directamente del PDH:

15. Antes de asistir a esta capacitación, ¿se sentía familiarizado con el tema de derechos humanos?
16. ¿Qué ha aprendido sobre diferentes temas de derechos humanos? ¿Ha ampliado o profundizado sus conocimientos en materia de derechos humanos?
 - ¿Qué temas en particulares fueron los nuevos que aprendió?
 - ¿Recibió algún material de capacitación, como un manual?
17. ¿Cómo aplican estos conocimientos en su trabajo?
 - ¿Podría darme ejemplos concretos de cómo el apoyo del PDH le ha servido en su trabajo?
 - ¿Ha habido algún cambio en su organización o proyecto como producto de las capacitaciones que recibió?
 - ¿El PDH le ha hecho seguimiento después de la capacitación para ver cómo ha aplicado el conocimiento de esta capacitación en su trabajo?
18. ¿Cómo se podría mejorar la capacitación?
19. ¿Qué otro apoyo o capacitación sobre DDHH ha recibido diferente al PDH?
20. ¿Con respecto a las principales afectaciones en este municipio en el tema de derechos humanos, cree que las entidades responsables están cumpliendo su deber?
 - ¿Cómo es su relación con estas autoridades municipales?
 - ¿Ha contribuido el PDH a un mayor acercamiento de estas autoridades municipales con las organizaciones de sociedad civil?

Sostenibilidad

21. Si el PDH se fuera en un mes, ¿su organización pudiera cubrir y responder por las actividades que realizan? ¿Qué haría falta para que pudiera responder a las demandas de la población?
22. Si pudiera cambiar algo sobre el apoyo del PDH para garantizar la sostenibilidad de sus actividades, ¿qué cambiaría? O qué pudiera hacer el PDH para apoyar su sostenibilidad?

Logros y dificultades

23. ¿Qué ha logrado cumplir que no hubiera logrado sin el apoyo del PDH?
24. ¿Se le ha presentado alguna dificultad al tratar de alcanzar o trabajar con [grupos vulnerables]?
25. ¿Cuáles son los obstáculos que ha enfrentado al tratar de abogar por víctimas? ¿Para servir como veedores a las acciones del gobierno? (*preguntar dependiendo de la organización*)
26. ¿Cómo está apoyando el PDH para afrontar/disminuir estos obstáculos?
27. ¿Qué apoyo del PDH les hace falta o ayudaría más para afrontar estos retos/obstáculos y tener un mayor efecto con su trabajo?
28. ¿Qué recomendaciones le haría al PDH para mejorar la implementación de sus estrategias y apoyo?

Group Discussion Guide

GUÍA GRUPOS FOCALES - BENEFICIARIOS

Presentación de la actividad

Mi nombre es _____ y hago parte del Centro Nacional de Consultoría, una empresa privada dedicada a realizar estudios de opinión y sobre políticas públicas. Actualmente nos encontramos realizando un estudio sobre el bienestar y calidad de vida de la población en diferentes zonas del país y sobre cómo está cambiando el contexto de derechos humanos en su municipio/departamento. Ustedes fueron seleccionados para participar en este estudio por su participación en el proyecto [NOMBRE DE LA ACTIVIDAD] de la [NOMBRE DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN].

Esta actividad es una conversación abierta con ustedes. Nos interesan sus opiniones y experiencias. Yo les voy a ir proponiendo una serie de preguntas para que ustedes las comenten, debatan y expresen sus ideas. Lo que se diga en esta mañana/tarde va a ser confidencial y solo será usado en el contexto de este estudio. Sus datos y opiniones son confidenciales y solamente van a ser usados para efectos de este estudio.

En este ejercicio no hay respuestas buenas o malas: lo importante son las opiniones e ideas que ustedes tienen sobre los temas que les proponemos. Con fines del registro y posterior análisis de la información les pedimos permiso para grabar esta sesión.

¿Tienen alguna pregunta antes de comenzar?

Presentación de los participantes

Inicialmente le voy a pedir el favor a cada participante que se presente y nos diga su nombre, dónde vive y cuánto tiempo tiene viviendo en su comunidad.

- Ahora, para irnos conociendo un poco mejor, ¿por qué no me cuentan qué es lo que más les gusta y lo que menos les gusta de vivir en este municipio?

Situaciones

Ahora les voy a presentar una situación o historia y luego les voy a formular preguntas para que me digan que piensan sobre esta historia.

FACILITADOR: Escoja 2 situaciones dependiendo de la zona, la población con la que desarrolle la actividad y el tiempo. Verifique que los nombres de las historias no coincidan con los de ningún participante, de ser así cambie los nombres de la situación hipotética.

Situación 1

Juan vive en la vereda Candelaria del municipio de Simajuga. El vecino de Juan es un importante comerciante de la región y amigo de gente poderosa. El vecino lleva meses insistiéndole a Juan que le deje abrir una trocha por la finca para sacar material del río. Juan se ha negado porque la trocha que quiere abrir el vecino pasa por la mitad de sus cultivos de café. El vecino se ha puesto agresivo y le envenenó a algunos animales como amenaza.

- ¿Si usted fuera Juan, que haría frente a esta situación?
- ¿A quién/quienes pudiera acudir para solucionar esa situación?
- ¿Con que mecanismos cuenta para enfrentar esa situación?
- ¿Qué creen que pasará si usted hace x o x? Dependiendo de lo que opinen que debería hacer
- ¿Qué creen que haría su comunidad como reacción a esta situación?
- ¿Qué autoridad debería implicarse en esta situación? ¿Qué debería hacer?
- ¿Cuál cree que sería la reacción de las autoridades locales (alcaldía, gobernación, personería, defensoría, policía)?

- Si esto estuviera pasando con un vecino suyo, alguien de aquí de este municipio, ¿qué haría?

Incremento 1. Un día el vecino llegó con un grupo de hombres y mujeres armados y con maquinaria (bulldozer) para empezar la obra por la finca de Juan. Le tumbaron la reja y parte de la matas de café.

- ¿Si usted fuera Juan, que haría ahora?
- ¿A quién/quienes pudiera acudir para solucionar esa situación?
- ¿Cuál cree que sería la reacción de las autoridades locales (alcaldía, gobernación, personería, defensoría, policía)?
- ¿Qué tan frecuentes ocurren situaciones como esta en su municipio?

Situación 2

María vive en la vereda Candelaria del municipio de Simajuga, ella quiere participar en las actividades de la JAC y ha empezado a asistir a las últimas reuniones porque le interesa que cuando hagan las gestiones para el acueducto, este pase por su finca porque actualmente no tiene acceso al agua.

María es madre cabeza de familia y cuando asiste a las reuniones tiene que ir con sus hijos. Por esa razón, la han sacado de dos reuniones. Las personas de la JAC, mayoritariamente compuesta por hombres, le han dicho que deje de molestar, y que mejor regrese a la casa a cuidar a los niños y hacer oficio.

- ¿Qué opinan sobre esta situación?
- Si fueran María, ¿qué harían frente a esta situación?
- ¿A quién/quienes pudiera acudir para solucionar esa situación?
- ¿Con qué mecanismos cuenta María para enfrentar esa situación?
- ¿Qué tan frecuentes ocurren situaciones como esta en su municipio?

Situación 3

Fernando vive en el barrio Santo Domingo de Simajuga. Fernando ha sido acusado falsamente de cometer un robo en su población, bajo el argumento de que él se asemeja al perfil del ladrón según los testigos del hecho.

Fernando es detenido en la tarde, tipo 4 pm y llevado a la estación de policía. Queda bajo arresto durante la noche.

Imagínense que ustedes son familiares cercanos de Fernando y que un vecino ve la detención de Fernando y los llaman diciéndoles que Fernando está detenido, pero que él no ha hecho nada y a ustedes no les queda ninguna duda que es inocente.

- ¿Qué harían en este momento? ¿Y qué esperan de esta acción?
- ¿Qué creen que va a pasar con Fernando?
- ¿A quién/quienes pudieran acudir para solucionar esa situación?

Incremento: Al día siguiente, Fernando es liberado porque no hay pruebas concluyentes en su contra. En ese momento, te cuenta que durante su detención en la estación de policía fue golpeado, y ves que tiene un moretón/morado.

- ¿Qué harían en esta situación? ¿Y qué esperan de esta acción?
- ¿Qué creen que pasará si usted hace x o x? *Dependiendo de lo que opinen que debería hacer*
- ¿A quién/quienes pudieran acudir para solucionar esa situación?
- ¿Con que mecanismos cuenta Fernando para enfrentar esa situación?
- ¿Qué tan frecuentemente ocurren estas situaciones en su municipio?

Situación 4

Manuel, un líder cansado de la ineficiencia de los gobernantes de las pasadas administraciones de su municipio, decide lanzarse al concejo municipal con el apoyo de la gente de su comunidad, que le ha pedido que los represente por su buena gestión. Parte de sus propuestas han tocado las fibras de quienes se han amañado en la administración. Manuel ha notado que siempre hay dos personas vigilándolo en todo momento.

- Si usted fuera Manuel, ¿qué haría frente a esta situación?
- ¿A quién/quienes pudiera acudir para solucionar esa situación?
- ¿Con que mecanismos cuenta para enfrentar esa situación?
- ¿Qué creen que pasará si usted hace x o x? *Dependiendo de lo que opinen que debería hacer*
- Si esto estuviera pasando con un vecino suyo, alguien de aquí de este municipio, ¿qué haría?

Incremento: Manuel llega a la casa y le dicen que retire su candidatura o si no habrá consecuencias para él y su familia. – Atentado?

- ¿Ahora, qué harían en esta situación? ¿Y qué esperan de esta acción?
- ¿A quién/quienes pudieran acudir para solucionar esa situación?
- ¿Con que mecanismos cuenta Manuel para enfrentar esa situación?
- ¿Qué creen que pasará si usted hace x o x? *Dependiendo de lo que opinen que debería hacer*
- ¿Qué autoridad debería implicarse en esta situación? ¿Qué debería hacer?
- ¿Cuál cree que sería la reacción de las autoridades locales (alcaldía, gobernación, personería, defensoría, policía)?
- ¿Qué tan frecuentes ocurren estas situaciones en su municipio?

Situación 5

Pedro y José viven en el barrio Providencia del municipio de Simajuga, viven juntos hace 2 años pero han sido pareja hace 5. En el pueblo abrieron una nueva cafetería y ellos deciden ir a conocerla. Ellos entran cogidos de la mano y antes de que se puedan sentar y ordenar, los meseros de la cafetería les dicen que no los pueden atender y que por favor se retiren del establecimiento.

- ¿Qué opinan sobre esta situación?
- ¿Si ustedes estuvieran sentados en la cafetería y ven lo que ocurre, que harían?
- ¿Qué creen que debería hacer la pareja frente a esta situación?
- ¿Qué creen que pasará si ellos hacen x o x? *Dependiendo de lo que opinen que debería hacer*
- ¿A quién/quienes pudieran acudir para solucionar esa situación?
- ¿Con que mecanismos cuenta la pareja para enfrentar esa situación?
- ¿Qué tan frecuentes son estas situaciones en su municipio?

Derechos humanos y justicia

1. Después de todo esto que hemos venido hablando, ¿qué son para ustedes los Derechos Humanos?
2. ¿Qué pasó frente a los derechos humanos en las situaciones vistas antes?
3. ¿Qué han aprendido sobre los derechos humanos que les sirve en sus actividades o vida diaria?
4. ¿Ustedes le han enseñado a alguien sobre estos temas que han aprendido? ¿A quiénes? (familiares, amigos, compañeros en la escuela, vecinos) ¿Cómo reaccionaron esas personas?
5. ¿Qué hacen ustedes diferente frente a situaciones como las que vimos antes, que antes no hacían? ¿En los últimos años han cambiado la forma como actúan frente a cosas como esas?

6. ¿Qué tipos de situaciones ven en su comunidad que son violaciones a los derechos humanos?
7. ¿Cuáles son los temas/ aspectos más difíciles en la protección de los derechos humanos en su municipio?

Institucionalidad

8. ¿Cuáles instituciones son las que más les ayudan en sus necesidades de acceso a la justicia y a hacer valer sus derechos? *Identificar las instituciones estatales de las se hace uso. Tener en cuenta personerías, jueces, abogados, policía, FFAA., ONGs, cooperación internacional, etc.*
9. ¿Creen que las organizaciones sociales, políticas o culturales son importantes para defender y proteger los derechos humanos? ¿Por qué creen que eso pasa?
10. En qué casos se acude a la policía, defensoría, ejército, ... ¿creen que en este municipio cumple con las funciones que ustedes esperan de esa institución?

Participación en las actividades

11. ¿Qué actividades ha desarrollado [la organización] en su municipio?
12. ¿Cómo se enteraron de ese programa? ¿Qué los/las motivo a participar?
13. ¿Qué expectativas tienen o tenían cuando empezaron a asistir a las actividades desarrolladas por [esta organización]? ¿Qué tanto se cumplieron estas expectativas?
14. ¿Después de haber participado en esta actividad, que cambios han habido en su vida? ¿Cuál(es) han sido su principal logro(s)? ¿Qué efectos ha tenido esta actividad en su vida?
15. ¿Cómo sienten que pueden aportar a mejorar la situación de derechos humanos en su comunidad/ organización?
16. ¿Se le han presentado dificultades después de participar en las actividades de [la organización]?
17. ¿Qué otras organizaciones o entidades los ha apoyado con estos cambios/logros?

Entendiendo la situación

Si queda tiempo y si estos temas surgieron durante la discusión se pueden plantear estas preguntas. Evalúe si para el ambiente y la población con la que está reunida es pertinente hacerla.

18. Después de todo lo que hemos hablado con respecto a los derechos humanos, las instituciones, la [organización] y demás, ¿cómo explican ustedes que sigan habiendo violaciones a los derechos humanos? ¿Cómo puede explicar uno que a pesar de que haya tantos esfuerzos de parte de líderes, grupos organizaciones, programas y algunas autoridades todavía haya personas amenazadas, asesinadas, violentadas?

Recomendaciones

19. De todo lo que hemos venido hablando ¿Qué creen que el Estado puede hacer para mejorar la situación del municipio? *Tener en cuenta: derechos humanos, seguridad, justicia.*
20. ¿Qué recomendaciones haría a [la organización] para mejorar la actividad y el apoyo que le dan a la comunidad?
21. ¿Qué otras estrategias o actividades serían pertinentes para hacer frente los problemas de derechos humanos en este municipio?

ANNEX F: CONTEXT ANALYSIS

Contexto de los Derechos Humanos en Colombia tras la firma del Acuerdo de Paz

Elaborado por: María Angélica Alvarado y Natalia Estupiñán (9 febrero 2018)

El 24 de noviembre de 2016 el gobierno de Colombia y la guerrilla de las FARC – EP firmaron el *Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera*. Su ratificación marcó oficialmente el **fin del conflicto** armado entre las dos partes.

El presente documento sintetiza los principales aspectos en materia de derechos civiles y políticos en Colombia. Para este análisis se tuvo como referente inicial tanto la línea base³², como la revisión estratégica desarrollada por el Programa de Derechos Humanos³³. Asimismo, se consultaron diversas fuentes secundarias, y se constataron los factores aquí incluidos en la aplicación de los instrumentos desarrollados por el equipo tanto a nivel nacional como territorial.

I. Aspectos generales

I.1 Reacomodamiento de actores armados: disidencias de las FARC, ELN, Grupos Armados Organizados y Grupos Delincuenciales Organizados

El país se encuentra en una fase de transición caracterizada por la continuidad del crimen organizado, de algunos grupos guerrilleros y de otro tipo de expresiones armadas que se han hecho más visibles o que están en proceso de formación (FIP, 2017. p.8).

Por un lado, se encuentran las disidencias de las FARC que, según la Fiscalía General de la Nación, se han ubicado en 48 municipios del país. Si bien numéricamente no pareciesen tener mayor impacto (500 personas aproximadamente) en alguna subregiones ya han demostrado que tienen capacidad de afectar a la población de manera significativa. Los departamentos donde se concentran las acciones de las disidencias son **Meta, Caquetá**, Guaviare, Amazonas y el municipio de **Tumaco** (El Tiempo, 2017). Desde esas zonas se estaría intentando controlar las 7.102 hectáreas de hoja de coca que, según el Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos (Simci), hay en esas regiones (El Tiempo, 2017).

En Tumaco por ejemplo, una de las zonas con mayor presencia de disidencias, hay al menos 11 grupos que vienen afectando la seguridad ciudadana. Asimismo, en dicho municipio el grupo de disidentes se ha venido fragmentando, disputándose el control territorial tanto en el casco urbano como en la zona rural.

Una de las razones principales que explican las disidencias es el lento avance que se ha tenido para lograr la reincorporación económica de los desmovilizados. A falta de respuesta oportuna institucional, las desertiones comenzaron a aumentar desde mediados del año 2017.

Por otro lado, el contexto actual en Colombia se caracteriza por la presencia de los Grupos Armados

³² El Programa desarrolló a través de la FIP, una línea base que identifica los principales aspectos en materia de derechos humanos por cada uno de los departamentos.

³³ El Programa actualizó la información de la línea base a finales del 2017, y clasificó los departamentos en tres categorías de contexto según el accionar de los grupos armados.

Organizados (GAO) y los Grupos Delincuenciales Organizados (GDO).³⁴ De acuerdo con las Directivas 015 y 016 del Ministerio de Defensa, los primeros cuentan con estructuras organizadas y centralizadas, mandos responsables y control territorial, mientras que los segundos, son grupos de menor envergadura que operan como subcontratistas de organizaciones mayores, pero que igual generan un alto impacto en la población.

El accionar de estos grupos en diferentes regiones del país, más allá de enfrentamientos entre sí y con la fuerza pública, incluye amenazas, extorsiones, asesinatos selectivos, imposición de normas de conducta, intimidación por medio de panfletos, capacidad de generar impacto humanitario (desplazamiento y confinamiento de poblaciones), violencia sexual y reclutamiento de niños, niñas y adolescentes (entrevistas equipo evaluación, 2018).

En tercer lugar, está el ELN que se ha fortalecido en sus zonas de presencia histórica como el Catatumbo, sur y centro de Cauca, Nariño, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño y está llegando a zonas donde no tenía presencia como el Vichada y a otras que antes controlaban las FARC (FIP, 2017).

Es preciso anotar que no se puede hablar de una presencia homogénea en el territorio de estos grupos, situación que ha sido comprobada a través de la consulta de fuentes primarias y secundarias y que se detallarán más adelante en el análisis en los contextos regionales.

1.2 Cultivos ilícitos y economías ilegales

Las economías ilegales están teniendo procesos de reacomodamiento y expansión con nuevos acuerdos entre las guerrillas y las organizaciones criminales. Los cultivos de coca se han incrementado, la minería ilegal se ha expandido y otras economías ilegales como el tráfico de madera y la extorsión aparecen como prácticas recurrentes (Garzón, Llorente, Álvarez y Preciado, 2016).

En este escenario, se resalta las dificultades que se han tenido en materia de sustitución de cultivos ilícitos. Las zonas priorizadas están caracterizadas por el choque continuo entre la erradicación forzada y la sustitución voluntaria; por el lento avance en la generación de condiciones que permitan el tránsito a la legalidad de las familias dependientes de los cultivos de coca y por la incertidumbre legal para las familias cultivadoras (FIP, 2018).

Se ha identificado además que aquellas familias que han firmado acuerdos con el gobierno en el marco del Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito (PNIS) han sido víctimas de represalias. De hecho, a diferencia de la tendencia a nivel nacional, la tasa de homicidios aumentó 11% en aquellos municipios con presencia de cultivos de coca y 33% en aquellos donde la sustitución comenzó (ibíd.).

El deterioro de la seguridad no solo se ha expresado en el alza en los niveles de homicidio sino en amenazas y ataques directos al proceso de sustitución. La incidencia violenta por parte de los actores criminales ha ido más allá de hechos aislados, con ataques y amenazas en distintos territorios. Esto ha sido recurrente en la costa pacífica de Nariño y en el bajo Cauca Antioqueño.

Finalmente, el proceso de sustitución ha conllevado a un incremento de la protesta social, con comunidades que impiden el ingreso de la Fuerza Pública, argumentando el incumplimiento de lo pactado

³⁴ En la categoría de GAO se reconocen al Clan del Golfo, Los Puntilleros, el EPL, el Bloque Meta y el Bloque Libertadores del Vichada. Dentro de los GDO más conocidos están Los Rastrojos, La Cordillera, la Construy y La Empresa.

y en varias zonas del país se ha informado sobre la instalación de nuevas minas antipersona por parte de diferentes grupos armados, lo que afecta a las familias que tienen la voluntad de sustituir los cultivos ilícitos. Hasta agosto de 2017 se registraron 25 víctimas en operaciones de erradicación manual, superando los niveles presentados desde 2014 (FIP, 2018, p. 17).

I.3 Contexto electoral

El actual escenario electoral está incidiendo en la efectiva protección y garantía de los derechos humanos. Hay varios factores y riesgos en el marco del conflicto que puedan constituir violaciones al derecho de participar en la conformación, ejercicio y control del poder político (Defensoría, 2018).

De acuerdo con el Sistema de Alertas Tempranas, para las próximas elecciones, se han identificado 287 municipios de 29 departamentos con riesgo electoral por incidencia de grupos armados ilegales, que corresponden al 25% de los municipios del país.

De estos, 87 han sido calificados en riesgo extremo, 91 en riesgo Alto, y 109 en riesgo Medio. Al clasificar los departamentos según la cantidad de municipios que registran nivel de riesgo extremo, el más afectado es el departamento de Antioquia con veinte (20) municipios. Le siguen los departamentos de Bolívar con 13, Chocó con 12, Nariño con 10, Norte de Santander con 8, Cauca con 7, Arauca con 5, Guaviare con 4, Caquetá con 3, Meta con 2, y finalmente Casanare, Putumayo y Risaralda con 1 municipio en riesgo extremo, cada uno.

Como se muestra en la tabla a continuación, de los municipios focalizados por el PHD, 18 registran nivel de riesgo extremo (rojo), 9 riesgo alto (amarillo) y dos riesgo medio (verde).

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO
ANTIOQUIA	El Bagre
	Ituango
	Tarazá
	Valdivia
	Anorí
	Briceño
	Cáceres
	Nechí
	Zaragoza
	Caucasia
	Remedios
	Segovia
	CÓRDOBA
Montelíbano	
Puerto Libertador	
TOLIMA	Ataco
	Chaparral
	Cajamarca
	Ortega
	Planadas

DEPARTAMENTO	MUNICIPIO
	Rioblanco
CAUCA	Corinto
	Santander de Quilichao
	Caloto
	Buenos Aires
	Caldono
	Miranda
NARIÑO	Tumaco
	Barbacoas
	Francisco Pizarro
META	Mesetas
	Uribe
	La Macarena
	El Castillo
	Puerto Rico
	Vistahermosa
CAQUETÁ	Cartagena del Chaira
	San Vicente del Caguan
	Valparaíso
	La Montañita

Fuente: elaboración propia

Algunos factores que caracterizan el contexto en dichos municipios son la estigmatización hacia los pobladores y organizaciones sociales de los territorios donde tenía presencia las FARC EP; la persistencia de la violencia política hacia líderes y defensores de derechos humanos; y el reacomodamiento de grupos armados ilegales y economías criminales en estos territorios (Defensoría, 2018, p. 2).

2. Principales afectaciones

2.1 Desplazamiento forzado:

En materia de desplazamiento forzado, el Registro Único de la Unidad de Víctimas muestra que 54.684 personas fueron desplazadas en el 2017. Los departamentos más afectados fueron el Chocó (9.684 víctimas), seguido por Nariño (7.776) y Antioquia (6.982) (Registro Único de Víctimas, febrero 2018.)

En relación con el 2016 hay una disminución de un 41%, sin embargo, se dio un incremento en los casos de desplazamientos masivos. Según cifras de OCHA, hasta octubre de 2017 unas 13.096 personas habían sido afectadas por desplazamientos masivos, un 32 % más que en el 2016 (Humanitarian Needs Overview, 2018). Los municipios afectados por desplazamientos crecieron en un 40% al pasar de 20 a 28 en el último año según el ACNUR. El 68% está en la región Pacífica, lo que significa que la población más afectada es la afrocolombiana y la indígena.

Según monitoreo de OCHA, el 31 % de los desplazamientos tienen participación de grupos armados desconocidos tanto en acciones unilaterales como en enfrentamientos. Los departamentos de Valle del

Cauca, Antioquia, Chocó, Nariño, Cauca y Norte de Santander concentraron el 61% de la población desplazada, evidenciándose un impacto en las comunidades indígenas (6%) y afrocolombianas (17%) (Ibíd. p.10). Todos estos territorios cuentan con presencia de economías ilegales, como la coca y la minería.

2.2 Uso y utilización de niños, niñas y adolescentes

En materia de reclutamiento de niños y niñas, la Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Colombia, afirma que existen constantes denuncias acerca del reclutamiento de menores por parte de GAI, especialmente de comunidades indígenas en los departamentos de Caquetá, Cauca y Chocó. (Informe del Secretario General sobre la Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Colombia, diciembre 2017. p. 17)

Asimismo, se ha observado la utilización y uso de niños, niñas y adolescentes para actividades como el cuidado de cultivos, transporte de mercancías, otorgación de información, cobro de vacunas y extorsiones. Esto se da a cambio de dinero, promesas en materia de poder y control territorial, drogas y tecnologías (OIM, 2017). Se destaca el caso del Clan del Golfo, grupo que logra mantenerse a causa del reclutamiento de jóvenes de manera permanente, a pesar de las capturas que se han dado a algunos de sus miembros más importante (FIP, 2017. p.41).

3. Las regiones y las afectaciones a los derechos humanos

Las dinámicas que afectan la efectiva garantía y protección de los derechos humanos en Colombia, varían dependiendo de las regiones y subregiones donde se presenten. Tal como lo indica la FIP la violencia no se ha desarrollado de manera homogénea: la intensidad, los protagonistas, la duración, los motivos, las expresiones han variado en niveles locales y regionales, y han adquirido dinámicas propias, incluso autónomas de lo que sucede a nivel nacional.

Por esta razón, si bien el contexto presenta algunas temáticas generales que son necesarias tenerlas en cuenta para efectos de la evaluación, se enfoca sobre todo en aspectos específicos que varían según la región de análisis. Así, para cada región se incluyen las características más relevantes que se deberán tener en cuenta en el marco de la evaluación al Programa de Derechos Humanos.

Factores relevantes por cada región

3.1 Zonas antigua hegemonía Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.

Departamentos priorizados: Meta, Caquetá y Tolima.

- Reducción de las confrontaciones armadas en el marco del conflicto armado interno. Esto a su vez ha incidido en los descensos presentados en el número de muertes en combate. De acuerdo con la FIP, durante el 2015 y el 2016 el cese al fuego y el proceso con las FARC influyeron en el descenso de las tasas de homicidio en algunos departamentos (Putumayo, Caquetá y Meta y el noreste de Antioquia). No obstante, si se comparan las cifras del primer semestre de 2016, en La Montañita (Caquetá) y la Macarena (Meta), el número de muertes violentas en ese mismo periodo del 2017 subió (FIP).
- Nuevas dinámicas de conflictos sociales a raíz de la salida de las FARC como actor regulador de conflictos.

- Normalmente son zonas de coexistencia donde las estructuras de crimen organizado han creado alianzas y pactos con los grupos armados para evitar la confrontación, dividirse el territorio y administrar de manera más efectiva las rentas provenientes de las economías ilegales. En Meta por ejemplo, coexisten las AGC, el Bloque Meta y el Bloque libertadores del Vichada.

3.2 Zonas en disputa con presencia histórica de la Guerrilla.

Departamentos priorizados: Cauca y Nariño, Córdoba y Antioquia

- Las dinámicas del conflicto armado, aunque han disminuido, siguen siendo una constante y en esa medida, las violaciones a los derechos humanos siguen ligadas de manera importante a las confrontaciones armadas.
- Incremento en la tasa de homicidios (especialmente Tumaco) y como resultado de la reestructuración de los actores ilegales en la cadena del narcotráfico. En todas las zonas existe una alta influencia de organizaciones armadas al margen de la ley (ELN y EPL), facciones criminales de distinto tipo y economías ilegales.
- En particular, en Antioquia, no solo hay presencia del Clan del Golfo, sino la intención del ELN de ocupar territorios dejados por las FARC.
- Asesinatos y amenazas de tipo selectivo como forma de intimidación ocurren en zonas de alta conflictividad por la consolidación de territorialidades y de pactos, tanto a nivel urbano como rural. En la ruralidad impacta gravemente zonas de poblaciones indígenas, afro descendientes y de economía campesina.
- Nuevas temáticas en torno a los conflictos sociales, que obedecen fundamentalmente a: (a) tensiones entre campesinos y colectivos étnicos por el acceso a tierras; especialmente en zonas donde se han establecido las ZVTN y PTN al interior de territorios colectivos étnicos, o en territorios ancestrales en proceso de saneamiento o ampliación, caso Tumaco (Nariño) y Tierralta (Córdoba). (b) Tensiones entre comunidades y nuevos actores armados por el control sobre la actividad minera, como se evidencia en los consejos comunitarios ubicados en el pacífico colombiano. (c) Tensiones al interior de comunidades generadas por la política de erradicación forzada (Tumaco). (d) Tensiones alrededor de los intereses económicos y políticos en los diálogos locales para aterrizar los acuerdos de paz. (e) Tensiones entre nuevas organizaciones y nuevos liderazgos con organizaciones tradicionales históricas en las zonas; (f) organizaciones más grandes que buscan imponerse frente a las más pequeñas de arraigo local. (Vigésimo Tercer Informe del Secretario General al Consejo Permanente sobre la Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia de la MAPP/OEA).
- Disputas y alianzas por el control territorial por parte de los grupos armados ilegales con el objetivo de asegurar las áreas estratégicas y de implementación de economías ilegales: (a) narcotráfico (control de zonas de cultivo de uso ilícito, puntos estratégicos y corredores o rutas para el tráfico de drogas, tráfico de insumos para el procesamiento; propiedad sobre los laboratorios, e inversión en infraestructura). (b) Minería (control de zonas mineras, explotación y comercialización). (c) Tráfico de madera. (d) Servicios de seguridad privada. (e) Lavado de activos. (f) Extorsión. (g) Contrabando. (h) Micro tráfico / narcomenudeo.
- Riqueza aurífera que se constituye en una posibilidad financiera mucho más rentable que la hoja de coca. La disputa en Antioquia radica principalmente en las extorsiones a los mineros por el derecho a trabajar y a usar la maquinaria (FIP, 2017. p.54)

- Alto ejercicio de control social a través de métodos violentos, coercitivos, vulnerando especialmente derechos asociados a las libertades. El control social evita la configuración de procesos sociales que puedan jugar un papel alternativo en el escenario de posconflicto.
- Vinculación de jóvenes bajo incentivos económicos.
- Alta dosis violencia contra las mujeres, a partir de actos de violencia sexual y explotación sexual de menores.

4. Grupos poblaciones de interés

4.1 Defensores de derechos humanos y líderes sociales.

Una de las grandes preocupaciones en las diferentes regiones del país es las agresiones a líderes sociales y defensores de derechos humanos. Estas agresiones sin embargo, deben ser leídas según el contexto y el tipo de reivindicaciones que moviliza cada líder. De acuerdo con la FIP, las amenazas y agresiones son producto de un ejercicio de coerción a favor de intereses concretos, anclados en poderes locales de diversa índole que ven en estos líderes una amenaza a sus agendas (FIP, 2017).

Esta visión coincide con la hipótesis presentada por la organización Somos Defensores, quienes indican que los activistas se han convertido en una “*pedra en el zapato* para los poderes reales que actúan en los distintos territorios del país. Es decir, para quienes tienen las armas, controlan las economías ilegales, ejercer el poder político de manera corrupta, continúan con la tenencia de la tierra a gran escala o estén detrás de grandes intereses económicos en las regiones” (Somos Defensores, 2018, p. 6).

La presión sobre las comunidades y los líderes sociales y comunitarios, fundamentalmente en las zonas rurales, se ha afianzado durante los tres últimos años como una estrategia por parte de los GAI, para garantizar el control de las rentas legales e ilegales que se desarrollan en determinadas zonas y para evitar la consolidación de procesos sociales que puedan jugar un papel alternativo en el escenario de construcción de la paz. A esto se suma la estigmatización política y la persecución a la que son sometidos por ser considerados colaboradores de la guerrilla.

La distribución geográfica de las violaciones al derecho a la vida de líderes sociales se centró en ciertas zonas del país con una o varias de las siguientes características: (i) presencia de GAI; (ii) alta militarización; (iii) fuertes procesos de organización social; (iv) presencia de cultivos de uso ilícito o de rutas del narcotráfico; (v) existencia de actividades extractivas legales e ilegales, particularmente minería; (vi) presencia en o cercanía a ZVTN o puntos Transitorios de Normalización y (vii) priorizadas para la adopción de los Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial.

La Organización No Gubernamental Somos Defensores denunció 90 asesinatos de dirigentes sociales y defensores de derechos humanos (77 hombre y 13 mujeres) en el período comprendido entre enero y finales de noviembre de 2017, frente a 68 en ese mismo período de 2016, lo que significa un aumento del 32%.

Por su parte la Defensoría del Pueblo afirma que la mayor parte de los homicidios contra los líderes sociales, comunitarios y defensores(as) de derechos humanos durante el 2016 y el 2017, se concentró en 98 municipios de 14 departamentos del país y por lo menos el 69% de las víctimas desarrollaban su labor

de organización comunitaria e impulso de acciones de reivindicación de derechos en zonas rurales. (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2017)

Lo anterior se constata en Informe Anual del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos en Colombia 2016, en el cual se afirma que 43 (73%) de los casos de asesinatos verificados, **las víctimas desarrollaban su labor en zonas rurales**. El Informe afirma que esta situación está relacionada “con los vacíos de poder que han dejado las FARC EP; la escasa o débil presencia del Estado; la percepción de los actores criminales que los defensores de derechos humanos afectan sus intereses; la persistente estigmatización de los defensores de derechos humanos; el uso de la violencia para resolver disputas en las comunidades; la competencia entre grupos criminales por el control de actividades económicas ilegales; y el limitado acceso a los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales”. (Informe Anual del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos en Colombia, 2016)

Distintas fuentes coinciden en afirmar que durante el 2016 y el 2017 Cauca fue el departamento con mayor número de asesinatos de líderes sociales, seguido por Antioquia, Valle y Nariño. Los municipios más afectados fueron Tumaco (Nariño), El Bagre (Antioquia), Corinto, Caloto, El Tambo (Cauca) y Buenaventura (Valle). Se resalta que en lo que va del 2018, la situación de orden público se ha deteriorado significativamente en el Bajo Cauca antioqueño (Cáceres y Tarazá) y en el Norte de Antioquia (Ituango y Valdivia).

Dentro de los perfiles de población, los estudios han determinado que los líderes con más casos de homicidios corresponden a defensores relacionados con la tierra y el territorio con enfoques étnicos y poblacionales como campesinos, indígenas, afrodescendientes, y Juntas de Acción comunal de zonas rurales (Somos Defensores, 2018, p. 10).

Según el Observatorio de Tierras, desde el punto de vista de las organizaciones, las más afectadas son las Juntas de Acción Comunal, seguidas por las asociaciones indígenas, las organizaciones campesinas no relacionadas con la restitución y las organizaciones de restitución. Esta misma fuente afirma que las organizaciones más afectadas son del ámbito municipal con el 77% de los casos, seguidas por las departamentales con 16% de los eventos y en menor medida las nacionales con 7% de las afectaciones. Esto significa que las organizaciones de base son las más fuertemente atacadas (Observatorio de Tierras, 2017)

En materia de impunidad, los niveles continúan siendo alarmantes. La Fiscalía General de la Nación manifestó que había obtenido condenas en 5 de más de 80 asesinatos documentados por OACNUDH desde enero de 2016. A su vez, y de acuerdo con un estudio del Programa Somos Defensores, de los asesinatos de líderes sociales documentados entre 2009 y 2016, el 87% de los casos no se han investigado ni sancionado a los responsables.

4.2 Mujeres – Violencia sexual

En Colombia, la violencia sexual se ha inscrito en las lógicas del conflicto armado, y ha operado como una violencia comunicativa que le envía a la población y a la víctima un mensaje sobre quién manda en un territorio (Centro de Memoria Histórica, 2017, p. 23)

Si bien todos los actores armados han hecho uso de la violencia sexual, no todos lo han hecho de la misma forma, o en la misma magnitud. Como lo indica el Centro de Memoria Histórica, “el escenario está determinado por la relación que cada grupo armado establece con la población civil en un contexto geográfico e histórico particular y en una dinámica específica y que se define, principalmente, por la experiencia vivida de las víctimas en dichos contextos ” (CNMH, 2017, p. 51).

No existen en Colombia, datos robustos sobre las magnitudes de la violencia sexual en el marco del conflicto armado lo que contribuye a reforzar la impunidad frente a esta modalidad de violencia y a obstaculizar las demandas de justicia. Pese a esto, se ha identificado cómo los diferentes actores armados continúan haciendo uso de la violencia de género y sexual como parte de sus estrategias. De hecho, el 60,6% de los municipios PDET han mantenido tasas altas y muy altas de violencia sexual. En 2017 la Defensoría del Pueblo registró 61 alertas tempranas de violencia sexual por parte de actores armados en dichos municipios (Dejusticia, 2017, p.31)

Por su parte, la Encuesta de Prevalencia de Violencia Sexual en contra de las mujeres en el contexto del conflicto armado colombiano 2010-2015, publicada en agosto de 2017, da cuenta de algunas de las modalidades de violencia sexual en el país y de las intersecciones entre un contexto armado y uno de violencia cotidiana. La encuesta concluyó que la percepción generalizada de las mujeres es que la violencia sexual en el espacio público se incrementa con la presencia de actores armados. Sin embargo, la violencia sexual no se limita a la presencia de actores armados, sino que la violencia en el espacio privado, perpetrada por familiares, es una constante.

5. El contenido de los acuerdos y la nueva institucionalidad para el posconflicto

5.1 Garantías a la participación política

El punto 2 del Acuerdo- Participación política- busca fortalecer la participación de todos los colombianos en la política, los asuntos públicos y la construcción de la paz, y la ampliación de la democracia como camino para tramitar los conflictos de manera pacífica y el rompimiento definitivo del vínculo entre política y armas.

Mejorar el entendimiento en materia de derechos humanos, y empoderar a la población para que abogue por la efectiva protección y garantía de sus derechos es uno de las herramientas que facilitan dicha participación.

El acuerdo reconoce que el ejercicio de la política no se limita exclusivamente a la participación en el sistema político y electoral, sino que se requiere del reconocimiento tanto de la oposición que ejercen los partidos y movimientos políticos, como de las formas de acción de las organizaciones y los movimientos sociales y populares que pueden llegar a ejercer formas de oposición a políticas del Gobierno Nacional y de las autoridades departamentales y municipales.

5.2 Garantías a la seguridad

Uno de los aspectos más relevantes a tener en cuenta es la protección de los derechos de las personas que están en el proceso de reintegración y que hacen parte del partido político Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC). El gobierno está en proceso de conformar el Sistema Integral de Seguridad, que tiene como fin la protección de quien ejercen política, por medio del fortalecimiento de las capacidades institucionales para combatir la impunidad, lo que se ajusta al componente 3 del Programa.

Es importante mencionar que las garantías no son exclusivas para quienes dejan las armas, sino que se incluye a las familias de los desmovilizados, a las personas que viven en los territorios priorizados para la implementación, y a la actividad de aquellos líderes que existente y a quienes surjan del tránsito de las FARC a la política (FIP, 2018).

Las garantías a la seguridad son una pieza fundamental para la paz territorial que invoca el Acuerdo. Por esta razón el texto del Acuerdo plantea un diseño institucional que establece estrategias para el esclarecimiento de fenómeno paramilitar y el desmantelamiento de organizaciones criminales.

La **Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad** será la encargada de diseñar y hacer seguimiento a la política pública en materia de desmantelamiento de organizaciones criminales. A su vez, en la **Fiscalía**, estará la Unidad Especial de Investigación para el Desmantelamiento de esas organizaciones, así como un nuevo Sistema de Prevención y Alerta en la Defensoría. Este Sistema tendrá que mapear y monitorear las amenazas, generar instrumentos de verificación y respuesta a denuncias.

En el mismo sentido, se destaca que el Acuerdo insta al gobierno a revisar **el marco normativo para elevar el costo de los delitos contra líderes y lideresas de organizaciones y movimientos sociales y defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos**, y fortalecer las capacidades investigativas y de judicialización contra quienes atentan contra estas personas, pues como se vio en el aparte anterior, dichas afectaciones continúan siendo una de las principales problemáticas en materia de protección y garantía de derechos humanos.

Asimismo, el acuerdo establece medidas para lograr no estigmatización a grupos en condiciones de vulnerabilidad o discriminados como las mujeres, los pueblos y comunidades étnicas, población LGBTI, los jóvenes, niños y niñas y adultos mayores, las personas con discapacidad, las minorías políticas y las minorías religiosas.

El punto 2.1.2 plantea un compromiso de garantizar la seguridad para el ejercicio de la política, cuyo objetivo final debe ser el afianzamiento de una cultura de convivencia, tolerancia y solidaridad que permita la ampliación de la democracia participativa, sobre la base de prevenir la estigmatización por causas de opinión o el ejercicio de la oposición y el empleo de la violencia por la defensa o contradicción de ideas en el debate y participación en el espectro político nacional.

El Acuerdo final, prevé la construcción de un Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política (punto 3.4) adecuando las normas y estableciendo elementos de coordinación y corresponsabilidad institucional (punto 3.4.1), bajo una perspectiva de seguridad basada en el humanismo y valores democráticos. La asunción de este sistema de seguridad debe conllevar al fin del conflicto (punto 3 Acuerdo Final).

El Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política, debe prevenir las amenazas a la vida, integridad, libertad y seguridad de: i) líderes y lideresas de organizaciones y movimientos sociales y defensoras y defensores de derechos humanos; ii) garantías para la movilización y la protesta social; iii) partidos y movimientos políticos, en especial aquellos que se declaren en oposición.

Específicamente, el artículo 13 del DL 895 – 17 establece una presunción de riesgo extraordinario para integrantes del partido que surgió del tránsito de las FARC – EP a la vida civil, hoy Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común – FARC. Para la protección específica de integrantes de la FARC, sus sedes y actividades, deberá implementarse el: “Programa de Protección Integral para las y los integrantes del nuevo movimiento o partido político que surja del tránsito de las FARC-EP a la actividad política legal”.

5.3 Sistema de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y no Repetición

Uno de los pilares del Acuerdo, es el relativo al Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición, que comprende instancias como la Comisión de la Verdad; la Unidad para la búsqueda de personas dadas desaparecidas; y la Jurisdicción especial para la paz (JEP). Se requerirá que los funcionarios

públicos y la ciudadanía en general conozcan del acuerdo en general, pero sobre todo de los avances y funcionamiento de las instancias previstas en el Sistema.

Asimismo, la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz debe aprovechar las estructuras e iniciativas existentes del Estado, y procurar la articulación entre entidades con la institucionalidad e instrumentos de política pública existentes.

De igual forma, es preciso tener en cuenta aros instrumentos de política pública que se han expedido en aras de facilitar la implementación de las medidas previstas en el Acuerdo como los siguientes:

ANNEX G: INDICATOR PROGRESS

Indicator progress, as reported directly by HRA in their Quarter 3 Fiscal Year 2018 report (data as of December 31, 2018).

#	Indicator	Target LOP	% Achievement LOP
AO: Support the GOC and civil society in promoting a culture of human rights, preventing violations of human rights and responding effectively to violations that occur.			
1	Number of sub-national entities receiving USG assistance that improve their performance.	33	21%
2	Number of human rights defenders trained and supported.	14,400	82%
IR 1: Improved understanding of human rights			
3	Number of stakeholders with broader knowledge and understanding of human rights.	5,040	136%
4	Number of domestic NGOs engaged in monitoring or advocacy work on human rights receiving USG support.	20	130%
5	Number of media products produced through national and local media outlets which contribute to effective oversight on human rights issues in target regions.	120	62%
IR 2: Policies to prevent human rights violations developed and Implemented			
6	Number of sub-national entities receiving USG assistance that improve their performance on prevention.	32 Stage 4	72%
7	Number of government entities that improve prevention service delivery according to the community scorecard methodology.	20	55%
8	Number of local authorities trained to implement prevention policies.	400	178%
IR 3: Investigation and prosecution of human rights violations increased			
9	Number of individuals/groups from low income or marginalized communities who received legal aid or victim's assistance with USG support.	300	203%
10	Number of mechanisms implemented by government entities to advance efforts to curtail impunity.	10	50%
11	Number of strategic cases related to human rights defenders and GBV documented.	9	67%
12	Number of municipalities in which local gender policy is being implemented.	25 Stage 3	72%

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